July-September 1960

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND MODERN ART

STALIN AND IDEOLOGY *RICHARD LOWENTHAL*

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PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SOVIET LIFE: CASE HISTORIES

FIVE SHILLINGS

POEMS BY THE CARLOAD

Chairman Mao's good leadership, so good,
College graduates come here to 'pick up our tune'
Yellow mud on our legs, but as man to man,
I sing a tune to greet our 'next of kin'.

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APPLICATION TO MAIL AT SECOND CLASS POSTAGE RATES PENDING AT NEW YORK 1, N.Y.

SOVIET SURVEY

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July-September 1960

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Editorial and business offices, Summit House, 1-2 Langham Place, London, W.1.
Subscription rates £1 0 0 or 3 dollars a year, post free.
American Distributors: Eastern News Distributors Inc., 306 West 11th Street, New York 14, with whom subscriptions may be entered.

CONSUMER'S CHOICE

Going Round the Shops

Marshall Goldma

HAVING crossed the border into Russia, the first retail stores of any consequence were found in Viborg. On entering the city, I asked my guide to take us along to the collective farm market. I was told it was uninteresting. After lunch I persisted but was then told it was after two o'clock and the market was closed. We nonetheless stopped off in various stores along the road to Leningrad. In Viborg the stores were well stocked and the clerks were not using the old kassa system (cashier) but were taking money over the counter. While the stores were not especially clean they seemed adequate by what I later came to call Russian standards. In the resort town of Zelenogorsk, the kassa system was used, the lines were longer, and the stores more crowded.

In Leningrad, the first major store that I visited was called Gostiny Dvor. I had read in the Soviet press that eventually this store would be the largest department store in the Soviet Union. It was being reconstructed so it is not completely fair to judge the store by its appearance. It is two storeys high, and they often sell the same thing on one floor above the other. I am not exactly sure why this is done; I asked but I couldn't understand the reasoning. The various departments are situated along the main passage, so that one walks down the centre with cashiers located intermittently along the hall. With one or two exceptions, the lighting was poor, the sections were small, and the goods were not attractively displayed. The merchandise did not look too bad, and with prices at the exchange rate of 10 rubles to the dollar, not too expensive to a Western worker. Of course, the Russian workers' wages are very much lower. I asked for and was shown the complaint book. The cashier who showed it to me blew dust off it, but there were some recent entries and replies. I then asked for the director of the store and was taken to what resembled a closet. There, a stout but extremely pleasa and very hospitable woman said she would ca the manager, and she did. The lady to whom was speaking turned out to be the floor man ger. She took me over what seemed about tw blocks through the back door, through th courtyard area, which was being reconstructe It now served as a place for storage and for war housing. The goods that were coming in we being roughly treated; some of the goods the boxes were being tried on by the personn unloading them. Finally, we entered the offi of the manager. It was on the second floor ar was dimly lit. Outside was a plan fulfilme chart. Almost all the sections had done we Unfortunately, the director was on vacation ar the assistant or commercial director was out lunch. (Lunch for him lasted three hou although I later saw him in the store.) Th third person in command, the director for pe sonnel, was brought in and I had a short inte view with him. The first question I asked w 'Who sets the plan?' He answered the Upra lenie (administration) and the workers. I ask if they had self service. He answered yes, the fabrics department, where the customer, he desires, can obtain advice and help. Actuall this turned out to be a service known as *b prodavets*, which means that the prices are list and the consumer can look but cannot take t goods out. I asked about the problems material responsibility in self service. H answered that the assistant section head has t material responsibility. I asked, 'Aren't the difficulties with material responsibility in s service?' He answered, 'Yes, but we are worki to improve the system, which, after all, is ne Then I asked, 'What happens if an assistant se tion head does not like the system of self s vice because it makes his life much more di cult in terms of financial accountability?' H answered that no such situation exists since it

:he assistant section head's job to serve the people. (He said this with a self-satisfied glance at the others in the room.)

I then made plans to return the following day :o speak to the commercial director, the second n command. I also said that I would be happy :o answer any questions about the United States ınd that I would bring some American maga-:ines with me to show them.

Having concluded the interview, the woman loor manager, accompanied by the store inter-ɔreter, a young girl with eye shadow—the first Russian I saw who used it—took me on a tour ɔf the store. In the store itself we found much oafing. Most of the sales clerks were women, ınd almost all sales clerks and all cashiers used ıbacuses. As I mentioned earlier, the kassa ystem was used universally throughout the tore. It was common to see one clerk on duty elling an item such as socks with a long line of ustomers stretching down the corridor. Many izes were out of stock in almost all depart-nents. Because of the nature of the building here were many partitions in between depart-nents. As a result, there was no feeling of novement. It was also common to see many ections in the store closed, with the sales clerks ither taking inventory or free for the day. There were many Komsomol emblems and 'best lepartment' banners awarded for efficient sales lerks and departments.

The next day I returned for my interview with he commercial director. I brought along my uide, and as we walked through the back ourtyard it seemed to me that overnight it had ecome spotless. I felt pretty sure it was in ıonour of my visit. I remarked as much to my uide, who at first felt I was exaggerating. How-ver, as he saw the extent of the cleanliness he inally remarked that, well, our trip had accom-ɔlished at least one thing.

uly 9: Interview with Commercial Direc-or. I began the interview by again asking what ecame my standard question: How do they letermine demand for goods in their store? He eplied that it was possible to measure the move-ıent of goods in monetary and quantitative erms to see which goods were selling most apidly. It was also possible to check inventory ɔ see what goods were accumulating. I then asked what would happen if the plan did not allow for an increase in goods but they suddenly found that the demand for a particular item was larger than had been anticipated? He replied that they could ask for an increase in allotment right away; that they would first address the local planning committee, which would in turn address itself to superior agencies. He stated that the first of August of each year a plan of delivery is drawn up for the entire year to come. Seasonal demand is corrected twice a year—the summer demand is corrected in January and February. They could also make direct contact with the factory, if need be. For example, this year they found they were short of butterfly nets. They requested an increase in shipment from the factory and received them.

I then asked what was done about handling goods out of season. For example, at the end of the summer what do they do with their unsold summer stock? He replied that three years ago a special section was set up in the store to sell goods out of season. We later visited this section and found it very small and the stock of goods very poor and limited. The department store was allowed a certain amount for marking down out of season or difficult to sell goods. For small markdowns on a batch of goods, the amount could be deducted from profits and no one cared. On a quantity of goods on which the markdown would be large, permission must be obtained from the Leningrad office of the Ministry of Trade and in special circumstances from Moscow.

He then asked some questions about trade in the United States. He wanted to know what was new there. I replied that self service seemed to be one of the most important developments in distribution in the United States. He then remarked that he had seen some catalogues in which products were enclosed in glass and in plastic. I tried to explain that we still consider this to be self service and if anything a more efficient form of self service. I showed him my copy of the Sears Roebuck catalogue and *House Beautiful* and *Vogue*. I also gave him some plastic toys I had brought along. After looking at *House Beautiful* he inquired as to the cost of one of the houses and after mentioning a typical price I also stated that it was not necessary, of course, to pay the whole cost at one time. He

then asked me what would happen if one should fail to pay on time. I said there would be a period of grace, after which it might be necessary to foreclose. This was exactly what he was looking for. Later I realized that I should have said that actually foreclosure is very rare.

I then visited some other department stores also on Nevski Prospect, the main street in Leningrad. While the stores seemed to be adjacent to one another, there didn't seem to be any spirit of competition and there were again long lines in front of sections selling commonplace items such as handkerchiefs and socks. In one store I noticed a battery of four vending machines for selling notebooks, all of which were empty.

Something that vaguely resembles self service is being introduced in some department stores for certain goods. In many cases, however, the customer is roped off from the area in the store where the goods are displayed. If you desire to see them, you ask permission to see the given size and the clerk removes the rope so you may enter. I was told that among other reasons, this was to prevent the goods from being soiled by non-purchasing citizens.

July 11: Interview at Leningrad Trade Administration. I saw the assistant director, and started off with the question about demand. S. replied that there were several methods by which trade officials could determine demand. They could use the statistics from last year. The contract made between the firm and the factory would spell out the detailed assortment as to size, price, and nomenclature. Both sides must see to it that the contract is fulfilled. If there should be too many goods for the current demand, then in the next quarter the store could refuse to accept more. Now, 45 days in advance, detailed plans were drawn up as to size, quantity, and colours—this was the precise plan. However, the yearly plan, which is drawn up a year in advance, specifies only the number of the general category of item to be supplied and its monetary value. The factories bring out their new fabrics a month and a half to two months before the production quarter. The goods are then shown and consultation is sought. Trade organisations, clubs, and big department stores all participate. Demonstrations of ready-to-wear clothing are held twice a year for th autumn-winter season and the spring-summe season. Also, various new goods are tried out i the 'new goods' store.

At this point, S. moved into the problem o demand in greater detail. He volunteered th information that now the problem of demand i greater than ever. He said that non-essentia goods are sold freely through the stores on th basis of contracts between trade organisation and wholesale organisations. Goods of import ance, however, are still under the control o Gosplan. I asked him about Yarmarka (trad fairs) which I had read were being held b wholesale organisations for their new goods. H replied that once or twice a year for each lin of commodities such trade fairs were being held This all started about four years ago. They were necessary because many stores and wholesalin organisations found they could not sell thei goods in their particular district. At such trad fairs were representatives of wholesale and trad ing organisations from all the republics in th Soviet Union.

Last year the government decided that th Sovnarkhoz should be given the power to sto production of goods which it considered obso lete. Before this, the plan was not subject t reconsideration.

In Leningrad, production decisions are mad by specialists who determine quantity, price and assortment, and whether or not the good should be produced here. I asked if there wa any danger of autarky. He replied no, tha goods are produced here according to whethe or not the materials existed. He said, for ex ample, only 15 per cent of all the shoes mad in Leningrad are sold here; the rest leave th Leningrad area and some even go abroad. (Thi was not a direct answer to my question.)

I then pursued the question of planning fo demand in more detail. I asked if it was poss ible to plan for non-essential goods, that is, is i feasible to return to production through pla instead of through contract. He replied that i would be difficult because there is much fluctua tion in the demand for consumer goods, there fore it is possible to make many mistakes. H said for example bread is easy to plan; howeve it is hard to plan for stationery and to foreca in advance the quantity and quality desire

Therefore it is necessary to have contracts between retailers and wholesalers to decentralise the process. Ten years ago, one could buy directly from the factory; now it is possible to buy only from the wholesale organisations. As an example of the type of problem they are now faced with in determining demand he cited the case of radios. After World War II, there were only two or three makes of radios. Now there are 25 to 30, and consequently it is difficult to plan production of the various models. He felt that as the country became richer, more and more choices would become available to the consumer. When I cited some comments his subordinates had made in the stores I had visited, to the effect that planning was feasible and presented no obstacle, he said flatly that they were wrong and that it is difficult to plan. That was why the government is decentralising the operation of trade. He then gave me an example of how changes in demand are handled in the Soviet Union. A firm making crank phonographs found that since there was no demand, they could obtain a loan from the bank and start producing another good for which the demand was greater. He felt that in the United States changing production was a more difficult matter.

The next topic of conversation was packaging and the necessity of keeping inventory and records of all packing materials. He said unfortunately this was necessary because they use large quantities of wood in their packing. It was necessary to maintain inventory and records on the packing materials so that they could be used several times. I asked if it was not more expensive to maintain a bookkeeping force than simply to abandon the records and hope that the stores themselves would see to it that the packing materials were re-used. He said no, because it was standardised and there was a standard price list and therefore it was not too complex. I asked if there were any people whose job it was only to keep track of the packing material. He said in the stores there were no such special people but he admitted that in large wholesale organisations there were people whose function was simply to keep track of packing materials.

We then turned to questions about the United States. He asked me about specialised stores and the degree of specialisation in the United States. He stated that they were going to specialise even further in the Soviet Union; for example, a store just for jackets and one just for pants, and he wanted to know if in the United States such specialisation existed. I replied that for the most part stores in the United States are less specialised than stores in the Soviet Union. We felt that saving the consumer's time was more important. He replied that the situation in the Soviet Union was different: each year they were opening up 100 to 120 new stores in Leningrad alone, and the average space for store was 250 to 300 square metres. However, most stores would be on the ground floor of apartment buildings and as a result floor space would be at a premium. Consequently, it would be impossible to open large diversified stores and specialisation was almost a necessity. He also explained that in Gostiny Dvor the departments were very small because of a Leningrad law requiring that historical buildings (Gostiny Dvor is over two hundred years old) be preserved in their original architectural form. He agreed that this was not advantageous for trade but there was nothing they could do about it. He also felt that while there was a need for new housing they could not build department stores.

Ninety per cent of the trade in Leningrad was controlled from his office. Cost of distribution for the Leningrad trade area was 3.96 per cent of the retail price. He himself offered reasons as to why the cost of distribution was so low. The first reason he mentioned was frankly that service was much worse than that in the west; there were fewer stores, smaller sales staff, and as a result lower costs of distribution. I suggested also that the turnover tax had some effect on the base on which the tax was levied and he agreed. He said that the turnover tax on shoes was approximately 20 to 25 per cent.

After such an interesting interview, I regretted that I had already given away my Sears Roebuck catalogue. I suggested that he take the remaining magazines home and look them over. He suggested that perhaps his wife and daughter might be even more interested than he. He gave me some catalogues and an autographed copy of his book about trade in Leningrad which he was impressed to find I had already read.

We went into a radio-television store on Nevski Prospect and saw a radio-television-phonograph combination for about $1,400 at the rate of 10 rubles to 1 dollar. There were smaller television sets—smaller than the size of this page—for about $84.

I found out how the black market works for United States goods. The goods are solicited in the parks or in front of the hotels and then are taken along to the bank of the Neva and are sold to Russians. Black marketeers pick out likely customers and simply ask them if they want it. There was a tremendous mark-up on the goods. For example 20 packages of gum which cost less than a dollar in the United States will sell for approximately $80 in the Soviet Union—that is, each package sells for about $4 in the Soviet Union, or about 40 rubles. I was also asked if I wanted to sell my watch, regardless of the fact that it didn't keep good time. It was western style and that was all that was necessary.

July 12: Together with three Harvard students who were staying in our hotel, we set off in our car for some kolkhoz markets. We headed for the Kirov market but never reached it. But we found two markets on the way. The first, and larger, was very crowded. There were some commission stores mixed in with government stores which surrounded the area. We took some movies showing all of the stores, of which there was almost every sort. Along the way there were some sewing machine operators repairing goods. I took some pictures and a frightened young man came up and said *'Nelzya'*. I said, 'Why?' He said 'Because'. I said, 'Then I want to talk to the director'. Then he said, 'This is not typical'. I said it was a nice-looking market and kolkhoz markets certainly were typical. Then he said sewing was not typical. He seemed to be upset, so I said that if he liked I would take a picture and give it to him, provided, of course, that it was all right to take pictures. I took it on my Polaroid camera and within a minute there it was. Then an old peasant woman came along also saying *'Nelzya'*. I showed her the picture and asked what was wrong with it. She put on her glasses and was quite excited. I said if she wanted one, I would take one of her and she could have it. 'Oh,' she said, and she took off her glasses and placed them on a table and posed. Unfortunately, just then a militiaman came up and said *'Nelzya'*. He said 'If they don't want to have their pictures taken, then *nelzya'*. At this point the woman decided that it was better not to have pictures taken, and urged the crowd to move on, telling them not to congregate because it was interfering with business. Just then someone handed my daughter a bunch of flowers and fled. On our way out we received three or four more bunches of flowers from a large and very friendly crowd.

We drove on again towards Kirov market, but I took a wrong turn and we found ourselves in a smaller, less crowded kolkhoz market. There seemed to be more shelter and facilities here. I looked around and saw a list of charges as of 1957 for services and sales and the *razochny sbor,* the franchise tax, which I proceeded to copy down. If you sell from a machine, from a truck or car, you must pay a franchise tax of 10 rubles. If you sell from a cart, 5 rubles; from a stall or by hand, 2 rubles. If you sell cattle you must pay 5 rubles, small cattle, 2 rubles 50 kopeks. If you do repair work you must pay 2 rubles. If you want meat cut you must pay 30 kopeks; if you rent a scale it costs you one ruble; if you rent work clothes it costs you 2 rubles. You can store things in an icebox for 20 kopeks and in a warehouse for 5 kopeks. Personal things can be stored for 1 ruble; you must pay at the beginning of the day. In the middle of my copying, one of the clerks asked me what I was doing, and I said I was copying down the list. He asked me where I was from. Naturally, he was surprised, and a bit later I noticed him climbing the stairs to wherever the office of the kolkhoz market was. I finished and walked on. By then a group had gathered, and suddenly an old peasant woman started shouting at us. We said nothing but she was quite hostile. Some other people in the market came by and immediately apologised and said she was a bit feeble-minded and not to bother. I then went to price some apples. Many were bruised and rotten, but there were a few beautiful, red, ripe and obviously highly polished apples for approximately 35 rubles a kilogram, which is nearly $3.50 for two pounds. When I turned around, two not quite as nice but certainly

adequate apples were in the hands of my children. Two swarthy men standing there had given them the apples; they turned out to be from Georgia. They go back and forth for about three weeks at a time, flying along with their apples. At 35 rubles a kilogram, I suspect they do very well. We thanked them and walked outside.

July 13: Interview at Dom Modelei. We were received by the director, a woman, in one of the most tastefully designed offices in the Soviet Union. She seemed to be very efficient and alert. She said there were 17 houses of fashion in the Soviet Union. Once a year a general fashion show was held at which each fashion house presented its styles in Moscow. A vote was taken and the best models were selected. Each month in Leningrad the fashion designers hold a meeting to discuss styles and fashions. At these meetings there are fashion designers, artists, representatives of textile firms and stores.

Dom Modelei is under the control and direction of the Department of Sewing Industries and is not under the Trade Administration, but they present their fashions to the Trade Administration who then order the goods they find most appealing. Dom Modelei makes only a single copy and if it is adopted patterns are then sent to the factories for manufacture. In Leningrad they create over 2,000 fashions a year and all the fashions that they make are used in one way or another. They meet the consumer at clubs, at fashion shows, in various houses of culture, and in their own demonstration showroom in the building in which the interview was being held. They also show goods at Gostiny Dvor. Dom Modelei itself does not sell any goods to the population, but sells magazines and patterns to the factories. Each pattern and model adopted by a factory brings from 2,000 rubles to 1,000 rubles. There are approximately 300 employees under the control of Dom Modelei, of whom 20 to 25 are models.

The conversation then switched to America and I showed her some fashion magazines and a Sears Roebuck catalogue. She asked me if Sears Roebuck owned their own factories. I said that they owned some factories, but that they purchase on a contractual basis the majority of their goods from other factories. She wanted to know if anybody could obtain this catalogue and I said yes, it was a mass catalogue. In looking over the fashions she commented, 'These fashions are the same as ours', and I replied, 'Maybe naoborot' (and vice versa). She then said that she had seen the Dior models when they made their appearance in Moscow. She said that she was not much impressed by them. She wanted to know how many fashion designs are made each year by a firm like Sears Roebuck; I was not able to answer the question.

From Dom Modelei we went on to visit Dom Leningradskoi Torgovli. This was by far the best department store in Leningrad. Again, however, there was a duplication of sections and again many sections were blocked off with people either having the day off or stocking up their goods. The store was brighter, lighter and more colourful. We saw a whole department full of Chinese raincoats freshly unpacked. Ivan said these things were usually sold out in a day. We saw women's clothing and one nice light blue suit, made in Leipzig, for only 300 rubles, about $30. The other clothing, much less tasteful, was much more expensive. There was also a line that reached up to another floor simply to buy children's coloured towels, also recently arrived from China, at 10 rubles 50 kopeks, approximately $1.05. I purchased some toys which were not badly designed but very heavy and very expensive. For example, a small plastic fish which costs about 60c. in the United States costs $3 in this store and was much heavier. On the way out, I took a picture of a doughnut machine similar to American doughnut machines, and a board displaying want ads for jobs and furniture for sale.

July 14. S. had arranged for us to visit two warehouses. When he asked me what kind I wanted to see, I said I would like to see the best since I realised that this is what I would see regardless. The first warehouse we visited was a shoe warehouse adjacent to the Skoro Khod shoe factory. We were told this was the largest shoe factory in the Soviet Union. From the warehouse the goods were shipped to the rest of the country and to stores in Leningrad. Twenty-five per cent of the shoes produced remained in Leningrad, and some were even

shipped abroad. The shoes produced here are mainly for ordinary wear; very little was produced of a stylish nature.

Before 1957 the shoe factory was attached to the Light Industrial Ministry; now it was attached to the Sovnarkhoz. The warehouse had 230 employees; the factory had 12,500. Goods were shipped out from the warehouse primarily by railroad; however, water transportation and trucks were also used. A store manager in Leningrad would receive his goods directly from this warehouse. In other cities, there would be a second warehouse which would pass on the goods.

I asked him how he knew how much to send out to stores in the Leningrad area. He said that schedules were drawn up by three Funds. Each Fund served several stores and each Fund completed a plan. The plans were drawn up on a yearly basis in monetary terms. If a store required shoes, the requirement was drawn up by the Fund and the next day the goods were delivered to the store.

Since the industry was under the direct control of the Sovnarkhoz, and since the warehouse was under the control of the Trade Administration, I asked if there were not difficulties between the factory and the warehouse since they had two different head organisations. He replied that there were a few difficulties, mainly over quality. He said assortment was corrected four times a year. I also asked if they didn't have trouble in receiving their products from the factory. I told him that I had heard that there were spurts in production at the end of each quarter, did this not complicate his shipping plans? He said yes, there were spurts in production, and to cope with this a reserve had been created to ensure that the spurts would not affect the smoothness of delivery. This seemed inconsistent, however, because in the next sentence he stated that normally shoes have a turnover of only eight days, that is, they remain in the warehouse only that long.

He said that the factory itself has no warehouse and that the shoes were packed in his warehouse, which belonged to the Trade Administration. He said that 70,000 pairs of shoes were received a day. He paid the turnover tax to the factory for the goods that he received. He said that the rate of turnover tax was approximately 35 to 37 per cent of the retail pric His costs of distribution on the retail price wa 0.422 per cent. Sales amounted to 721,000,00 rubles for the past half year.

He took us on a tour of the warehouse. Ther were three conveyor belts coming directly fro the factory. At each conveyor belt sat a repr sentative of the factory and a representative the warehouse checking the quantity and th quality of the shoes. In the warehouse we collapsible, heavy metal containers used f shipping the packed boxes of shoes. Ther seemed to be a good use of gravity, since th was a three-storey warehouse—slides and co veyor belts were abundant. There also seeme to be good, waterproof packing paper used wooden boxes which were to be used for long shipments. The collapsible metal containe were primarily for Leningrad shipments shoes. The warehouse seemed to be efficient an up-to-date. In the director's office was the on picture of Stalin I had so far seen in Leningra

The reception we received was warm an friendly. I brought my wife and children alon to see the warehouse and during the tour of th warehouse the entire operation was disrupte After seeing a sign urging fulfilment of th seven-year plan, I remarked that today's pr duction would certainly not contribute to th overfulfilment of the plan. They gave us son candy for the children; I took their pictures my Polaroid camera and gave them the print

Upon leaving the shoe warehouse, we dro to a cold storage house also under the Leni grad trade organisation. There were thr refrigerated warehouses in this particular co storage plant, the capacity was 300,000 tons cold goods. Five hundred people were e ployed. There was a specialised trust that co trolled the operation of the trucks. I was to that now delivery was better than before, wh the cold storage house owned its own tru park. The cost of distribution to the wholesa price was 2.8 per cent. They did not pay the tur over tax; it had already been paid by the orga isation which supplied them with the goo Every day over 500 trucks arrived and left wi shipments. The first warehouse in this compl had been built in 1912, the second in 1932-3 and the newest in 1957. They were building fourth. They use a central compressor to supp

cold air for two or three of their warehouses. One warehouse was solidly stocked with eggs, which I was told would remain filled until February or March, at which time the eggs would be sold on the market. We went into the newest building and it was of rather poor construction. Many of the doors stuck and one could only be opened by two or three of the men working together. We visited the compressing plant and saw some of the new equipment. Leaving the compressing plant, I noticed a sign saying 'Mashino Schetnoi Stantsii'. As the director started to walk by the entrance, I asked permission to enter, saying that this had a special interest for me. They hesitated, because it was lunch hour, but then ran inside and told the workers we were coming. This was the one section in the whole cold storage plant where the floor was not clean, obviously because they had not expected us. The staff consisted entirely of women; the big card-punch, computing, sorting and tabulating machines were all Russian made; I was told they were made in 1956. The small desk computers were made in Germany. The whole operation seemed very efficient; it was actually the first time I had seen anything other than an abacus in any trade organisation. I was told they worked only one shift and that the machines lay idle after normal closing hours. I was told that machine accounting was necessary because the wholesale turnover of the cold storage plant amounted to 2 billion rubles a year. Daily there were sales of 6 to 7 million rubles. This meant that there were 16-17,000 railroad cars a year. Seeing the tabulating equipment was the biggest surprise of the whole Leningrad stay.

July 15: The Road to Moscow. In Novgorod I saw Prokatny Punkt. This was a rental store. There were durable goods inside. It was possible, for example, to rent a bicycle for 7 rubles (70c.) a day. Along the road I stopped in various village stores. Although they were not too clean, they were well stocked with goods. There were even fresh tomatoes, from Bulgaria; we saw Bulgarian tomatoes all over the Soviet Union. One woman along the road did not want us to take her picture or take a picture of the store, but the others were warm and friendly. Along the road again we continually saw armed soldiers stopping trucks. At almost every junction with the main road there was an armed soldier checking trucks coming off the small roads. The roads were good, with very little traffic. We noticed a pipeline being constructed from Leningrad to the south. For the most part, the villages looked like a page out of pre-revolutionary textbooks or, at the best, the worst parts of our rural south. There was some new construction but not much.

July 16: Kalinin. We asked to see the kolkhoz market in Kalinin. Although it was late in the afternoon and we were told that the market would probably be closed, we were given directions and we drove off to see it. The whole phenomenon of the kolkhoz market seems to be a very delicate subject, something like an ugly wart that no one likes to think or talk about. In Smolensk we almost caused a riot. An urban resident said that this was not typical—that what we should do was take a picture of the Russian car or of the old Russian church. This is really a curious aspect of their inferiority complex. I persisted, and finally took a Polaroid picture of one of the protesters as he was waving his arms. He took my licence number and phoned the militiaman, but we left before the militiaman arrived. It always seems that those who complain most about the kolkhoz market are urban residents, whereas the peasants themselves were very warm and friendly. In Kalinin I had a long argument with our guide about the kolkhoz market and its future. He felt that they were not typical because they accounted for only 1 per cent of retail turnover. I corrected him and said that it was approximately 8 per cent of the total retail turnover and in some cities as much as 30 per cent. In an attempt to pacify him, I tried to show him my article on the kolkhoz market in the hopes that he would see that I was not interested in what he considered to be the seamier side of the Russian economy. I also tried to explain my feelings about the similarities in retail trade between our two countries. I said that regardless of his ideology, with time there would be greater similarity instead of less in domestic trade in the two countries. He asserted that the kolkhoz market would be completely abolished in a short time, as food production increased. He also

felt that commission trade would push out the kolkhoz market from the other direction. I disagreed, and explained that such farmers' markets existed even in the United States today. He said that as production increased the kolkhoz market would disappear because prices on the kolkhoz market would be driven down. I tried to explain that prices on such markets in the United States were lower but it didn't matter—the markets continued to exist. The fact that prices were lower in the United States on such markets than in the retail stores was quite a shock to him.

Moscow. Near Lenin Hill we saw an automat serving sandwiches and beer from machines. It was quite modern but not too clean. It was located along the main highway in the newest and most modern section of the city, on the route from the airport. Throughout the city of Moscow, as in every other city in the Soviet Union, there is an abundance of tomatoes, all from Bulgaria. Except for the first afternoon in Moscow, there were no oranges until the last three days of our stay. There were oranges in Kalinin, none in Novgorod.

We went to Detski Mir, the store designed especially for children, and about the nicest store in the Soviet Union, probably because it's the newest. To some extent, it's just an excuse to sell regular goods, but still it was impressive and a good idea and the majority of goods were only for children. We were stopped by three Russian women who asked the price of our stroller and where we bought it. Most looked insulted when I said it was an American stroller, that we bought it in the United States and the price wouldn't make much difference. One woman refused to believe it. They were expanding the store, which is already large. The toys were not bad.

We also went into Tsum. There were long lines for everything—one line was just to buy a cheap little bathing suit. However, next to Gum, this store had the best display of any in the Soviet Union. There were complaint books both in Detski Mir and Tsum; they were out in the open and full use was being made of them. Many of the cash registers were made in Japan, and were called National cash registers. There was again a long line for men's socks. Shoes and socks, while being sold elsewhere in the store, were also sold on the top floor of Tsum. There were four floors, and again, at approximately the same position on each floor, they were selling perfume, etc., one floor below the other. The clothes displayed in the windows of Tsum for men were priced from about $160-164. Many of the clothes had no price tags, which meant that they were not for sale. In the background of one of the windows was a picture of a stylish man. He had a crew cut, tweed sports jacket and pipe, and a bow tie with polka dots. He looked like a real American Joe College.

Intourist informed me that they could do nothing to arrange for my interviews, so, armed with my guide I went to see the editor of *Sovetskaia Torgovlia*. My guide was a bit nervous as we walked in and he looked as if at any moment he would be swallowed up, but we were readily admitted. There we met G. He had received and read my letter, as had his colleagues, and I was expected. (I later found out that he had answered me and his letter was forwarded from Wellesley to Moscow.) Most of his colleagues, he said, were on holiday and he too would be leaving in a week, but we arranged a meeting for July 23rd. He was pleasant, intelligent, and witty. He knew about an exchange which had been proposed between Soviet and American marketing personnel. I gave him some questions for our meeting.

G. then excused himself and said that it was necessary for him to leave to give exams. I gave him a copy of my article and he also wanted the rest of my work, which I promised to send him. When I asked him if he had ticket for the American Fair he said no, he didn't, but he intended to go. (At our next meeting he showed me the tickets he had received in the interim.) I followed his advice and together with my guide took a letter to the Ministry of Trade. Again, there was no guard at the gate and we simply went to the fifth floor as suggested by the hall directory. We selected the most likely looking corridor. Here we stopped but only for a minute. A woman asked our destination and we told her that we'd like to see the Minister. She said simply to go down to the end of the corridor. The door was closed and we started to knock, but she motioned simply to go in. In the inner office was the

Minister of Trade, and three men waiting outside. They also said to walk in, even though Pavlov seemed to be busy with his secretary. We hesitated, and in the meantime two women walked in ahead of us. Finally we walked in and handed him the letter. He told us to sit down. (Imagine walking in to see the Secretary of Commerce of the United States with so little trouble.) He read the letter and started to apologise because he felt it was too late in the day to arrange all the things I had requested. We tried to explain that we had time, that we didn't want everything arranged that same day. Then he asked why I had not requested an interview in advance. I said that I had not written him in the first place because I felt he would be too busy, but I would certainly be happy to discuss trade with him. He said we should call him in the morning. We left Pavlov and went downstairs. On the first floor was a kiosk which sold books on trade. It was by far the best place to purchase books on the subject. We also noticed a food store across the street from the Ministry of Trade building; I decided to go in simply because I expected it to be one of the best. Actually, it was one of the worst—my guide was upset by this.

I returned to Detski Mir. While I was watching, some store personnel wheeled in a cart full of children's watering cans. It was during store hours. The freight truck was wired completely on top and all four sides with two doors which opened at the counter so that no one else could get to the goods. The watering cans came in packages of six; many of the paper packages were broken open and some of the cans were falling all over the counter. While the clerk behind the counter was checking them in, a line of people immediately formed and waited. Each item was accounted for and counted. There were several arguments as to the open packages and about there being room for further goods. Actually, there was very little room behind the counter. In the meantime the packages continued to spill all over. I saw other customers in the store carrying similar goods, so this must mean that other counters were selling them. Nonetheless, the line remained. In the final count there was a dispute over the exact quantity. Still the people were in line, and again, not one word of complaint. Finally, to settle the whole matter, the clerk who brought in the goods from the freight room decided to pay the difference in cash herself to the clerk behind the counter. Only then did the freight clerk move on. The whole thing took about 40 minutes; the cost of the pails was 80c. (about 8 rubles) and the people waited in line throughout.

STUDYING THE STUDENTS

Between Conformity and Dissent

Tim Callaghan

THE writer spent the academic year 1958-59 at Moscow State University and there came into close and sustained contact with a large number of Soviet students. During the year, in the course of innumerable conversations, both private and non-private, on a vast variety of topics, some sense of the major divisions among these students in terms of their social and political attitudes began to emerge, and it is these divisions which I have tried in the following pages to define. In addition, I have tried to give some idea of the psychological propensities and personal experiences which are most commonly associated with these divisions as I observed them. And, finally, I have tried to suggest some probable patterns of interaction between these various student-types and their Soviet environment in the future. The students of Moscow State University have been most carefully selected and, in many cases, are destined to occupy positions of power and influence in Soviet society. In this sense, these students are perhaps far from being representative of Soviet youth at large. That there are among them representatives of almost every element of Soviet youth is probable, although their willingness to maintain close and sustained contact with a foreigner (in many cases they became real and close friends) in itself makes them in some sense atypical. However, the great variety of their attitudes and responses to all issues makes it extremely difficult to isolate any syndrome of characteristics common to them all, and inclining them towards friendship with a foreigner, which is more significant than the diversity among them. In any case, it is on this diversity which I will concentrate my attention, and I have grouped them into the following descriptive categories: (1) the bored, (2) the political activists, (3) the discontented, (4) the disaffected, (5) the inner-emigrés, and (6) the satisfied. I will not go into elaborate definitions but will simply suggest the primary characteristics of each within its Soviet context.

The bored. Boredom is one of the most pervasive characteristics of a large number of Soviet students and one of the most significant determinants of their behaviour. The bored student is not simply a new variant of that familiar Russian type, Oblomov. He is ready and anxious to respond to external stimuli and, indeed, seeks out such stimuli, whereas the Oblomov type has more or less consciously withdrawn from his environment in order to avoid the necessity of response. The Oblomov type is bored with the world; the bored student is bored with the Soviet world. The causes of his boredom are manifold and deeply rooted in Soviet society. It is their cumulative impact which oppresses the bored student, and in this he differs from the discontented student. His attitude towards Soviet society is not determined by any specific deprivation but rather by what, for lack of a better term, might be called the *tone* of Soviet life. When pressed to give the reasons for his boredom, the bored student, while he frequently enumerates specific deficiencies in Soviet life, most often emphasizes the general spirit (*dukh*) of Soviet society, its puritanical morality, its rigid code of conduct, its stultifying over-organization. When asked to elaborate the changes which might make Soviet society less 'boring', he is usually at a loss. Neither coherent thought nor a lively imagination is natural to him; indeed, one gets the impression that the bored student (the student who is *above all* bored) is not usually distinguished by high intelligence. Not quite knowing what is missing in his life or what he seeks from life, the bored student often becomes little more than a seeker after novelty, sensation, and innovation.

Many of the friends of Westerners in the Soviet Union are their friends simply because of boredom. The Westerner, to the bored Soviet student, is a new, untried stimulus, a source of possible variety. Boredom is likewise undoubtedly at the root of much of the *stilyagiism* and 'pandering to Western taste' which is

found among Soviet students. But it is important to emphasize that novelty alone is often not enough for the bored student. A crucial factor in the boredom syndrome is often precisely that the novel ways which are adopted evoke public condemnation. Boredom is caused in the eyes of the bored student by the very nature of Soviet society, and the bored student chooses his route of escape from boredom with the more or less subconscious desire to 'take revenge' on society. It is the appropriation by the regime of all outlets for self-expression, with its almost inevitable concomitant of propagandizing, moralizing, and regimentation, which creates the state of boredom; so much so that the automatic and unreflecting response of a not insignificant number of Soviet students to *any* regime-sponsored effort to relieve boredom (*e.g.*, the sanctioning of some varieties of jazz) is rejection—rejection based on a deep-rooted belief that regime sponsorship and boredom are irrevocably synonymous.

Politically, the bored student tends to be apathetic. While he rejects much of the political propaganda of the regime he is not an articulate dissenter. 'Politics' has become a dirty word towards which all response is negative. The regime has so effectively monopolized all political themes that, among the bored students, even a discussion of *Western* politics is suspect. This is not due to fear, for many Soviet students who do not rank among 'the bored' are ready to run the risk of discussing Western political ideas. The political apathy of the bored student seems rooted in the conception that *all* politics must be drab. That some bored students openly flaunt their attachment to 'religion' (*e.g.*, by wearing crosses around their necks) shows that they are not cowards in their seeking out of all varieties of social disapproval. Their 'religiosity' often brings quite tangible deprivations (including expulsion from the University) imposed by the Komsomol and other organizations. The bored student is anti-regime, but not in the political sense. He is anti-social rather than a political deviant. And he is often psychologically impelled to escape from boredom by soliciting public disapproval and thus creating a situation in which he can interact with society while at the same time taking his revenge upon it. Of course, this attitude is not translated into conspicuous anti-social action by all bored students or even by the majority. Those who openly solicit public disapproval are the extreme members of the group; but, in a real sense, they are its symbolic representatives. Their extremism usually leads to expulsion from the university, and this serves as a warning to other bored students.

The political activist. In the university, the political activist is not simply a student who is politically active. He must be distinguished, for example, from the careerist, and the distinction must obviously rest on something as tenuous as 'fundamental cast of mind' or psychological attitude. All the 'genuine' activists of my acquaintance seemed almost obsessed by some personally-experienced, war-connected, *violent* disruption of normal life or else by unmistakeably authentic identification with others who suffered such disruptions. Life under siege conditions, loss of immediate family, and/or contact with some particular atrocity are recurrent themes. Why these traumatic experiences should have set them on the road towards political activism is a question too complex for discussion here, although the widespread success of the regime—a success marked even among the most discontented strata of Soviet student society—in identifying itself with the cause of peace obviously plays a part.

The activists of my acquaintance are hardly what would normally be called 'idealists', and certainly they are not fanatics. They tend to be 'realists' in the broad sense of the word, and are by no means blind to the defects in Soviet reality. Indeed, the activist tends to be more aware of and articulate about these defects than the more complacent members of the group which I have labelled 'the satisfied'. Part of the activist's heightened consciousness of defects in Soviet society undoubtedly derives from his real and active commitment to the Utopian ideals and Victorianesque morality of the regime. Thus, while conscious of defects, the activist believes that action in accord with ideology-derived precepts can remedy them. He is, of course, immune to any suggestion that these defects are rooted in the Soviet system itself.

The political activist is more aware of the propagandist quality of much of Soviet communication than are most of 'the satisfied'. The activist student tends towards a rather articulate elitism which emphasizes the necessity of such propaganda for 'the masses', from which it should not be inferred that he is a cynical manipulator, but rather that he is a conscientious, disciplined, and dedicated young Communist.

That the activist can sometimes verge on fanaticism is indicated by a remark of one student activist at the time of the Pasternak affair. He volunteered on that occasion that he or any of his friends would gladly 'strangle Pasternak with our own hands'. Still, this is not the primary trait of the activist, and it would be a mistake to over-emphasize this side of the picture.

The student activist, then, is a type successful within the Soviet context, thanks to an ability to see his environment 'realistically' and to cope with it competently, while seeking at the same time to transform it on the basis of an ideology-inspired programme (or, more accurately, on the basis of the Party's programme which he perceives ideologically). The activist is *not* satisfied with his environment and, perhaps partly because of propensities traceable largely to childhood experiences of horror and deprivation, is psychologically impelled to embrace, internalize, and act upon the ideology of the regime. This same ideology seems empty moralizing to the bored student, remains simply a dead letter to the satisfied student, and is a source of perpetual irony and a symbol of calculated hyprocrisy to the disaffected student and the student inner-emigré. However, before turning to these three categories, the category of the discontented student should be mentioned briefly.

The discontented. The discontented student is one of an extremely large and amorphous group in Soviet society—a group tending, on the one hand, to merge into the group of the bored or the disaffected, and on the other hand into the group of the satisfied students. The sources of discontent are those long familiar to students of Soviet society, and range from the inadequacy of consumer goods, through (presumptive) job discontent, to the rigidity of intellectual controls. What distinguishes the discontented from the bored students is the ability of the former to articulate the sources of their grievance and the fact that their specific and so to speak, localized state of discontent does not expand into a generalized set of attitudes influencing the entirety of their social conduct. Unlike the discontented students who keep their discontent localized, the disaffected students tend to *generalize discontent* and to identify its sources with the more or less permanent characteristics of the Soviet regime and hence to *politicize discontent* (unlike the bored students).

The student who is simply discontented is often fairly complex. For example, I knew many Soviet students who deeply resented being deprived of access to the entire range of Western literature, while, at the same time, being cognizant of and sympathetic towards the theories by which the regime justifies its inaccessibility. Some, indeed, resented the deprivation not because they thirsted for literary stimulation but because the deprivation cast aspersions on their own maturity and loyalty; at the same time they were ready to admit that perhaps they were not mature enough, perhaps their loyalty could not survive exposure to the unknown but surely real, satanic lures of the West. The rather subtle ambivalence of such an attitude prevents the transformation of discontent into disaffection but in no way alters the reality of the discontent itself.

It should also be emphasized that one of the great sources of discontent is job dissatisfaction or, in the case of students, presumptive dissatisfaction with the job which it is anticipated the state placement apparatus will assign.[1] To

[1] Although the jobs assigned by the state placement service—jobs which are obligatory and which must be accepted for three years—rarely come as a total surprise to the students, there are cases where the opposite is true. In the early Spring of their final year at the university, the students are all permitted to list preferences for types of work and places of work. Even where they do not attempt to gain credit with the regime by volunteering to go 'where it is most useful in the eyes of the assignment committee' they nonetheless limit the operation of their fancy in making these choices. They already know the rough limits of tolerance, occupational and geographical, which the system permits. For example, most of the merely average students in the humanities and

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the bored student it is 'all the same' but not so to the discontented. At the very least, among the bored students, job dissatisfaction seems to follow from an already present set of attitudes rather than to appear as a prime factor in shaping attitudes.

The disaffected. Conceivably the discontented student could often be converted into a satisfied student by relatively slight, albeit extremely difficult and rather unlikely alterations in the regime's policy. The disaffected student, on the contrary, has generalized and politicized his discontent to the point where only fundamental alterations in the Soviet political structure could satisfy him. Moreover, in comparison with both the discontented student and the student inner-emigré (see below), the sources of disaffection are more likely to be clearly political and the grievances themselves more extreme. One disaffected student said 'the American SAC should make me a bombardier, because I know just where to drop the bombs and would enjoy doing it'. Clearly, he is not merely discontented. This response, in its passion and totality of rejection is, of course, extreme, and its psychological roots are deep. (This student's father suffered severely from the measures taken after the anti-destalinisation riots in Georgia.) More moderate is the disaffection which characterized several Jewish students. Here the source of disaffection was often the suffering of parents and, to a lesser extent, the students' own suffering, this time from Soviet anti-semitism. One Jewish friend specifically traced his total disillusionment with Soviet society to his having watched his father disintegrate after being thrown out of his job during the period of the 'doctors plot' scare. Here and in other cases a specific traumatic experience led to generalized reflection and ultimate rejection of the Soviet system.

'The disaffected' are by no means necessarily unsuccessful in their Soviet environment. The mere fact of their being students at Moscow State University would indicate the opposite, and indeed many disaffected students are very successful. All are conscious of the risks they run, and, perhaps thanks to lessons absorbed from the very experience which disaffected them, are exceedingly skilful in dissimulation. Personal or familial 'rehabilitation' in the past several years seems to provide a considerable margin of security, at least psychologically, but it does *not* seem to put an end to disaffection. Several disaffected students of my acquaintance are potential activists in *any* anti-Soviet context. I underline the word 'any', because this highlights one of the key differences between the disaffected students and the students who are inner-emigrés. The former want to change the system at all costs but have not necessarily thought out a programme for change. That this is not true of the inner-emigré students will be seen below. First though, it is simply necessary to repeat that the disaffected carry a permanent scar (with the underlying wound seemingly capable of transmission from generation to generation or, at least, from father to son) the depth of which the Soviet regime may well underestimate.

The inner-emigres. Unlike the disaffected student, the inner-emigré is likely to have come to his state through a prolonged process of inner evolution rather than through a fairly immediate reaction to externally-caused shock. Unlike the discontented and like the disaffected student, the inner-emigré generalizes and politicizes his grievances. His approach to Soviet society is usually analytical and, while he rarely sees any salvation within what he calls 'the system', his attitude towards it is rarely purely destructive.

The path towards inner-emigration is an intellectual one, often inspired by literature sanctioned by the regime but capable of a variety of interpretations, and sometimes inspired by forbidden literature. The path of the inner-emigré is wholly isolated and he lacks the support which even the disaffected student is likely to receive from family, 'fellow sufferers', and old and trusted friends. A Westerner met

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social sciences know that they will be assigned jobs as secondary school teachers regardless of any alternative they might prefer. Knowing this, these students often 'volunteer' to be secondary school teachers and hope thereby to have a greater chance of at least being assigned to the location they really desire. Even this hope is frequently unjustified, because the bulk of the students opt to remain in Moscow or go to another large city, whereas the teacher shortage is most acute in the villages and rural areas.

by chance is often the only person with whom the inner-emigré can discuss his views. Hence it is not surprising that these views, developed by a young person in total isolation, often lack discipline, coherence, and refinement, and a single kernel idea may be elaborated to fantastic lengths. For example, one inner-emigré, inspired by Dostoevsky, had become a Slavophile of the sort who would have stood on the lunatic fringe of Russian intellectual life even in the nineteenth century. Yet he was not a lunatic; he simply had to develop all of his ideas for himself, without criticism, guidance, or system. The Westerner feels that he is caught up in a time-machine operating in reverse. The literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been less thoroughly purged by the regime than literature of later date. Hence, among the inner-emigrés, one finds a fascinating microcosm of nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectual life with the neo-Hegelians and Nietzsche playing the leading roles. Grotesque as this world sometimes seems, it is one of the very few wholly free products of the individual human mind and imagination in the Soviet Union.

Less grotesque and, in a sense, less free are the attitudes towards society and politics of those inner-emigrés who derive their intellectual stimulus and critical position *vis-à-vis* Soviet society from Marx or, sometimes, Lenin. Among these students the image of 'socialism betrayed' or 'the Revolution betrayed' plays the predominant role. In the eyes of many inner-emigrés, they give a certain legitimacy to Soviet society conceived as something apart from 'the system'. And, commingled with this rescuing of a pure nucleus in Soviet society at its inception, one often finds a highly articulate and emotional patriotism (as distinct from political loyalty). The problem which this type of inner-emigré poses for himself is to save Socialism, or the Revolution, and Russia. In his approach to these 'pure forms', there is a marked intolerance of ambiguity and a marked rigidity of thought, as well as a rather amazing self-confidence. His Soviet education has instilled in him deep-rooted patterns of thought.

It is remarkable and encouraging that, in an atmosphere heavy with the pressure of ideological indoctrination, social control, and perpetual mobilization, there are students who have both the intellectual capacity and the psychological fortitude to maintain an almost complete inner integrity, to detach their inner existence from their external environment and, while coping successfully with the latter, to lead an independent mental life in complete isolation from their fellow students. This living in isolation creates tremendous psychological tension for the inner-emigrés, and, although the mere fact of their being students at the university indicates their ability to sustain the tension and perpetuate a complex deception, it is not accidental that two inner-emigrés of my acquaintance were compulsively fascinated by the idea of suicide. Because of the confused nature and complexity of his understanding, the psychological effects of standing always alone and on guard, and perhaps because of the absence of an intense and personal emotional nucleus of disaffection, the inner-emigré, when all is said and done, suffers more sheer, uncompensated strain than any other Soviet citizen.

The satisfied. There are, of course, Soviet students who have achieved considerable success within the system and are, on the whole highly satisfied with their position. Their achievements are *not* traceable to political activism, and their success and acquisition of relative status have not imposed upon them a demand for political activism. Perhaps this is because of their youth and their still comparatively low level in the status hierarchy. That is to say, a demand for intense political participation may be made upon them if their success is to continue. However, the future psychological response of the satisfied students to these hypothetical demands is difficult to predict. Certainly their satisfaction makes them prone to political loyalty, and the imposition of these hypothetical future demands, especially in so far as they indicate rising status, is unlikely to be deeply resented. Still, it is important to remember that the satisfied students are not activists by nature, and their political participation is likely to be always artificial from the psychological point of view.

The satisfied students tend to see Soviet reality suffused with the glow of their own contentment, and are thus less prone than the

political activists to recognize defects in the Soviet system. One factor in explaining this seems to be the apparent stability which has characterized their lives. Thus, though the satisfied student is likely to share few views in common with the average Western observer, he is more likely to 'make sense' to the latter than either the political activist or the disaffected student, who continually refer, both consciously and unconsciously, to a store of experiences and insights which can perhaps be understood but can never be shared by the Western observer. The satisfied student is to some extent a 'reasonable man', though his reasonableness is marked, in the eyes of the Western observer, by an irritating complacency. He makes fewer demands on his human environment than either the activist or the disaffected student. He has a 'live and let live' attitude; it seems to me that *the satisfied student is by far the most representative, statistically speaking, of all of the student types which have been discussed.*

WHILE I have suggested that boredom is a pervasive characteristic among Soviet students, that particular syndrome of psychological propensities and social and political attitudes which goes to make up the bored student (the student who is *above all else* bored) is not widely prevalent among the Soviet university population. The regime conducts a perpetual campaign against this type of student who, by courting the opprobrium of society in an almost compulsive way, cannot fail to make himself conspicuous. Because boredom derives from the oppressive drabness and dull repetitiveness of Soviet life, it is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, although (in so far as the material standard of living is one of the causes of boredom) on a diminished scale and at a lower level of intensity. However, the bored student cannot, in the nature of things, adopt the art of dissimulation and his chances of exercising power or authority in Soviet society are slight. That he will prove a less than perfect object and instrument for those exercising power and authority is certain, but he is unlikely to have any significant role in shaping the Soviet future.

The discontented students are many, but the combination of their ambivalence and their pragmatism with respect to the sources and varieties of their discontent makes it unlikely that they will have any pervasive influence on the evolution of the *fundamental* nature or structure of Soviet society. Their discontent, as I have suggested, tends to be localized and is in many cases capable of satisfaction within the framework of Soviet society. Even where this is not the case, discontent does not seem to develop into disloyalty. Nor, and this is much more important, does it seem to inspire generalized reflection on the means for its own elimination. Rather, discontent seems a quality that can be channelled by the regime for its own purposes. Its existence can be an impetus towards social betterment and cultural relaxation, but it is unlikely to call into question the basic purposes and policies of the regime.

The disaffected students are far fewer in number than the bored or the discontented; in fact, it is remarkable that any such people have survived and prospered in the Soviet educational system. However, it seems most unlikely that they will attain positions of influence or power in Soviet society. To some extent, because of the very experience which brought them to a state of disaffection and because of the long memory of the Soviet regime, they are already marked men. The fact that past history and present suspicion are likely to hamper their careers makes them potentially all the more dangerous from the regime's point of view, and heightens the probability of ultimate head-on collision with the regime; there seems little doubt about who will emerge the victor from such a clash.

As in the case of the disaffected, it is remarkable that the inner-emigré students manage to manipulate their environment and their own psychological dualism so well that they gain admittance to the university and survive in the university environment. That they do so is a fact which should make us wary of exaggerating the monolithic character of Soviet society. However, these inner-emigrés, too, are few in number; the possibility that they will crack under the tension of their lives, and their need to remain inconspicuous and withdrawn, make it highly unlikely that they will have much influence on the future evolution of Soviet society. The inner-emigré lacks ambition (this is not

true of the other types) and seeks above all to avoid involvement with 'the system'.

The political activist is not a very common type in the university population, but he is likely already to occupy a position of power and influence within university society (Komsomol committee, student-faculty union committee, etc.) and is likely to attain the upper reaches of the Soviet hierarchy. It should be emphasized that this type of student is not an idealist but rather an ideologically committed realist. He has demonstrated organizational talent and has been given responsibility. In my experience, at least, he has proved to be of high intelligence and acute perception. Part of his success in Soviet society is undoubtedly traceable to the intensity of his motivation, but part is due to the skill of the regime in identifying him and allowing him to develop and discipline his capabilities. Having been initiated into the rites of responsibility, he seems unlikely to become disillusioned with the intricacies of the exercise of power in his later career. The emotional nucleus which sustains his political activism seems powerful enough to lend dynamism to his operations within the bureaucracy. To predict the particular policies which are likely to be favoured in the future by the political activists is, of course, impossible, but it is difficult to find anything in their backgrounds or current attitudes which could lead to fundamental revision in the structure or orientation of the regime. This is not to suggest that the student political activists are either complacent or unimaginative. Rather, they think in terms of more effective implementation of current policies and seem to feel that in every respect the Khrushchev regime is moving forward in precisely the right direction. The political activist is imaginative only in the instrumental sense and his strong emotional commitment to 'the system' makes it extremely difficult for him to look beyond the horizons set in childhood and assimilated in practice throughout his successful student career. It seems probable that he will bring to the Soviet future dynamism, improvising pragmatism, and disciplined self-assurance.

POSSIBLY a majority of the students fall into the category of the satisfied. In the most concrete and obvious sense of the word these students have, by Soviet standards, every reason to be satisfied. Most of them come from relatively affluent and influential families, and are receiving the best which Soviet education has to offer. They look forward to promising careers. They are wholly loyal to the regime, but accept politics passively even though, in order to promote their career and avoid any shadow of suspicion, they may participate actively in the political and social work of student organizations. In other words, they are politically apathetic at the same time that they are politically loyal. They are intellectually complacent at the same time that they are highly educated. They are, I believe, real representatives of the 'new Soviet man'. From the regime's point of view, these satisfied students are a real problem in so far as it is interested in training up young intellectuals who are resourceful, imaginative, and psychologically motivated towards the fulfilment of the regime's goals.

It is with the phenomenon of these satisfied students that, it seems to me, anyone who is inclined to speak of any future 'liberalization and democratization' of Soviet society is forced to count. And it is often absence of contact with this predominant majority of Soviet university students which prompts Western visitors to speak so optimistically about the intellectual vitality of what they are all too ready to identify as *the* Soviet student. The satisfied student is, I believe, a relatively new phenomenon in Soviet society. He is impressed by Soviet achievements and by the improvement in the consumer goods situation; he is pleased with the relative cultural relaxation which has taken place under Khrushchev; he is glad that police terrorism has disappeared from the Soviet scene. But his satisfaction with these new features of Soviet life tends to be *absolute* at the very time when the changes themselves are only relative. The satisfied students have been diligent and have absorbed their lessons, and the result has been a total stultification of the imagination. One Soviet student, when asked what he most desired in the world, thought long and deeply and then solemnly announced, 'I wish every city in the world could be just like Moscow'. While this answer may represent the extreme in complacency, it typifies a prevalent attitude. It is not

that the imaginative capacities of these students have merely been disciplined—that after all is one of the effects of any educational process. It is rather that their imaginative capacities have atrophied. Leaving aside the question of the extent to which this is the result of conscious educational policy, the *de facto* educational experience of many Soviet students has been such as to inculcate complacency. Indeed, I think that much of the intellectual-cultural relaxation which has taken place in the Soviet Union should be seen against this background of complacency. The regime can, perhaps for the first time, risk exposing its citizens (or at least the bulk of its university students) to hitherto prohibited intellectual stimuli. It can rid itself of the onus of exercising a fantastically rigid censorship and can capitalize on the abatement of discontent which this relative relaxation brings. Now, for the first time, the students who are anyway prone to satisfaction can feel that they are not being significantly deprived. At the same time, the regime can take the risk because their imaginations have been so atrophied and their analytical abilities so deadened that exposure does not invite discontent or, indeed, arouse strong demands for more exposure. While some few students get caught up in a cycle of rising expectations, the majority, having tasted the heretofore forbidden fruit, are unimpressed and uninspired. Their palates have been deadened. There are students who have developed immense analytical and critical capacities and who possess rich and fertile imaginations, and who will probably become increasingly dangerous to the regime. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is the satisfied students who are the most representative products of the Soviet educational system and who will be more instrumental in shaping the evolution of Soviet Russia.

At first glance, it would seem that the satisfied students, complacent and politically apathetic, are unlikely to be instrumental in modifying the structure or orientation of the Soviet system. They are easily manipulated and strongly conformist. They are incapable of imagining alternatives to the system or of conceiving modifications in it. More serious, it seems to me, is the possible role of the satisfied students in slowing the dynamism of Soviet society. Many of them will occupy important positions in Soviet society, and their combined weight could well force a modification in the pace of Soviet life. Such a modification would not bring with it major political or social changes in the direction of liberalization. Liberalization is not the product of complacency and defective imagination. But such a change in the nature of Soviet society would be none the less real and, from the point of view of the regime, none the less undesirable. However, it might be well to remember that the Soviet regime has managed to retain its dynamism in the face of positive opposition. It has never before had to face complacency, but it would probably be excessively dogmatic to insist that it cannot successfully cope with the problems it poses. If it is true that the future leaders of the regime are probably to be found among those students who are now political activists and if these students are ideologically committed, thoroughly disciplined, organizationally experienced, and pragmatically creative, then it would be exceedingly risky to discount the probability that the Soviet regime a generation hence will be *essentially and in its fundamental socio-political structure and orientation* very similar to the regime we know today.

NEUROSES: EAST AND WEST

Psychotherapy and Soviet Life

Emanuel Miller

IN 1931 the writer was privileged to visit Soviet Russia to study at first hand the methods and progress of Psychiatry in its clinical and social aspects. We were particularly interested in certain claims that had been made in the field of rehabilitation; perhaps the term reconditioning would be technically more accurate. This technique of rehabilitation was mainly concerned with various forms of mental disturbance, including the behaviour disorders of children, and the social deviations in conduct. The philosophy of this approach had clearly a two-fold root. The one pole was informed by, or rooted in, a socio-economic doctrine springing from dialectic materialism; that the satisfactory and the contented were those who fitted into a social frame which not only disciplined but satisfied basic needs. The second pole of this philosophic spectrum was planted in the already deeply established and impressive work of Pavlov, whose physiology of behaviour had scientific method and a neurological model which gave considerable intellectual satisfaction in addition to a coherent explanation of behaviour in practice. It was a fairly logical move from the conditioning of animal behaviour with certain limited objectives in view to social conditioning, despite Pavlov's candid admission that the difference of complexity was immense. Moreover, although Pavlov was himself a product of an earlier social political culture, the materialistic concept of man's basic needs fitted in well enough and safely enough with his physiological determinism.

In our visits to Pavlov's laboratory, to schools for difficult children and the bezprizorny (homeless), to prisons, to institutes for reclaiming prostitutes and other social deviants, we witnessed a common urge to restore persons to society without reference to the personal history, the vicissitudes of a private kind that had brought them to their present state of maladaptation. It is true that the children were examined in the light of the family structure, but therapy was social-educational. The prostitutes and the vagrants and the criminal psychopaths were reconditioned through group life and work; social obligation and the soviet message was the star to which these damaged wagons were to be hitched—repeated failure at adjustment usually led to the labour camps. Any hint of personal psychological insight was not apparent in the management.

Where major mental disorder was in question, the old custodial method was the rule, and in this respect it differed in no marked degree from our then existent practice of control and reasonable care. Artistic production, not uncommon in schizophrenic thinking, was a subject of curiosity—but although Freudian phantasy interpretation appeared to be strictly taboo, we witnessed an interesting lapse when an ikon-like drawing with Christian symbols was diagnosed as a regression to the Christian phase. When the minor psychoses and neuroses were discussed, we were told that these rapidly resolved with social control, sedatives for anxiety, and various exercises, baths, and massage. In short, as one book of the time expressed it, Soviet Russia had liquidated Neurosis.

In this respect Pavlov's work was the guiding principle in theory and practice; indeed it held the central position in all neuro-psychiatry at that time. In the light of the recent collections of case studies published in Soviet Russia which have come to hand and which will be discussed in the light of Western psychiatry, it would be only fair to consider briefly Pavlov's attempt to contain the study of neurosis in the wide vesse of conditioned reflex psycho-neurology.

PAVLOV had already noted certain basic temperamental differences in his experimental dogs; two polar opposites were observed the quasi-sanguine co-operative (extrovert?) who formed conditioned reflexes with ease, and the sullen, withdrawn, unco-operative, slinkin

creature whose conditioning was difficult but asting. In 1923 a flood in Leningrad inundated he laboratory and the priceless experimental dogs were subject to near drowning. They were ll saved but the conditioned patterns were en-irely broken up. A state of experimental neurosis, according to Pavlov, had been created. Much that he subsequently wrote and which his exponents disclosed, on the nature of clinical neuroses, was derived from Pavlov's specula-ions on the inhibitions and the obliterations which took place in the conditioned behaviour patterns of his animals. These mechanisms must be familiar to the student of Pavlovian behaviour theory, but it is timely to repeat that herapeutics were not a very prominent feature n the work of his associates. Strangely, he everted to Janet's theory of weak nervous otential in the cerebral apparatus of the neu-otic, and to the idea that rest-conditioned sleep roduced by suggestion aids, not to mention arcotics, was the strong suit in his treatment rmoury. The word psychotherapy was occas-nally mentioned but it is impossible to pin own either Pavlov or his followers to any defin-ion: is it a relearning process of faulty con-itioning, is it suggestion, is it the establishment f a good patient-doctor relation? There was o clue to an answer until recently. Certainly reudian analysis was anathema and even the retchmerian typologist was regarded as super-cial and un-neurological in Pavlov's sense.

We may well ask where has Soviet psychiatric nerapeutics moved in recent years, and do nese recently published case studies betray a hange? What are these changes; are there ny sacrifices of formerly held Pavlov-based neories; has personal psychology crept in and there in consequence a move towards Western assification and its psycho-dynamics? How far ne objective psycho-neurology of Pavlov and is immediate associates and followers has eated a fixed corpus of doctrine and practice is impossible to say on the evidence at our sposal. The case studies now available do ggest a wider horizon and perhaps an elastic terpretation of Pavlov. To be sure, there was idence in Frolov's account of Pavlov's work blished 25 years ago that while Freud's xual theories were vehemently repudiated, his ew on slips of the tongue, forgetting, and the existence of powerful dynamics outside the realm of consciousness as generally understood, could be viewed in the light of Pavlov's theories of inhibition. In fact his followers were only too ready to say that Pavlov's neurological model sufficed to explain the neural basis of disturbed conduct plus the theory of a weak neural constitution, genetic or acquired. Nor did Pavlov ignore the complex or non-motor influence of language on the expression of the life of behaviour. Pavlov and Freud had a common mechanistic foundation, the one kept to the neural model, the other argued from histories that it could never be clear what happened without the verbal recapitulation of history as felt. Neither doubted the share of higher functions—i.e. frontal cortical, and the effect of the unconditioned realm of emotion and instinct. Dr. Svyadoshch's first case study illustrates the duality of the Pavlovian approach tempered by a wider and deeper appreciation of personal vicissitudes. The young man was overwrought by study and exhausted by influenza. The young woman was distressed by a disturbed personal relation or marital tangle. But here too the explanation descends from the human experimental-emotional plane to the signalling and conditioning system of the brain. As if, so to say, telephone messages between two lovers were adequately explained by the electronics of the circuit

Other examples, however, make greater concessions to the complex psychic pattern, for example, the onset of an obsessional neurosis in an already recognised obsessional or pedantic character with mood swings. His present trouble had as precipitant a marital upheaval. Now the narrative is not unlike the manifest content of any psycho-dynamic case-history with the exception that the explanatory exposition is given solely in terms of cognitive processes, that is, that higher cortical functions are alone implicated. This is of course inadequate, even on Pavlovian theory, for which the unconditioned lower centres of the instinctual-emotional life are the primary processes (in analogy with Freud's principle). In this example of an obsessional character the personality involvement is hidden beneath a sketchy neurological mechanism.

Every so often the case studies disclose a growing interest in the dynamics of the emotional life; personal vicissitudes are stressed and the relationship between intellectual superiority and emotional inadequacy considered, but with an inexplicable restraint the underlying conflicts are left half considered.

Pavlov made some attempt at the neurological analysis of hysteria and in these studies one or two examples are given which even stress the well-known phenomenon of secondary gain. This reaction formation can only be adequately explained in terms of total personality values. These processes show a growing interest in total responses which indicate that psychopathological attitudes are feeling their way into Soviet psychiatry. Psychotherapy, as an adjunct, is frequently employed, results are successful and surprisingly rapid. Nevertheless there is no indication what this implies; was it suggestion persuasion, indoctrination? One is led to th conclusion that more personality analysis (of preconscious character) has been utilised wit a view to what has been called 'insight therapy

It is important to consider the one or tw examples of unsuccessful therapy. Here hyp nosis was tried, sometimes unsuccessfully sometimes even with unfortunate results. Dan gers of suggestion are honestly mentioned These life stories were clearly cases of comple emotional stresses which only prolonged effor in depth analysis could alter.

Over all, these interesting, but to the analyti cally-minded rather bleak expositions, indicate shift towards a psychological approach althoug there is no abandonment of the brilliant neuro logical model upon which Pavlov's fame s deservedly rests.

Below we give some brief case histories taken from:

A. M. Svyadoshch: Neuroses and their Treatment (*Nevrozy i ikh lechenie*, Moscow, 1959)

A YOUNG man and a young woman were admitted to the Sanatorium. Neurasthenia had been diagnosed. Within a few weeks the young man had gained considerable weight, felt brighter and more rested and was discharged. The young woman lost weight in spite of the good food and the strict observance of Sanatorium rules. Her neurasthenia symptoms increased. Without staying her full term, she left the Sanatorium and went on an expedition. Despite the hard climatic and living conditions, and the great pressure of work which often meant going without sleep, and getting food which was less nourishing, less varied, and less well prepared than the Sanatorium standards, she nevertheless made a quick recovery and got rid of her neurasthenia. By nature she was impatient and active, a hard worker who could be placed neither in the thinking or artistic category, as classed by I. P. Pavlov.

The young man's neurasthenia started after he had strenuously and over a long period worked for an exam, gone without sleep, eaten irregularly and finally had an attack of influenza without taking to his bed. The Sanatorium treatment which followed the successful passing of his exam, led quickly to his recovery.

The young woman had, five months befor entering the Sanatorium, received a letter to th effect that her husband who was on an exped tion, had been unfaithful to her with one of hi women colleagues. On his return the husban frequently met that woman in the course o his work. The thought of her husband's inf delity never left the patient. The slightest dela that kept him longer at his job, a telephon call or the thought that her husband and th woman were meeting at work, caused he anxiety and emotional upset. In her relation with her husband the patient was reserved, try ing to keep her sufferings from him. Graduall neurasthenia symptoms set in. Her stay in th Sanatorium at a time when her husband wa still in the old job, brought no improvement i her health. Her recovery began fairly soon aft her husband had gone off with another exped tion which included his wife, and marital rela tions had improved.

In this particular case the illness develope in a woman who belonged to the category o people with a strongly unbalanced nervous sy tem, without one of the signalling systems pr dominating. Her slow braking process fostere the onset of her illness. The latter was cause

by conditioned reflex irritants (the letter, etc.), signalling the approaching threat to her family life. And the, till then indifferent, irritants (such as the telephone, the husband's delay at work, the thought of his woman colleague) assumed a new signal significance and in this context became psycho-traumatic. (pp. 31-2.)

THE Patient X, 28 years old, going downstairs one morning on his way to work, suddenly stopped at the thought 'had the door been left open?' He went back, checked: the door was shut. From that moment he was assailed by constant doubts about the door, 'had it been left open?' When he left, the door was locked, barred and bolted; nevertheless, several times a day he left his work and felt compelled to return home and check on the door. He realised how unfounded his anxiety was, he fought against it, but could not overcome it. This state of affairs went on for over three months. By nature the patient was pedantic, neat, sociable, had difficulty in switching from one activity to another; there were no signs of one signalling system predominating over the other. No such compulsive states had been observed in the past. Periodically, there had been changes in mood—he became very irritable and irascible. The patient himself was unable to associate his illness with any cause. It seemed to him that it had started without any external reason.

The patient had married for the second time. He had loved his first wife very much and had lived with her for about two years. At the end of that period he began getting irritable, irascible, grumpy. Relations with his wife deteriorated and, one day, on returning home, he found the door to the flat open—and on the table lay a note from his wife informing him that she had left him and gone to another man. He was very upset, begged her to return to him, but she didn't. 18 months later he married again. The marriage was a happy one. After about two years, the symptoms he described suddenly began manifesting themselves. The wife noted that a few weeks before he became ill, he had become very irritable, petulant, and excitable. As a result, relations between them deteriorated. The patient himself did not notice this.

Obviously, the deterioration in relations between the patient and his second wife was a signal which evoked thoughts of her possible departure. Touching off the 'sore point' in the brain caused by his first wife leaving him, this signal was a super-potent conditioned reflex irritant, provoking a tendency towards a pathologically inert excitability. The core of this patho-dynamic structure was the thought of the possibility that his second wife might leave him. Then the inhibiting process came into action, and that is why the thought was not adequately reflected in the secondary signalling system and the patient remained unaware of it. His wife leaving him was associated in his mind with the door being left open (when his first wife left, the door had remained open). Being, as it were, on the periphery of a patho-dynamic structure, this image assumed the traits of a constant stimulant and thus became compulsive.

It is possible that in this case the thoughts about his second wife leaving him did not find sufficient reflection in the secondary signalling system in consequence of the break in direct contact between the secondary signalling system and the nidus of the pathologically inert stimulus which formed the basis of these thoughts. The break could be the result of a negative induction from the nidus, the centre, of the pathologically inert stimulus. The reason for the insufficient reflection of psycho-traumatic ideas could also be inducted influences derived from some other thoughts. From the centre of the static stimulus associated with the thought of his wife leaving him, the stimulus radiated, as it were, along side routes, through a long-standing conditioned reflex link into the secondary signalling system. There it led to the emergence of a stimulus centre, expressed in the form of a compulsive thought (compulsive doubt): 'had the door been left open?' Here, however, the basic centre of the stimulus, associated with thoughts of his second wife leaving him, was found to have received insufficient reflection in the secondary signalling system. (pp. 72-3.)

THE Patient M., 28 years old, a mathematician. She is by nature over-anxious, easily tired, switches with difficulty from one kind of activity to another. Frequently conscious

of the lack of a full life. Always inclined to abstract-logical thought, 'always understood best what was expressed in words or formulas'.

Menstruations, begun at 14, were regular. Sex life from the time of her marriage, at the age of 21. Attached to her husband. 4 years after their marriage her husband left her. She has a 4 year old daughter whom she loves. Childhood illnesses: only measles and scarlet fever: mild attacks. Feared the dark from childhood. At the age of 12 she almost drowned in the river and has ever since been afraid of water (depths). Afraid to go into the water even near the shore. When she was 15, after working very hard for school examinations and following a bout of influenza, the anxiety state worsened. She would repeatedly check whether she had closed the door, whether she had switched off all the lights and electrical gadgets. On learning that a girl friend, on leaving school, had developed a mental illness, she was, for about six months, afraid of 'going mad'. At the same time she was afraid of getting rabies, after a dog had seized her by her dress. This fear lasted for about a month. When she was 16, she became attracted to a young man. Their relationship was a platonic one. In that period she also feared getting dirty, a fear which has lasted to this day, in varying degrees. She started a compulsive ritual of washing her hands—going on washing them until a large soap bubble had appeared (3 x 7) 21 times. If something prevented her from washing her hands, her fear would return and if she made a mistake in counting the bubbles, she started washing her hands and counting all over again.

In the last year she developed a fear of sharp objects, particularly at home, which she associated with the thought that she might accidentally hurt the child with them. The patient herself stated that the renewed fear of water (and depth), the fear of 'going mad' or getting rabies were perfectly comprehensible to her. But her fear of 'getting dirty' and the fear of sharp objects are quite incomprehensible to her and she could not associate them with any event in her life. She believes they had no outward cause. They seem to her to be alien to her nature, stupid, incomprehensible. . . . She fights them, but cannot overcome them.

Here the neurosis began in a psychostenoid psychopathic person. According to I. P. Pavlov the patient belonged to the weak thinking type as borne out by increase in fatigue, timidity, the sense that life was not full enough, the weakness in visual, graphic thought and the predominance of abstract-logical thought processes. At the same time she displayed also insufficient mobility of nervous processes, as evidenced by her difficulty in switching over quickly from one kind of activity to another and also the existence of her anxiety state.

The patient's symptoms may be divided into three groups. The first group is made up of symptoms linked with the aggravation of her characterological traits (de-compensation of psychopathy). They became evident after the patient had worked very hard and became weakened following her attack of influenza when her anxiety state, her lack of confidence, her desire to check her actions (door, lights, etc.) got rapidly worse. Here, too, belongs the patient's awareness of the lack of fullness in her life and her increased timidity. (pp. 86-7.)

TYPICAL traits of hysteria attacks appear in the following observation:

Woman patient Zh., 24 years old, technician artistic. By nature obstinate, egocentric, inclined to day-dreams, fantasies and dramatisations, easily tired, highly emotional. Complained of convulsive attacks which took the form of a feeling of a lump in her throat and gesticulating and sweeping movements, accompanied by sobbing, moans and waving of arms which lasted for a quarter of an hour. During the attack, the pupils react to light. As attack comes on, manages to reach the bed. Recalls only vaguely what happens during actual attacks. Attacks are not accompanied by tongue-biting or involuntary urination. The attacks occur only when she is upset, and only in the presence of her husband, during a family scene. Terrorises husband with her attacks and makes him attend to her whims.

Zh. reported that her attacks first began when she was walking with a young man—now her husband; there was the sound of a distant explosion, she was frightened, she felt 'bad', and had 'hysterics'. Later on, the hysteria attacks returned on the conditioned reflex lines in a situation and at a time which seemed to the

patient conditionally best suited and desirable.

The origin of that first attack is interesting, being as it was conditioned by the inter-action of various factors. We shall deal with this at greater length.

It may be assumed that the first attack occurred in connection with the fact that the distant sound of the explosion, signalling danger, was a super-potent irritant which inhibited the action of the cortex and caused a relaxation of the sub-cortex that expressed itself in the attack. This conditioned reflex irritant was pathogenous, in all probability due to the following circumstances:

(1) in the war the girl had frequently heard the sound of an explosion, experienced fear, but behaved bravely and lost none of her self-control. Evidently, by exercising control, she managed to suppress her emotional reaction to fear. The conditioned reflex link between the sound of the explosion and the feeling of fear nevertheless persisted because ever since she had disliked all sounds reminiscent of an explosion.

(2) she liked the young man very much. He had courted her for a long time, but behaved with too much restraint and indecision, while he had waited for him to declare his love for her. Thus, excitability of the cortex increased seriously as a result of radiation of sexual excitement from the sub-cortex; the stimulus of the conditioned reflex irritant (the distant sound of the explosion), taken in conjunction with her own stimulated state, could easily become super-potent.

(3) the girl's reaction was an impetus which speeded up the man's long-awaited declaration. Before that, she had known that faints and similar states of 'helplessness' could sometimes bring people nearer to each other, but had not thought about it. The mechanism of 'conditioned desirability' of the symptom—discovered by I. P. Pavlov—played its part in this. (p. 109-11.)

PATIENT F, 34 years old, dancing teacher.

By nature volatile, irritable, inclined to dramatise, a poseur, has a vivid imagination, easily switches from one kind of activity to another. Once, going into the street after an attack of follicular angina, he felt compression in the cardiac region and great weakness. The skin became pale and covered with cold sweat. A passer-by saw him home. Ever since F. has had a phobia, a fear of going out alone. As soon as he went out by himself, there was the same tension around the heart, he became pale, cold sweat broke out, and he felt a sharp sense of fear. If, however, he went out in company, he felt no fear. For two months F. has tried unsuccessfully to get over this fear, and eventually had gone to seek medical advice.

In this case the phobia started in a type who could be said to belong to the artistic category. The whole origin of his illness would seem obvious in this case. His feeling of fear, caused by an interruption in the activity of the cardiac vessels, during his reconvalesence from the angina, happened to occur when he was in the street. From that moment the, previously indifferent, irritant (the street) assumed a new, pathogenous quality and began, through the conditioned reflex mechanism, to cause a feeling of fear and the sense of danger at being out alone, with no one to help him. But the fact that the conditioned reflex persisted for so long was due to something else as well. The patient was jealous of his wife, 14 years his junior, who was his dancing partner during their lessons. This fear of being alone in the street led to his wife always accompanying him. The fear of being out alone, and his wife's presence near him, coincided in time and became associated as a conditioned reflex. The phobia assumed the nature of a 'conditioned desirability' and therefore persisted. The revelation of this mechanism and the patient's realisation of it, achieved in the course of causal therapy, not only helped him to understand the origin of his illness but also led to its speedy elimination. (pp. 151-2.)

PATIENT P., 48 years old, was admitted to the Sanatorium in 1956, complaining of sleeplessness over the last 3 years. He associates the start of his illness with a period when he had to work very hard on a dissertation and through 'will power' and tablets had cut short his sleep in order to work at nights.

Having read how vital sleep is to a human being and the harm done through lack of sleep, the patient decided that the harm had already

been done and therefore was resolved to get enough sleep. The thought that sleep was essential never left him. 'Sleeplessness will be my death' he would say. And when he went to bed, he thought hard about sleep, counted to thousands, told himself 'I shall sleep' and didn't sleep for nights. When he took sleeping tablets, he checked his reactions, lay waiting for sleep to come, and didn't fall asleep till morning. He would get up, tired out with the expectation of the 'horrible end'; in the last six months he had given up his job, begun to shun people, received no one and constantly thought of ways to combat his sleeplessness. At the Sanatorium the patient was prescribed 0.2 gr. (? Barbamil) and physio-therapeutic procedures but he did not go to sleep as he was always waiting 'to catch the moment of going off'. Hypnosis was applied but between the first and second hypnotic stages the patient shuddered, opened his eyes and said: 'I felt I was falling . . . don't do it. . . .'

Then followed a talk with the patient about his illness and it was suggested to him that he should go to bed and try not to sleep, telling himself, 'I must not go to sleep'. All sleeping pills were stopped. Next morning the patient declared delightedly that in 3 years this had been his first full night's sleep. There were more such talks and the patient began to sleep well. He said 'I no longer have to force or not to force myself to go to sleep. I lie down and go off to sleep, without thinking'. (p. 200.)

PATIENT P., 46 years old, musician, soloist and conductor. Complained of feeling fear at public appearances, which sets in the moment he gets up on the stage; lasts through the first work on the programme. He experienced this fear for the first time when, after an interval of seven years, he played a solo on a trumpet, with orchestra, before an Audition Committee. While he was playing, he trembled so hard that he had to steady himself against the piano during the performance of the first work. Since then, the fear, accompanied by a feeling of tightness in his chest, and by trembling and excessive sweating, had afflicted him for the last two years, whenever he has to go out on the stage and during the performance of the first work on the programme. He can hardly play because the instrument trembles in his hands. But he loses that fear during the subsequent items on the programme—his solo appearance and conducting the orchestra. 'I understand', he said, 'that I have got a conditioned reflex, that I again experience the fear I felt two years ago at the time of the audition but I cannot help it. I can't overcome it'. Even long before his illness hypnotists had several times tried to hypnotise him from the stage but without success. The patient himself had asked for hypnotic treatment. It was pointed out to the patient that hypnotic sleep and suggestion were not one and the same thing and that his cure did not call for hypnotic sleep. His pathological conditioned reflex could be stopped, the association broken by suggestion while he was awake.

The patient was asked to look into the doctor's eyes. The doctor, lightly pressing the patient's head with his fingers, said slowly, clearly, and impressively: 'Now you will experience no fear when coming out on the stage. You will be quite calm, quite calm, quite calm . . . You will feel extremely well and happy . . . extremely well and happy . . . you will feel lighthearted and joyful'. Then he added quietly: 'You understand, the fear you felt two years ago which coincided with your going on the stage and playing your first work, is still associated with your going on stage, through a conditioned reflex. Now this conditioned association has been broken. When you go out on the stage you will have no fear at all, no fear at all. . . .'

The suggestion formula was repeated once more. The patient's face flushed, became covered with sweat, the breathing became more rapid. About ten minutes later, when the patient was about to leave, he was again asked to sit down and the suggestion formula repeated yet again.

On the evening of that same day the patient went on the stage quite calmly. 'I noted with surprise before going on', he said, 'that I felt no fear and felt extremely well. On stage I was quite calm and felt not the slightest fear during the playing of my first work. I did not press against the piano to steady myself. Your words rang in my ears'. The phobia did not return. (pp. 232-3.)

M. S. Lebedinsky:
Sketches in Pyschotherapy
(*Ocherki Psikhoterapii*. Moscow, 1959)

PATIENT K., 32 years old, foreman; has always been rather timid and indecisive. From childhood terrified of corpses and for that reason did not attend the funeral of his father who died not very long ago, and whom he dearly loved. In December 1951 his friend died suddenly of a heart disease. K. at once experienced unpleasant sensations in the cardiac region; he was troubled by shortness of breath, palpitations; often it seemed to him that he was dying and then he would call the First Aid. On therapists' instructions he took heart medicine for a long time and was often away from work. He was sent to Kislovodsk. While in the resort, he worried over his wife and children. Here his condition sharply deteriorated; according to him, he found the company of the other heart cases depressing. He returned to Moscow in a state of depression, and was unable to work. All the time he was troubled by those sensations in his heart, he was afraid to go out alone, often asked therapists' advice and called out the First Aid. The medical therapists sent him to a psycho-neurological clinic. Here, in a few days, psychotherapy (psychotherapeutic talks) removed all the symptoms described. The patient now feels quite well, and is able to work. Further prolonged observation showed that he went on working all the time without seeking therapist advice and only occasionally complained to us of debility and fatigue. His heart does not worry him. After each talk with us his condition improved. (p. 102.)

PATIENT U., 46 years old; widow; teacher with higher education; came for help. Has always been nervous, irritable, given to crying. But until the last few years her nerves had never prevented her from leading a normal life. She lived happily with her late husband and enjoyed a good standing in her school. About three years ago she got on intimate terms with a teacher colleague who also worked in the same school. The man was younger than she, married, had children and thought a great deal of his family. But 18 months later he clearly thought his relationship with U. a burden, made attempts to break it off, but, as could be gathered from the patient, met with opposition from her. Relations became worse. Recently, according to U., her lover had behaved badly to her, had deliberately compromised her in front of their colleagues. U. has taken this very badly, but has been unable to put an end to a relationship that had grown so abnormal. She had some severe attacks of hysteria which had not occurred before, and several times she has been compelled to interrupt her lesson and leave the classroom in tears. Both teachers and pupils began to disapprove of her.

When the patient came to see us she was in a bad state, and asked to be helped quickly. She said that if she can't rid herself of this attachment which has become meaningless and, in fact, dangerous to her, then she will 'go mad' or at any rate, which is probably very true, will lose her chances to work as a teacher.

Considering that the patient seemed to assess correctly the situation she was in, but could not cope with the emotions involved, we tried, on the whole, to adopt a course of suggestion in a hypnotic state. We realised the danger of suggestion in this kind of attachment which ought, of course, to be solved consciously, by the patients themselves. But here, it seemed, the circumstances permitted the use of the suggestion method. Also, the patient had been asking most insistently for this particular method being applied. She placed all her hopes in this type of treatment, she said. Help must be given quickly, in view of the complexity and the danger of the situation in which the patient found herself.

But from the very beginning we realised the futility of our efforts: during the first hypnotic session U. broke out of her hypnotic state with a stormy attack of hysterics. She came twice more. Although the patient had been put into deep hypnotic sleep, she obviously offered resistance to suggestion (trembling, coughing), which we had difficulty in overcoming. The third time the patient complained that she felt worse. The talk with her brought no real improvement and U. stopped coming. As we learned later, she had not stopped her efforts to continue the relationship. (pp. 112-13.)

PATIENT K. entered the hospital because of a torturing compulsive thought. It seemed to her that she must murder her only son whom she adored. She knew she would never do this, but she suffered over the shameful thought. In hospital, the patient either suffered because of this, or else she was plagued by a fear that this was the beginning of a psychosis, that she was 'going mad'. To begin with, the patient had no other complaints and at our first meeting could not tell us anything about the reasons behind her illness.

We established complete contact rightaway: the patient was clearly frank, trusted us and waited for us to help her. But she was really convinced that the illness was only expressed in this compulsive thought. Nor did she suspect that this compulsion had its causes in her life, her personality. That is why she could not spontaneously tell us anything more about the nature of her illness or its causes. It is this narrow comprehension of her illness which prompted the patient to give standard replies to our questions about her family life and her past—replies which were to show that all was well. The first talk with her yielded nothing new by comparison with her case history notes compiled by the doctor on her admission.

Immediately after our first talk with her, the patient was treated through intermittent sleep (amytal-nitrate, coupled with suggestion in a hypnotic state). During the treatment she felt very well. Clearly a big part in this was played by the daily suggestion treatments in a hypnotic state. But she reverted to her earlier state at the completion of her treatment; compulsion reappeared.

Now, having got to know the patient better, additional and very important facts have emerged. Her family loved and spoiled her. There she was used to everything being done for her and decided for her. She has always been timid, unsure, indecisive. She had a hard time when evacuated. Got to know her present husband there; he is much older than she; she married him, as she herself says, 'calculatingly', —it was hard living on her own. She does not love her husband. He is a despot, won't let her do the housekeeping, so that K. continues to feel dependent. Her husband won't let her take a job; and, because of him, she does not meet many people. They have one child. The birth was a difficult one, with a difficult post-natal period. While in the maternity hospital she spoke little to the other mothers, but listened to their conversations. On the one hand, all the talk about the post-natal complications and women's ailments deeply perturbed her; she began to feel ill and to imagine that major complications would set in also in her case. On the other hand, hearing about their relations with their husbands, the way they kept house, and worked at their jobs, she became more conscious than ever of her own lack of independence, forced passivity and inactivity. She left the maternity home under great mental stress; felt more overwhelmed by her home and husband than she had done before the birth of her child. She loved her son very much, but was always plagued by the thought that she was not a very good mother. It was against this background, evidently, that the thought of murdering her child first arose. According to the patient, she realised this for the first time clearly when a rabid dog had to be killed in the house. One supposes that this episode provided an impetus to a thought that had already begun to take shape. (pp. 149-50.)

THE young woman K. recently got married. She clearly suffers from hysteria but came to see us because of a pathological symptom which at the moment was most important for her: as soon as she began living with her husband, she developed an unsurmountable fear of the sexual act. Marital life proved impossible, and this is perturbing the young couple. K. came to see us greatly depressed. She found it particularly hard because she had no one to talk to openly about this. She thought the situation was hopeless.

At this juncture the patient was least of all inclined to go through a long treatment. We made an attempt at symptomatic treatment which was fully successful. We found out that the patient had all her life been very shy and her married life was such that she and her husband were never really left alone. After a talk with the young woman's parents, it was possible to effect some temporary changes in the young couple's life. It was explained to them at the same time that their troubles were also due to

he young wife's shyness but that they were ıot caused by any grave, still less by any irre-ıovable pathological reasons. This proved ;ufficiently effective. The rather restricted infor-ıation about the patient which was, however, ;ufficient to clarify the origin of the pathological ;ymptom at the most important moment in this ɔarticular case, made it possible to give effective ıelp. (p. 158.)

PATIENT X, 18 years old, student. She had had a difficult childhood but before her ill-ıess had been gay and sociable. By nature she is ʼery impressionable. The patient and her ɔrother, also a student, don't like their step-ıother and left home for a student hostel. A ʼhile ago some students had made unfair and ısulting accusations against the brother and ister. The patient was deeply shaken and tried ɔ commit suicide. Admitted to the clinic in a ɔad mental state. She makes no contacts, does ıot wish to see her parents who come to visit ıer. Inclined to generalise her negative attitude ɔ those who offended her by their accusation. ;he seems to bear a general grudge, to shut ıerself in. It appears she had made no attempt ɔ discuss the insult to her and her brother with ıyone. That is why she found herself alone ı her trouble, alone with her sad thoughts.

In the very first talk it was possible to estab-sh the difficult family conditions which had ɔng been a deep traumatic condition in the ɔatient; these had clearly heightened the girl's ensitivity and made her particularly sensitive bout life in the hostel. This led to the situa-ion where the patient, at the first sign of trouble ı the hostel, repulsed the help and sympathy f several friends and unjustly transferred her eeling of hurt from a small group of offenders ɔ all her colleagues. (p. 182.)

PATIENT R., 53 years old. Has for many years held a very responsible post. In the ast he had frequently written, out of his wide nd interesting knowledge, papers and articles ʼhich had always met with approval. Two ears ago, wishing to raise the standard of his ıeoretical knowledge and broaden his experi-nce, R. relieved himself of the practical side f his work.

Getting down to his work R., as usual, did not spare himself in his efforts to get his dissertation written as quickly and as well as possible. But two obstacles arose. His health deteriorated after a severe attack of influenza; he had frequent headaches, weakness, at times dizzy spells; his sexual powers weakened considerably; he grew more and more tired and began to lose sleep. On the other hand, R. began noticing that the very nature of his undertaking bothered him.

Of course, these two factors, asthenia, and the problems connected with his changing over to a new type of work, reacted on each other: post-infection asthenia became over-laden with neurotic reactions. Of late the neurotic symptoms had increased considerably. The patient cried frequently.

He suffered from the delays in his work. He worried whether he would complete it in time. Had set himself an impossible time-table and tried to study at nights. Naturally, this lowered his productivity even more. The patient did not speak about it directly, but gave the impression that he tried to prove to himself, and perhaps to others, that he was really not sparing any effort to get the job done. He is very conscious of his state, and the fact that for the first time in his life he might be falling behind—although absolutely no pressure had been put on him; on the contrary, his colleagues tried to persuade him to put off the finishing date for his work until a later term.

The patient is obviously unable to adapt himself to the situation, unusual for him, of a man whose capabilities don't come up to the tasks facing him; a man who has proved incapable of carrying out his duty as he understands it, without taking into account the changed circumstances.

R.'s illness is connected not only with post-infection asthenia and the difficulties of a job new to him; his neurosis is, first of all, the result of a clash between the complexities of the task and the possibility of its fulfilment, the difficulties of switching to a new type of work, accompanied by hypertension in the mobility of the nerve cells, which has been lowered through age and infection. (pp. 188-9.)

PATIENT Sv., born in 1922. Sent to us by a therapist in February 1955. Certain that she was suffering from a bad heart and would soon die. Suffered from severe headaches, often called for the First Aid. Highly irritable, frightened, anxious. At times it seemed to her that someone was standing behind her. Could not be at home alone. Sometimes forced to run out of the house, even when husband and child were at home. Sometimes wanted to cry out, held in with difficulty. Nightmares. Lack of appetite. Recently lost much weight. Asked to be sent to a psychiatric clinic because she can no longer stand her condition.

Talks with the patient elucidated the following: Having lost her parents at an early age, she was brought up in a children's home. From 15-18 she lived with her aunt, a brutal woman who beat her. This treatment made a deep wound. She was sociable, sensitive, impressionable; took offence easily. From 18 on she worked in a factory. In 1941 she finished a nursing course and went to the front where she stayed till the end of the war. She began to feel unwell after demobilisation: she cried a lot, became irritable and fearful. Had treatment from a neuropathologist. Improved slightly. Soon after she got married. Her husband had a difficult character and treated her badly. They had one child. In the autumn of 1954 she once became very angry with her three-year old daughter and, being in a highly irritable state, beat her very hard. When she calmed down, she deeply regretted her unfair behaviour. She felt a pain in her heart and became frightened. She was given first aid. Next day a close friend of the patient died of a heart disease; ever since her condition has deteriorated. Received therapeutic treatment, but without result. A clinical and X-ray examination showed the heart to be normal; the electro-cardiogram recorded negligible fluctuations. A neurological examination showed heightened tendon reflexes, reeling in the Romberg position, trembling of closed eyelids and fingers of outstretched hands. We prescribed for the patient psychotherapy and small doses of insulin. Already after the first few psychotherapic treatments her condition improved considerably; her fears disappeared almost completely; she began to sleep well. Her appetite improved and she gained weight. Still complained of weakness and over-anxiety.

Although a diagnosis of neurosis was made in 1954, systematic psychotherapy was not applied once until 1955. (pp. 304-5.)

STALIN AND IDEOLOGY

The Revenge of the Superstructure

Richard Lowenthal

MARXISM, apart from having been the creation of a highly original thinker, may be said to have been the ideology of the early labour movement in the age of the European democratic revolutions of the 19th century. *Leninism* was the modification of that ideological structure by a leader who was above all concerned to forge a revolutionary instrument for seizing power, and was further modified in the light of his early experience with that power. *Stalinism* is the ideology of a fully developed modern totalitarian dictatorship. It arose from the need to justify the practical policies and techniques of this system as consistent with existing Marxist-Leninist doctrine by adjusting that doctrine to practice; hence the adjustments reflect, in Marxist-Leninist ideological terms, the real dilemmas with which Stalin was faced. They were the dilemmas of a party which thought of itself as the revolutionary party of the proletariat, but which had come to power in a vast, backward and predominantly agricultural country where the proletariat, the industrial working class, was very much in a minority.

This dilemma had not been altogether unforeseen by the founders of Marxism. In 1850, when Marx and Engels were drawing their lessons from the abortive revolutions of 1848, Engels wrote in his study of *The Peasants War in Germany* about the plight of Thomas Muenzer, the leader of a chiliastic movement during the Reformation and of a section of the 16th century peasant uprising, when he briefly gained a measure of local power in the Thuringian town of Muelhausen. 'The worst that can befall the leader of an extremist party', Engels wrote, 'is to be compelled to take over the government at a time when the movement [of history] is not yet ripe for the rule of the class he represents, and for the execution of such measures as the rule of that class requires. . . . He finds himself necessarily in an insoluble political dilemma: What he *can* do is in conflict with his entire previous attitude, his principles, and the immediate interests of his party; what he is *supposed* to do cannot be done. In one word, he is compelled to represent not his party, his class, but the class for the rule of which the movement happens to be ripe. For the sake of that movement itself he must act for the interests of an alien class, and must feed his own class with phrases and promises along with the assertion that the interests of that alien class are really their own. He who gets himself into that false position is irredeemably lost'.

The above quotation is in the spirit of what came to be the main stream of Marxism in the following decades. Marx viewed the future of socialism and the labour movement as analogous to the history of what he called the bourgeois revolutions. The latter, which we will call democratic revolutions, had come about on the foundation of an already developed capitalist economy and bourgeois society, so that the final act of political revolution had only been the sloughing off of the shell of the pre-bourgeois despotism. Just so, Marx expected a similar growth of socialist 'relations of production' from below, which would lead to critical conflict with the old order of private ownership and the state protecting it, culminating in a political revolution of the proletariat.

Lenin's concept of the revolutionary task came from quite a different tradition—that of the Russian revolutionary underground groups, such as the Zemlya i Volya and Narodnaya Volya of the 70s, which sought to organise the overthrow of the Tsarist Autocracy and their own seizure of power precisely because Russian society seemed *not* to be doing its job, *not* to produce the new social forces which could achieve a democratic revolution more or less 'spontaneously'. Lenin was well aware that in organising his party in such circumstances as an instrument for taking power, he was

preparing, from the point of view of proletarian socialism, to take power prematurely; yet already in 1902, in his pamphlet *What is to be done?*, he proclaimed preparation for armed insurrection as the purpose of the organisation and the justification for its centralist structure, and in 1905 he called for participation in the forming of a Provisional Government. It was then that one of his Menshevik critics, Martynov, faced him with the above quotation from Engels, suggesting that Lenin, too, would be 'irredeemably lost' if he took power prematurely in backward Russia. Lenin reacted with uncontrollable anger and with an unconvincing attempt to argue that Engels had meant leaders who took power before conditions were 'ripe' for the rule of their class would be lost only if they did not know what they were doing. But he also suggested, as early as 1905, that if the Russian Socialists entered a revolutionary government, socialist revolutions in advanced European countries might follow and might then help them to overcome Russian backwardness; if not, he then admitted, the Russian Socialists could only stay in power long enough to carry through the 'democratic revolution', after which they would have to abdicate and go back into opposition.

In fact, of course, things happened differently in 1917. Lenin did indeed take power, but he kept it even when it turned out that no socialist revolutions in advanced industrial countries came to his rescue, and so he found himself precisely in the dilemma predicted by Engels and his Menshevik critics. He was conscious of the dilemma, particularly after the concessions he had made to non-proletarian classes—peasants, traders, 'bourgeois' technicians and bureaucrats—under the New Economic Policy, and kept worrying about it in the last years of his life. But he never came to a final solution, and left the dilemma to his successors.

IT was Stalin who, in the course of the struggle for the succession, imposed his particular solution on the Russian people and the Bolshevik party. I am not here concerned with the historic evaluation of his achievement, only with the changes he had to make in Marxist-Leninist doctrine in order to defend it. For Stalin's solution to the dilemma—the so-called 'building of socialism in a single country' and in an underdeveloped, isolated country at that—created for him a number of ideological problems.

The first of these may be called the *problem of economic immaturity*. Stalin had decided to industrialise Russia under the leadership of the Bolshevik party—to do the job of 'primitive accumulation' which had elsewhere been accomplished by capitalism, and to call this 'Socialist Industrialisation'. The first systematic justification of this procedure in Marxist-Leninist terms is contained in Stalin's 1926 booklet *Problems of Leninism*, and centres on the distinction between the 'proletarian revolution', in which Stalin claimed to be engaged, and the 'bourgeois revolution'. According to Stalin, apart from other differences,

> the bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less finished forms of the capitalist order, forms which have grown and ripened within the womb of feudal society prior to open revolution; whereas the proletarian revolution begins when finished forms of the socialist order are either absent or almost completely absent.
>
> The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists in seizing power in order to build up a new, socialist economy.
>
> The bourgeois revolution is usually *consummated* with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the *beginning*, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organising the new one. . . .

These formulas have been familiar commonplaces to every communist and every student of communism for so long that the realisation that they were innovations of Stalin's, that they are not in Marx and are indeed in direct contradiction with Marx, comes as something of a shock. Even in Lenin's writings, Stalin could only find one quotation to support him, and that rather tentative. It is taken from Lenin's report to the seventh party congress in March 1918, when he was defending his decision to sign the Brest peace treaty with imperial Germany so as to keep power, although hopes for an immediate

German revolution had not materialised. Musing on the new task then facing him, Lenin had said that

> one of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution is that for the bourgeois revolution which arises out of feudalism new economic organisations gradually are created in the womb of the old order which gradually change all aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task, viz. to sweep away, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding society. . . .
>
> The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, had to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult is it for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction new tasks are added, incredibly difficult tasks, viz. organisational tasks. . . .
>
> The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter has ready at hand the forms of capitalist relationships, while the Soviet power—the proletarian power—does not inherit ready-made relationships if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism which, strictly speaking, affected only a small stratum of industry and hardly touched agriculture. . . .

Thus Lenin still treated the difference as largely due to the accidental 'zigzags of history' which had brought his party to power in backward Russia before the victory of socialism in any advanced capitalist country, not as inherent in the nature of the socialist revolution. But Stalin generalised the Russian experience of having to 'create' new social relations after the seizure of power into a law of development for all socialist revolutions. By doing this, he stood Marxism on its head: the political power, the 'superstructure', was declared the creative force with whose help the economic 'basis' was to be constructed. Of course, Stalin never expressed this innovation in these words; on the contrary, when explaining the Marxian concept of history in his chapter on Dialectical Materialism in the official *History of the CPSU* (*Short Course*), he repeated the old conventional formulas—but when he had to justify what he was actually doing, he turned the Marxian relation between basis and superstructure upside down. This is the fundamental Stalinist revision of Marxism.

The next question that arose was, of course, this: Given that the economic and social basis can be transformed by the use of political power, how is it to be done? We know from history how Stalin did it in fact—by forced industrialisation and forced collectivisation. He formulated the principle of that policy only much later, when dealing with the period of forced collectivisation in the *Short Course*:

> This was a profound revolution (Stalin wrote, looking back in 1938), a leap from an old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of October 1917. The distinguishing feature of this revolution is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the state, and directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants who were fighting to throw off kulak bondage and to live in freedom in the collective farms.

In the light of the known facts, we may safely discount the latter part of the sentence about the alleged peasant support, and concentrate on Stalin's statement that collectivisation was a *'revolution from above'*, on the initiative of the state. This is a fundamentally new concept, and of course it follows from the new thesis of the state as a creative force in history.

How does this Stalinist theory relate to Marxism, and how does it relate to reality? It is in irreconcilable conflict with the teachings of Marx, but it is a fairly good description of Soviet reality in ideological terms. In the guise of an alleged theory of socialism, Stalin has in fact given a formula for the forced development of an underdeveloped nation by the ruthless use of political power. It is precisely in that role that the Soviet Union has become an attractive model for a number of other underdeveloped nations.

THE second ideological problem created by Stalinist policy may be called *the problem of the New Class*—that of explaining the role of a privileged bureaucracy in a 'socialist' society. Leaving aside the earlier dispute with Trotsky, the problem arose for the Stalinist leadership itself only after the forced collectivisation had been completed and the groundwork of Soviet heavy industry had been laid

under the first five-year plan. By then, a new social structure with new classes had clearly come into existence, consisting of the industrial workers (no longer described as 'proletarians'), the collectivised peasants, and the mixture of clerical employees, intellectual specialists and bureaucrats officially grouped together as the new 'Soviet intelligentsia'.

The very existence of the latter group presented a difficulty. According to Stalin, the eradicated kulaks had been the last exploiting class, and there were only productive classes left—workers, collective peasants, and toiling intelligentsia. But even so, it was not enough to make the bureaucrats statistically disappear in the mass of clerks—it was awkward to call the new intelligentsia a class at all. In official speeches and documents, it was customary first to enumerate the three groups—and then to go on speaking of two classes.

How, then, were relations among these classes to be defined? According to Stalin, since there were no more exploiting classes, there could no longer be any class conflicts: this was now a socialist society, not yet classless, but with several productive classes co-operating harmoniously. (Here is one of the roots of the formula about 'non-antagonistic contradictions' of which so much has been heard in China in recent years.) The picture was elaborated in the so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936, in Stalin's speech introducing it at the Soviet Congress, and again in his report to the 18th party congress in 1939. But the new definition of Soviet 'socialist' society as founded on harmonious collaboration of two classes and a stratum raised several further questions.

First, how were the wide inequalities of income to be explained? Stalin replied at considerable length that equality had nothing to do with socialism: the only kind of equality implied in the Marxian vision was the abolition of exploiting classes. In his speech to the 18th party congress, he clearly rejected even the idea of a tendency towards greater equality; any other argument would have been in glaring contradiction with the facts.

Second, the question of whether the intelligentsia, or its bureaucratic part, was a class at all had to be slurred over: Stalin could neither admit that the 'New Class' had in fact a special relation to the means of production, nor preten that they were just part of the workers.

Third, if a socialist society free from exploi tation had in fact been achieved, why was ther still need for a state? Stalin explained that th theories of Marx and Lenin on the 'witherin away of the state' in socialism had to be re vised, because they had not anticipated th situation of a socialist country encircled by capi talist enemies: such a country needed a stat to defend itself against aggression from withou and enemy agents within. Moreover, in addi tion to its classical role as an apparatus o repression, the socialist state had also take over constructive cultural and economic func tions which had become very important. Here Stalin first threw out the idea that the construc tive role he had assigned to political powe might be a permanent one.

Finally, if the classes were co-operating har moniously in the new society, what had becom of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat?' Stali replied that the Party had ceased to be a pro letarian class party. This has been hardl noticed and little understood in the non-com munist world; it was most fully elaborated, i agreement with Stalin, in the report on th revision of the party statute delivered b Zhdanov at the 18th party congress. Zhdano explained that there was no longer any reaso to maintain different conditions of admissio to the party for people of different classes under the old statute, entrance had been muc easier for a worker than for a peasant or bureau crat. The revision was, of course, logical, bu it meant that the CPSU ceased to be a 'worke party' even officially: it became the party o 'toilers', all productive classes. Illogically, how ever, the term 'dictatorship of the proletaria has never been publicly renounced as a defini tion of the rule of that party, though in a recen conversation with a Western journalist, Khrush chev stated that it no longer applied to th Soviet Union.

This, then, is the second group of ideologic revisions elaborated by Stalin—the concept of 'socialist' Soviet Union as a harmonious societ of several toiling classes, permitting permane inequalities of income and privilege, and a indefinite extension of the creative role of th state. Of this vision of class harmony, it mu

be said that it is not only incompatible with the Marxian concept of class, but also with Soviet reality: It is ideology of a purely justificatory character and contributes nothing to real knowledge.

THE third kind of ideological problem arose for Stalinism out of the very fiction that socialism had been achieved—though it was bound to arise for the people of Russia anyhow from sheer lapse of time. It was *the problem of the permanence of dictatorship.*

Originally, no one had expected the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to last for decades; and with the announcement that socialism had been achieved and the party's immediate programme thus fulfilled, it seemed to have lost its purpose. Stalin's first attempt to explain the need for continued dictatorship was made at the height of the blood purge, at the famous plenary session of the Central Committee in March, 1937. In a report on the causes of the party's alleged 'backwardness' in dealing with the danger from 'enemy agents' in its midst, there occurs the vital passage whose repudiation formed the theoretical core of Khrushchev's 'secret speech' in 1956:

> We must destroy and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here would of necessity die down more and more, and that in proportion as we achieve success the class enemy would become more and more tractable. This is not only a rotten theory, but a dangerous one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and makes it possible for the class enemy to rally for the struggle against the Soviet government. On the contrary, the farther forward we advance, the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes, the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state and the more will they clutch at the most desperate means of struggle, as the last resort of doomed people. . . . This is what History teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us.[1]

That was certainly not what Lenin had taught; it was a real innovation of Stalin's and his first attempt to justify the permanence of the dictatorship. If the 'enemies' fight more desperately the more successful the measures taken against them, the dictatorship clearly is not self-liquidating—however many 'enemies' it may liquidate. But this particular justification of the permanence of dictatorship is not only a permanent threat to the cohesion of the party because of its association with the blood purge; it is also logically shaky in its obvious contradiction to the claim that the exploiting classes have been successfully eliminated. Though only Khrushchev repudiated it officially, there are some indications that Stalin may have recognised it as a mistake by 1939, after the Great Purge had run its course; the speech, though published at the time, was not included in later collections of Stalin's principal papers, and the official edition of his Collected Works never reached that year. But as Stalin had never formally disavowed the argument, he could always return to phrases recalling its tenor whenever another purge was on, and this type of language reappeared indeed in Soviet documents in 1949 and again in 1952.

The only more solid argument to justify the permanence of dictatorship despite the completion of 'socialism' that I can find in Stalin's writings is in his so-called testament—his 1952 pamphlet on *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. There, in his polemic against the economist Yaroshenko, Stalin insisted on the need for further changes in the structure of Soviet society, as distinct from mere quantitative advances in productivity and technical improvements in organisation. Before the higher stage of Communism could be reached, Stalin argued, the group property of the collective farms and the market relationship between them and the state-owned sector of the economy would have to disappear; among the conditions that would have to be fulfilled 'for a real and not just declaratory transition to Communism', he listed

> to raise collective farm property to the level of public property and also by means of gradual transitions to replace commodity circulation by a system of products exchange under which the central government or some other economic centre might control the whole product of socialist production in the interest of society.

[1] The speech was published in English as a pamphlet under the title *Mastering Bolshevism*. The passage is on pp. 29-30 of the 1937 New York edition.

Thus Stalin envisaged a further turn of the revolutionary screw—a transformation of the collective farms into state farms, a disappearance of the class difference between industrial (and state farm) workers and collective farmers, as a precondition for achieving 'full Communism'. Such a revolutionary transformation in the situation of a large class was clearly a political problem, not just a technical or organisational one; and it required the leadership of the party and the power of the state. The true and final argument for the permanence of the party dictatorship was the permanence of the revolutionary process.

This third major theoretical contribution of Stalin's thus completed, a few months before his death, the ideological self-knowledge of the first totalitarian regime of our time—a regime that can survive only by making revolution permanent. Again, it has nothing to do with Marx, who did not foresee any development of this kind, but it does reflect an important, new social reality in ideological terms: the dependence of a dictatorship of this new type on maintaining its revolutionary dynamism as a condition of its survival.

THE fourth major ideological problem raised by Stalin's policy of 'Socialism in one country' concerned the relation between the national power interests of the 'Socialist state' and the interests of 'World Revolution'—of the international communist movement. Once 'world revolution' ceased to be an immediate hope, contradictions between the two were bound to arise—and with them the question how far one could or should be subordinated or sacrificed to the other.

This problem has been so much discussed in the non-communist world that here we need glance at it only in passing, especially as Stalin never admitted it in explicit terms. In fact, his 'solution' consisted in denying the contradiction, by simply claiming that as the Soviet Union is the chief bulwark of international communism, its interests *are* the overriding interests of the world proletariat—by definition. In practice, this amounted to a claim that all communists everywhere must serve the interests of the Soviet Union and subordinate their local party interests to it as their supreme duty—a claim that became increasingly explicit after the thirties.

Underlying this complete subordination of world communism to Soviet interests was Stalin's growing certainty that a successful conquest of power by foreign communists was neither likely nor desirable (from the viewpoint of Soviet interests and world communist unity), except if it came about by the geographical extension of Soviet power. That view of Stalin's has never been publicly stated in so many words; but it was clearly implied both in the pre-war popular front strategy, which sought to use the local communist parties to underpin Russia's policy of 'collective security' rather than encourage them in striving for party power, and in the attempts to rein in the Yugoslav communists during the war and the Chinese communists in the early post-war years. When independent communist states nevertheless came into existence, alongside with satellite regimes founded on Soviet military power, Stalin's concept of 'the leading role of the Soviet Union' was clearly adapted to relations with the latter rather than with the former: to the end of his life, Stalin never came ideologically to terms with the existence of independent communist regimes in either China or Yugoslavia.

Stalin's doctrine of the pre-established identity of the interests of the world revolution with Soviet power interests, and of the leading role of the Soviet Union within the new camp of communist-governed states, while clearly in conflict with traditional Marxist internationalism, thus proved inadequate either to interpret reality or to cope with it successfully. Like the concept of the harmonious co-operation of classes within Soviet society, it is pure fiction and conveys no knowledge, unless it be knowledge about the motives and ambitions of Stalinist policy; but unlike the former case, Stalin did not dispose of enough power fully to impose the latter fiction where it mattered, in the field of inter-communist relations.

WHAT has been the fate of Stalin's major contributions to — or revisions of — Marxist-Leninist doctrine under his successors? The first two great innovations—the theory of the creative role of state power in 'constructing socialism', and the fiction of Soviet society as

founded on a harmonious co-operation of non-antagonistic classes, have been taken over integrally. True, some of the rough edges of Stalin's anti-egalitarianism have been rubbed off, and so have some of the harsh formulations about the permanence of the state under socialism, but the substance of the argument has remained under Khrushchev as Stalin left it.

A sharp change has been made in the third field—the justification of permanent dictatorship—by the official repudiation of Stalin's original solution, the 1937 thesis of the sharpening of the class struggle with the progress of socialist construction; but his later substitute, the theory of the continued need for revolutionary changes in the social structure, has been confirmed and developed by Khrushchev. There are some important differences in the detailed programme of *how* the difference between collective farm property and all-national property is to be overcome, but Khrushchev fully agrees with his predecessor that this qualitative change in the social structure is a precondition for reaching the 'higher stage' of communism, and the major task of the regime in domestic politics.

But on the fourth point, the 'leading role of the Soviet Union', where the Stalinist synthesis had always been weakest, it suffered a complete breakdown in the post-Stalin era.

This breakdown began with Khrushchev's rash attempt to adjust theory to reality by recognising the right of communist states and parties to equality and independence and replacing the concept of Soviet leadership by that of a 'Socialist World System' or 'Commonwealth' of equals—an attempt initiated in the Belgrade declaration of June 1955 and continued at the twentieth congress of the CPSU in the following February. When this attempt, together with the general crisis of authority due to the succession struggle in Russia and above all to Khrushchev's 'secret speech', led to a series of unforeseen difficulties, culminating in the Polish upheaval and the Hungarian uprising of October 1956, it was followed by an effort to restore unity at least in foreign policy and doctrinal principles, and to reimpose Soviet authority in these fields, while leaving some scope for national autonomy in the practical implementation of the common principles. The present official formula, while rejecting 'polycentrism', has not swung all the way back to the 'leading role' of the Soviet Union: it speaks of 'the Socialist camp with the Soviet Union at its head'. But this does not yet look like a permanent replacement for Stalin's fictitious solution of the international problem; further revision may well take place in the light of the unresolved Soviet-Chinese rivalry for doctrinal and tactical authority in the international field.

Yet if we survey Stalin's ideological achievement as a whole, we find that it has outlasted its creator to a remarkable degree. The reason seems to be that so much of it expresses in ideological form the lasting necessities of a totalitarian communist regime. Looking back to the dilemma which Engels formulated and which the Mensheviks used as a warning to Lenin—the dilemma of the leader who comes to power before the time is ripe for the rule of the class he represents, and who therefore is 'irredeemably lost'—we may well say that Stalin faced the dilemma and took a clear decision: He did what he *could* do—and boldly claimed that it was what he was *supposed* to do. As a result, he was by no means 'irredeemably lost'; irredeemably lost, however, was the Marxist and proletarian tradition in the Russian Communist Party.

(The above article is based on a talk given in the series of lectures on the development of Marxism-Leninism' arranged by Columbia University, New York, in the winter of 1959-60.)

REVISITING THE COMINTERN

Jane Degras

IT is unlikely that any satisfactory history of the Communist International will now be written, for the archives are in Moscow, and the articles that have appeared in Soviet periodicals in the last two or three years purporting to deal with this organisation make it abundantly clear that there is no intention of using them for any but the most limited polemical and propagandist purposes.

Virtually nothing on the Comintern had been published in the Soviet press for fifteen years or so; the decision to revive it as a legitimate subject of historiography was presumably taken as part of the massive campaign to link the present leaders and the regime with the Leninist beginnings (some of the articles begin and end with quotations from Khrushchev). There are pieces on 'Lenin at the first congress', 'Lenin at the second congress', etc.; others are reminiscences of Lenin, and all quote the founder profusely. The editorial article in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (1959, 3) on the importance of studying the history of the Communist movement has 23 footnote references to quotations in the article, and of these 19 are from Lenin. This, incidentally, in an article which refers to 'the great wealth of material' available for such studies.

Having read these articles, I think I can say quite truthfully that I know no more about the Comintern than I did before.[1] But if they fail to enlighten, they do succeed in misleading; and they have other features in common—or rather what is common to them is their featurelessness. They are uniformly lifeless and lifelessly uniform, sharing a deadly low level of dull deception. All might have been written by the same nerveless hand; there is not one that reflects—what at any rate might have been expected in accounts of the early years—the sense of history in the making, the hopes and fears, the illusions and despairs that were bred and flourished in Europe at the close of the 1914-18 war. And this is not, after all, surprising, for if these writers have to bear constantly in mind that there are names which cannot be mentioned, events which have to be surreptitiously misplaced in time, debates in which the words of the contestants have to be concealed, if not their roles reversed, how can they give their work any authenticity? It is more than forty years since the Comintern was founded, seventeen years since it was dissolved. No communist writer has yet attempted to record its history or assess its significance. The editorial already cited complains of the lack of interest shown by Soviet historians in the history of the communist movement. Not one doctoral thesis has been devoted to this theme in all the years since the war. 'In this connection it must be noted that the more experienced historians, the more highly qualified, do not in sufficient degree direct their work into research on questions of the international labour movement. There is scarcely an Academician or Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Union Republics who has devoted himself to research into these vitally important questions.' Of the few who deal with it, virtually all concentrate on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism has not produced 'a single work on the recent history of the communist and labour movement'. What, the article continues, has happened to the promised series of republications of the stenographic reports of Comintern congresses? And it urges historians 'to improve their theoretical equipment, gain a deep mastery of the Marxist methodology of

[1] Three years after it was published, the volume of Comintern documents which I edited was reviewed in two Soviet journals. To illustrate the standard of the reviews, may I quote from the one in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya* (1959, 2, p. 181): 'Degras even slanders the working class, declaring that "the failure of the international strike called in support of Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary showed clearly that the proletariat of France and England were hostile to Soviet Russia and on the side of Clemenceau and Lloyd George" (p. 64)'. It is true that these words appear on p. 64, but they are a quotation from Rakosi's report to the second Comintern Congress, not a slander invented by the present writer. This and similar statements are made the basis for charges that my work is marked by falsifications, distortions, etc.

historical research and of the factual historical material which is the essential basis for scientific research.'

IT is difficult to believe that this is intended seriously, for it is neither deficient methodology nor inadequate material that makes genuine historical work in this field impossible. Two articles concerned with the foundation of the Comintern make the real difficulties clear.[2] The first gives as sources for the first congress the writings of more than a dozen people, only one of whom was present at the congress itself. It does not include the memoirs of Angelica Balabanova, who was present and was appointed first secretary of the Comintern. (Most of the article is given over to the pre-history of the new organisation, which has been told and retold endlessly.) The invitation to the meeting which eventually became the first congress was drafted by Trotsky and signed for the Bolsheviks by Lenin and Trotsky, but to avoid mentioning this Mr. Trofimov writes that 'Lenin received the draft of the appeal drawn up on his instructions'. The great majority of those attending the meeting were resident in Russia, and could not claim to speak on behalf of any organisation, but Mr. Trofimov does not say so. Nor does he say that, in following the instructions of his party by opposing the formation of the International as too precipitate, Eberlein, the German delegate (in the event he abstained from voting) said: 'Belgium, Italy, are not represented, the Swiss representative cannot speak in the name of the party; France, England, Spain, Portugal are missing; and America is equally not in a position to say what parties would support us'.[3] The manifesto issued by the congress was written by Trotsky, the platform by Bukharin. Without, of course, mentioning these facts, Mr. Trofimov says that the principles embodied in the platform 'still unite the communist parties in their struggle against imperialism'. The Executive Committee (ECCI) elected by the congress had as its chairman Zinoviev, and as its secretary Radek. But there is no word of this.

Mr. Tsitovich is no more informative. He attributes the original appeal to Lenin (as is in fact done in the 1935 and subsequent editions of Lenin's *Works,* but not earlier; and since the appeal was included in Trotsky's *Works,* published in Moscow ten years earlier and not challenged at the time, there can be no doubt about the authorship). He calls Reinstein the 'delegate' from the United States, although in fact Reinstein had been delegated by the American Socialist Labour Party in 1917 for an entirely different purpose to an entirely different country (to attend the abortive Stockholm congress) and was at the time of the Comintern congress employed by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow; his action was disavowed by his party. Mr. Tsitovich also refers to the platform without mentioning Bukharin's name, as well as to the resolution on the Second International without saying that it was drafted by Zinoviev.

In fact, apart from Lenin, all the leading bolsheviks, who guided the work of the Comintern in its formative years, who drafted its theses and resolutions and drew up its statutes—for example Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, Rakovsky, Bukharin—were later to become victims of the regime and are therefore unmentionable except in execration. Condemned as spies, traitors, and wreckers, their work might reasonably be thought worthy of the same fate—or at any rate it would be logical to attribute the failures of the Comintern to their nefarious activities. But no. For in the first place this would imply that an organisation presided over by the Russians could err, and it is never admitted that the Comintern as such made a mistake; in the second place it would imply that Lenin, who attended the first four congresses, was incapable of distinguishing between loyalty to the revolution and treachery; and finally it would have deprived the organisation of most of its famous public statements—the platform and the programme, written by Bukharin, the manifestos of the first, second and fifth congresses, written by Trotsky, the theses on bolshevisation written by Zinoviev, the theses on the united front drafted by Radek. This would destroy the entire mystique of 'the' party, which can never err, however human, fallible, and even treacherous the men who make the decisions in its

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[2] Trofimov in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* 1957, 4; Tsitovich in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya,* 1959, 2.

[3] *Der I. Kongress der KI* (1921), p. 134.

name. Of the seven men who made up the politbureau after Lenin's death, six—in the eyes of the seventh—turned out to be enemies of the revolution for whose misdeeds the only punishment was death. But their work could not be condemned, because the bureau itself must be infallible, regardless of the quality of its members.

The way to avoid embarrassing dilemmas of this kind was suggested in *Partiinaya Zhizn* (1956, 4, p. 44): 'Publications of documents and research are often considerably impoverished because they do not include many official party and government documents which were the result of collective leadership and correctly express the policy of the Party and the Government but are signed by people who were subsequently dismissed from leadership. . . . Why should they not be published as a collective product, without any signatures, but only with an indication of the organisation from which they originated?'

THIS silence about who in fact ran the CI is the most pervasive characteristic of the articles. A Mr. Hermann Matern[4], who writes on the foundation of the German Communist Party (KPD), says that at its first congress it elected a central committee of twelve, and he gives some of the names, but Frölich, Levi, Meyer, and Thalheimer are not among them, nor is it stated that Radek attended as representative of the Russian CP. The Halle congress at which Zinoviev, in a four-hour speech, won over the majority of the Independent Socialists to the KPD (adding approximately 300,000 members when the Communists numbered not quite 50,000) gets 1½ lines from Mr. Matern—Zinoviev's name is not of course mentioned—although at the time it was front page news in the communist press.

Nameless also are those who led the KPD at the time of the 1923 fiasco. Brandler and Thalheimer are not even accused of error, for 'the party' did not err, it was 'immature'; the crisis which shook the KPD after that dismal failure was one of the most severe in its history, and had repercussions throughout the International, but in Mr. Matern's article the entire dispute is slurred over in a few sentences which, by a deliberate confusion of time, make it appear that Maslow and Fischer were the 'opportunists' responsible for the KPD's weakness in 1923, whereas in fact these were the leaders endorsed by Moscow after Radek, Brandler, and Thalheimer had been made the scapegoats for the 1923 events.

Klara Zetkin (whose prestige was so high that she was elected to the ECCI in an individual capacity, and whose *Reminiscences of Lenin* was once a minor communist best seller) doesn't get a look in in Mr. Matern's history, although still enshrined in the Soviet pantheon—but then she defended Levi, who accused the KPD of irresponsibility in the 1921 'March action', and later defended Brandler and Thalheimer, for whose actions, she said, the entire ECCI should assume responsibility. Another article by Mr. Tsitovich, on Lenin at the third Comintern congress[5], makes no reference to Klara Zetkin's defence of Levi, or to her charge that the ECCI was largely to blame 'for the incorrect slogans and incorrect political attitude of the [KPD] Central Committee'.

In his pitifully unmemorable 'Memorable Encounters', Mr. Gallacher[6] does mention Brandler, Thalheimer, and Zetkin. He even remembers meeting Smeral, but not, apparently, Zinoviev, Radek, and Trotsky. Another English contribution, from Mr. Pollitt[7], is equally poor; his memoirs can be virtually reduced to a list of the main resolutions and theses adopted at Comintern congresses and other meetings.

Gallacher is followed in the same issue by Mr. Gopner, who writes on the second congress. For all Mr. Gopner has to say, Lenin alone represented the Russian CP. But in fact among the documents issued by the congress were the theses on the role of the communist party in the proletarian revolution—these were drafted and introduced by Zinoviev; the theses on trade union work, brought in by Radek; the theses on communist parties and parliament, drawn up by Trotsky and Bukharin. The congress manifesto was written by Trotsky and delivered by him as a speech at its close. It is not only these

[4] *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya*, 1959, 2.

[5] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1957, 1.

[6] *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya*, 1959, 2.

[7] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1959, 3.

nen who remain a blank—the war with Poland s not mentioned, although there are many ccounts recalling how the delegates watched ne large map hung in the congress hall which howed the movements of the Soviet and Polish rmies. No doubt Mr. Gopner thinks it im- olitic to suggest that Russia was ever anything ut benevolent towards Poland — although enin, according to Klara Zetkin, said 'In the ed Army the Poles saw enemies, not brothers nd liberators'.[8]

The third congress is recalled by the (pos- humous) publication of some reminiscences of ne Bulgarian communist Kolarov, given 'in an bridged form'.[9] They are concerned in the main ith Lenin's criticism of Bela Kun for attacking ne French CP as 'opportunist'. Kun, officially ehabilitated at the twentieth CPSU congress, an now be mentioned, but who were the anony- ous Frenchmen? Loriot was there, but his ame is anathema; the ECCI constituted after ne third congress had as representative of the rench CP Boris Souvarine, and how can it be ated, explicitly, that Lenin defended Loriot nd Souvarine?

Lenin at the fourth congress is the subject f reminiscences in the same periodical by a ertain Runge. He relates how Lenin advised im to take advantage of the presence at the ongress of leading party members to get them arrange for regular contributions to *Inpre- orr*, the Comintern periodical which had been arted the previous year. (If such elementary dvice was necessary, Mr. Runge must have een a very simple fellow indeed.) Whoever oks through *Inprekorr*, he writes, 'will see that ne basic articles were always written by the ading comrades of our parties. We will name nly a few of them'. For the German party e gives Thaelmann, Pieck, 'and others'; for e French, Cachin, Thorez, Semard, Berlioz nd others'; for the Italian, Gramsci, Togliatti, ongo 'etc.'; for the Spanish, Diaz, Ibarruri nd others'. It is interesting to look through e first few years of *Inprekorr* to see who in fact did contribute to its columns. In the first four years of its publication (1921-1924) there were no contributions at all from Berlioz, Diaz, Gramsci, Ibarruri, Longo, Thaelmann, or Thorez; there were 6 from Cachin, 2 from Pieck, 3 from Semard, and one from Togliatti. On the other hand there were frequent contributions from correspondents now unmentionable—18 from Brandler and 21 from Thalheimer and 22 from Froelich; 18 from Victor Serge and another 18 from Treint, and 23 from Nin. (My file of *Inprekorr* is not quite complete, but the missing numbers would hardly change the picture.) Incidentally, Mr. Runge does not mention that when *Inprekorr* for the first time published an article by Stalin (in January 1923), it had to inform its readers who that gentleman was—so much for Lenin's best pupil.

NOBODY, of course, ever asks, much less explains, how it was that these nefarious characters were able to dupe the infallible Lenin and, for many years, the equally infallible Stalin, or why those who had given outstanding service to the revolution, and reached the highest positions the country could offer, decided that it would be to their advantage to undo the work to which they had devoted their lives. These recent articles do not run to the 'fascist hyena' argument for establishing the case against Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, etc., but Mr. Ruban, in an article on the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition,[10] says that Trotsky and his allies Zinoviev and Kamenev came into the party 'with a heavy load of menshevism'. Lenin was obviously unable to recognise menshevism even in his closest associates; or if he did recognise it, he clearly thought it no handicap to their occupying the highest posts—Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs and later Commissar for War, Zinoviev as President of the Communist International and head of the Leningrad party organisation, Kamenev as head of the Moscow party organisation. Mr. Ruban deals at some length with the fourteenth conference of the RCP (April 1925); by juggling his dates and events, and stating that the opposition was opposed to a policy of industrialisation, he gives

[8] K. Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (London, '29), p. 20.

[9] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1960, 2. 'Abridgement' is ne of the sinister offences of which non-communist iters who use communist documents are accused. o reason is given for cutting Kolarov.

[10] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1958, 5.

a completely false picture of the disputes which divided the leaders after Lenin's death. He writes that 1925 was the year when Russia was entering a new stage of socialist construction and adopting the policy of socialist industrialisation. It was, of course, nothing of the sort; this happened more than two years later, at the fifteenth congress at the end of 1927, and the policy was not put into operation until the end of the following year. The 1925 conference in fact *enlarged* the scope of private farming and trade, and it was this policy of conciliating and encouraging the more prosperous individual peasants (later to be liquidated as 'kulaks') which antagonised Kamenev and drove him and Zinoviev to break with Stalin and, in the following year, to join forces with Trotsky. Mr. Ruban does not mention the years 1923-25, when Stalin co-operated with Zinoviev and Kamenev to discredit Trotsky; nor does he mention that shortly before the fourteenth congress (December 1925), Zinoviev and Kamenev had Krupskaya's full support, that the chief complaint of the Leningrad opposition was the neglect of industry, that Kamenev's supporters were removed from their positions, that Krupskaya protested against the growing 'Lenin cult' and appealed for a discussion of issues, not quotations from her dead husband's writings, that Trotsky sat silent throughout the congress in which the behaviour of the majority was distinguished only by its coarseness, cynicism, and hooliganism.

Still, this article must be given its due; in the article on the Comintern in the second edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Vol. 22, passed for the press in September 1953, that is six months after Stalin's death), Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and their supporters were described as having been 'in the employ of the imperialist intelligence services as assassins, spies, and diversionists'. Mr. Ruban says that they 'joined up with the internal and external counter-revolution and became an anti-Soviet force'. He charges them with 'hatred of the party and the Soviets', but sees no need to explain the origin of this hatred. And at times even his stout heart fails. In writing of the seventh plenary session of the ECCI (December 1926) he devotes one sentence to the debate and resolution on the Chinese question—which was in fact the question most bitterly debated. The opposition, he says, 'took advantage of the tem porary failures of the Chinese revolution t attack the Comintern'. For a historian of hi calibre, it should not have been difficult to sug gest that it was Stalin who wanted the Chines CP to break with Chiang Kai-shek, and Trotsk who supported the alliance with Chiang, an so convey the precise reverse of the truth, as h has done elsewhere in his article.

A LONG article in *Voprosy Istorii* (1959 12) by Mr. Kisliakov is concerned wit 'the struggle of the KPD to establish a unite anti-fascist front in the first years of the fascis dictatorship'. (Nobody appears to have had th courage to write on KPD tactics *before* th rise of the Nazis to power.) The fascists wer called to power, says Mr. K., by the aggressiv circles of German imperialism with the suppor of American, British, and French ruling circles and they were able to do this because of th policy of the socialists (SPD) which split an disarmed the working class. On ten occasions he says, between July 1932 and 30 Januar 1933 (when Hitler became Chancellor) the KPI proposed a general strike to the SPD, whic ignored the suggestion. They even proposed general strike on 1 March 1933, but the SPI again refused because 'they feared revolutio more than fascist dictatorship'. (Earlier, whe the SPD and trade unions were discussing th possibility of a general strike, the Cominter called it 'a demagogic slogan' and 'rotten an slimy manoeuvres', cf. *Communist Internationa* 15 March 1932, p. 151.) As evidence of SPI 'willingness to co-operate with Hitler' Mr. K goes straight to the source—*Pravda*. The sam newspaper provides him with the informatio that 'on the instructions of Goering the leade of the SPD . . . visited a number of Europea countries, having accepted the shameful missio of rehabilitating fascist atrocities before worl public opinion'.

Of KPD policy in the ten years betwee Hitler's attempted putsch in 1923 and his as sumption of the chancellorship we learn litt except that there were 'mistakes'. He quote Pieck: 'In the two years before the establish ment of Hitler's dictatorship there were seriou mistakes in the conduct of our policy, both stra tegic and tactical . . . in our appraisal of th

situation and of the relation of class forces, as well as in determining the direction of our main attack'. The reader (but not Mr. K., nor for that matter Mr. Pieck) may well ask: if the appraisal of the situation was wrong, if the KPD was unable to understand what was happening in Germany, if it hit out in the wrong direction, what was there other than mistakes in its policy? What were its leaders up to, who claimed to be equipped with a scientific theory for correct analysis and prediction? And might they not be considered at least equally responsible with the unfortunate SPD leaders, who after all never claimed to have this marvellous scientific equipment? However, Mr. Thaelmann caught on, a little late it is true. At the meeting of the KPD central committee on 7 February 1933, we are told, he 'put before communists as their first task the creation of a united front, the organisation of a mass struggle against fascism'. (Mr. Korsunski attributes the formulation of this 'first task' to comrade Ulbricht.[11]) But if the KPD had not been primarily concerned with organising the struggle against fascism before Hitler came to power, what *had* it been doing? Mr. K is not interested in this question, but it is not really difficult to find the answer. In addition to fighting among themselves, they had been fighting the socialists. After all, if it had not been for the socialists, who were cunning enough to get the silly workers to follow them although they were really capitalist hirelings, the KPD could have forged ahead without rivals for the workers' allegiance. So the SPD had to be discredited, and every reverse suffered by the KPD was attributed to SPD treachery, and the socialists became 'the left wing of the bourgeoisie' and then 'social fascists'.

An ECCI resolution of 9 January 1924 stated that 'the leading strata of German social-democracy are at the present moment nothing but a fraction of German fascism wearing a socialist mask'. At the KPD congress in July 1925 the political theses, carried by 166 votes to 4, made 'the destruction of the counter-revolutionary influence of the SPD among the masses' the chief task of the party. Gusev, the Russian representative at the German central committee meeting at the end of 1929, said that the most important aspect of their struggle was the fight against social fascism. An article by Dengel a year later (*Communist International*, 1 December 1930) placed the emphasis of KPD work on the fight against fascism, in which the party had to expose 'the role of the national fascists and social fascists and the destruction of their influence among the proletariat'.

In winding up the Eleventh Plenum of the ECCI (*Communist International*, 15 June 1931) Manuilsky said that 'in Germany the basic hindrance to the revolutionary crises is, in the first place, the fact that the mass basis of Social Democracy and of the reformist trade unions has still not been finally shattered'. He warned communists against being deluded by the socialist argument that a parliamentary system of government was preferable to an extra-parliamentary dictatorship, by which the SPD attempted to conceal 'the basic fact that Fascism and Social Fascism are two aspects of one and the same social bulwark of bourgeois dictatorship. To shatter these illusions of the masses—this it is which will assure the disruption of the mass basis of Social Democracy inside the working class' (p. 345). To say that fascism was different in principle from bourgeois democracy, or the Nazi party from the SPD 'constitutes the most pernicious and destructive mistakes for the Communist movement. At the moment this represents our chief danger' (*ibid*). He went on to mock at those 'experts' in the communist parties who 'search out literally with a microscope the minutest details distinguishing the Fascist form of bourgeois dictatorship from bourgeois dictatorship of a so-called normal type'. Little wonder that none of the articles considered here quotes the Eleventh ECCI Plenum. In the 15 March 1932 issue of the same journal a long article on the decisions of the plenum explained that difficulties in the struggle against fascism did not mean 'that we must direct the main fire not against the social-democracy but against the fascists' (p. 149). It goes on: 'The eleventh plenum of the ECCI clearly stated that the Social democracy represents the main social bulwark of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and our principal enemy within the ranks of the working class, and that we must accordingly direct our main fire against

[11] *Ibid.*, 1960, 1, p. 96.

it in order to capture the majority of the working class. Some parties, as for instance our German and Austrian parties, took this decision seriously and started an energetic and successful struggle against the social-democracy.'

SEVERAL years too late, the term 'social-fascist' was discarded, but even then the KPD leaders found it difficult to conceal their opinion that the 'united front' could be established only on communist terms. In its resolution of 1 August 1934, the KPD central committee, in the words of Mr. K., 'demanded the reorganisation of all internal party work'. The party was now determined to fight sectarianism, to fight the incorrect attitude to socialist workers which 'took the form of efforts to create the united front by getting the social-democrats into the KPD'. This resolution, according to Pieck, was 'a turning point' in party tactics. Rather more than a year later, the KPD conference in Brussels condemned the KPD slogan issued in the summer of 1933, of 'come over to us', which had made it difficult to establish the united front, and 'the incorrect appraisal of social-democracy as the chief social support of the bourgeoisie even under the fascist dictatorship'. The attitude condemned in Brussels is illustrated in the May 1933 resolution of the KPD central committee which asserted that 'the complete exclusion of social-democrats from the state apparatus, and the harsh pressure on social-democratic organisations and their press, does not in the least change the fact that, now as before, the social-democracy is the chief social support of the capitalist dictatorship'. This, says Mr. K. in an understatement rarely rivalled, made it difficult to establish unity of action with socialist workers. At the same conference Pieck said that 'the majority of KPD leaders' by their actions 'only widened the breach between social-democratic workers and communists'. The offer of a united front, declared the conference, was not to be regarded as a mere formality, 'a pretext for exposing the social-democratic leaders'.

Having spent the sixteen years of its existence fighting the socialists, deriding the Weimar Republic, and pouring scorn on 'bourgeois democracy' (attitudes which had their parallel in the extreme nationalist movement), the KPD after nearly two years of Hitler's government, had second thoughts. 'Instead of fighting for the proletarian dictatorship and a Soviet Germany, the KPD advanced the slogan of the fight for democratic rights and liberties'. Still, it was all the fault of the socialists.

'It became the fashion [in the KPD] to treat Labour and Social-Democratic Parties not merely as declared enemies, but as the worst enemies, of the workers; and this line, pursued to its logical conclusion, had fatal consequences in Germany during the period of Hitler's ascent to power'. So writes Mr. Carr.[12] And although he is unlikely to be accused of any marked bias, he is still a bourgeois historian, so let us quote in support Comrade Togliatti.[13] 'The most serious mistake before Hitler's advent to power was to treat social-democrats as social-fascists, and the conclusions drawn from this. . . . Most important was the failure to understand what the advance of fascism portended—the destruction of all democratic institutions and liberties. To talk of social-fascism was to imply that this was also the aim of social-democracy. . . . Thus unity of action with the social-democratic masses and their organisations became, on these foundations, much more difficult; it had no more than a sporadic character and exercised no influence on the situation'. Togliatti, of course, does not trace this malignant stupidity to its source at the very top of the international communist hierarchy. Nor does he admit that it was precisely the SPD's adherence to 'democratic institutions and liberties' which was one of the reasons for KPD hostility.

Mr. K. ends his article with the now customary charge that 'the support given by international and above all American imperialism . . . strengthened the positions of fascism'. Hitler's foreign successes were achieved 'thanks to the support of the Western Powers'. Just as the new official history of the CPSU blandly passes over the period of extreme terror in the thirties, so the historians skip lightly over the years 1939-41. Mr. K. does not mention the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939 (which simple people

[12] E. H. Carr, *Studies in Revolution* (London, 1950) p. 178.

[13] *Rinascita*, July-August 1959.

ight think 'a foreign success' for Hitler, since enabled him to conquer in Western Europe ithout worrying about his eastern frontiers nd gave him facilities in Soviet ports). M. uclos is less diffident,[14] He gives one short aragraph to the first two years of the war: During the initial phase of the war, Hitler pitalised on the complacency of the Western owers. He was encouraged to turn eastwards. hen Hitler attacked the Soviet Union.' It was simple as that; nothing about Poland, the usso-Finnish war, the Baltic states, the defeat nd occupation of Belgium, Holland, France, orway, Denmark; nothing about the Battle of ritain, nothing about Stalin's statement that e western allies were responsible for the war, othing about Molotov's statement that fascism as a matter of taste. It was all just western mplacency.

M. Duclos' memory is not merely selective, is also at fault. He writes of 'Hindenburg, hom the Social-Democratic Party had nomin-ed for President against Ernst Thaelmann, the ommunist candidate'. He refrains from giv-g the date of this election. If it is meant to fer to Hindenburg's first election, in 1925, e facts were as follows: In the first round rres was nominated by the right wing, Marx the centre, Braun by the socialists, and haelmann by the communists. The first round d not give a decisive majority, and a second te had to be taken in which Hindenburg was t forward by the right wing parties. The CI, appalled by the size of the nationalist te, asked Thaelmann to withdraw his candi-ture in favour of the socialist, but Thael-ann was determined to run for President and e socialists, in an attempt to keep Hinden-rg out, agreed to vote for the centre. When oscow insisted, the KPD offered a 'united nt', but it was too late, as the SPD had ready committed itself, and it was a common arge against the KPD that 'Hindenburg had en elected on the shoulders of the commun-s'. The French and Polish Communists were arply critical of KPD policy. If M. Duclos referring to the 1932 election, he is equally isleading, for he fails to mention that there was another candidate—Hitler. Unlike the KPD, the SPD's chief concern was to keep Hitler out. Again there was a second round, in which more than a million who had voted for Thaelmann in the first round withdrew their support.

Mr. Clark,[15] another bourgeois historian it is true, but a close follower of German events who paid full tribute to the 'will to sacrifice, the reserves of courage and endurance' of the communist rank and file (p. 202), and who had little good to say of the SPD, its timidity and the 'pitiable mess' it occasionally made of things, wrote at the time: 'The Communist leadership achieved two things, and two only; it split the working class movement in Germany . . . and it held impotent the revolutionary spirit of the country. The first was in keeping with Moscow's traditional policy of weakening every socialist party that is not prepared to submit . . . the second was less intelligible because it was concealed with cloudy rhetoric and represented as clever tactics. . . . Its one positive deed was to stab German democracy in the back and paralyse its resistance to counter-revolution. . . Hitler had no better allies' (p. 204).

BUT it is on the dissolution of the Comintern that M. Duclos sheds the greatest light. 'At the height of the war, having fulfilled its mission, the Communist International decided to dissolve itself'. Suspecting that his readers may not be able to grasp all the missing terms in this elliptical statement, he explains that 'the CI was wound up after fulfilling its mission, that is, after making a great contribution to the consolidation of the international working class movement and to the promotion of its ideological level and helping to rally the forces of the working class of all countries against Hitlerism'. Wisely, no doubt, he does not check this version of the Comintern's mission against the declared purposes of its founders.

Madame Ibarruri's contribution to the series[16] is naturally enough largely concerned with the Spanish Civil War, and her view of history can be seen from the following excerpt: 'The imperialist governments of the USA, France, and

[14] *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1959, 3. 'The mmunist International and the struggle against scism'.

[15] R. T. Clark, *The Fall of the German Republic* (London, 1935).

[16] *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1959, 2.

England regarded the resistance of the Spanish people [to Franco] as an obstacle to their reactionary policy. Using their agents, undermining the unity and fighting spirit of the army and people, they broke republican resistance and surrendered Spain to fascism. They calculated that in this way they would make it easier for Hitler to realise his aggressive plans against the Soviet Union'.

The seventh and final congress of the Comintern, held in 1935, is the subject of an article by A. R. Korsunski.[17] Like his fellow historians, he places responsibility for the failure to achieve unity on the SPD. He admits that 'the treacherous tactics of the SPD were facilitated by the sectarianism of some communist parties'. 'Proceeding from the false idea that all bourgeois parties were fascist, these communist parties did not take up the defence of bourgeois democratic liberties, or took it up too late.' Moreover, some communists under-estimated the fascist danger 'and instead of directing their chief fire against fascism, in a number of cases regarded the fight against fascism and the fight against social-democracy as equally important, and sometimes even put the fight against social-democracy in the first place'. (The anonymity is, as our communist friends would say, no accident. What were Messrs. Thaelmann and Pieck and Ulbricht up to, not to mention their partners in Moscow?) Dimitrov is commended for his rebuke to those who said that the fight for democratic liberties might 'create democratic illusions'; in face of the fascists, 'the proletariat is vitally interested in the defence of bourgeois democratic liberties', and Mr. Korsunski notes with pride that the congress did not use the term 'social-fascist', 'This', he says, 'was no accident', because the phrase made it difficult to distinguish between those socialists who supported working class unity and those who supported fascism.

Pieck's report to the congress on the work of the ECCI since the sixth congress[18] gave a fairly damning account of the KPD. It 'failed to change its attitude in good time', some German communists 'even spoke of the necessity of "destroying" the reformist trade unions'. ' was only in the autumn of 1932 that the Germa CP issued to the communists the slogan defending the labour organisations . . . it w only after the advent of Hitler to power th the communists issued the clear slogan defending the Free Trade Unions' (p. 33). was not until late in 1932 that they decide to vote for the socialists and centre 'in ord to prevent the election of fascists' (p. 34 Nevertheless, he said that the fascist rise power could have been prevented had it n been for the 'counter-revolutionary' policy the socialist party and trade unions, who we followed by 'the majority of the working clas (p. 38). But he offered consolation. 'Th victory of fascism in Germany has not initiate a long period of reaction, as the social-dem crats prophesied' (p. 44), and 'there can be n question of the National-Socialist regime bein consolidated for any lengthy period of tim (p. 74). If his words ever reached the socialis and communists in concentration camps, the may have asked 'how long is a long time?'

The French socialist leaders also get rappe over the knuckles by Mr. Korsunski becaus they objected to the inclusion in the propose unity programme of the communist concep of proletarian dictatorship and party disciplin 'and other important principles of a revolutio ary party'. This 'made it easier for reaction launch a counter-offensive'. We also learn fro this article that Messrs. Neumann and Remme (not to mention Doriot) were Trotskyists, a though it is difficult to think of many commu ists (outside the CPSU) who were more vicio in their attacks on the fallen Russian lead than these two, or any for whom Trotsky e pressed greater contempt.

Finally, the article devoted to the inte national communist movement after the war and the same dreary cycle is repeated: 'Th experience of many years of the internation labour movement has convincingly shown th first-rate importance for the fate of mankind working class unity. . . . But while the com munist parties have indefatigably urged joi action by communist, social-democratic, chri tian, and non-party workers, the united worke

[17] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1960, 1.

[18] W. Pieck, *Report on the Activities of the ECCI* (New York, 1935).

[19] *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya*, 1960, 2.

ont, the right-wing leaders of the socialist irties have reinforced their splitting activities'. Oddly enough, although the Cominform was existence for more than half the period vered by this article, it gets only one brief ragraph, and that only in connection with its ssolution. 'In April 1956 the communist par-s which had in 1947 established the Informa-n Bureau of Communist Parties, decided to it an end to its activities. The Informburo d its paper *For a lasting Peace, for a People's emocracy*, played a positive role in the matter the reciprocal exchange of experience. But the new circumstances of growth and devel-ment of the international labour movement is form of contact among a few parties only came inadequate. Now there are widespread eetings of communist party delegates at con-esses and conferences, and also bilateral con-rsations and personal contacts between party presentatives' (p. 141). Not a word about e expulsion of the Yugoslav party and the measures which followed. Not a word about the changes in the Polish party, while the Hungarian revolution is dismissed in half a sentence. 'The reactionaries tried to exploit the criticism of the Stalin personality cult to vilify the Soviet socialist system, to undermine the unity and firmness of the socialist camp, to destroy the international bonds of the workers. With these ends in view the imperialists mobilised the most diverse means, going so far as to organise a counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary in the autumn of 1956'.

The fate of the eighteen signatories to the statement announcing the foundation of the Cominform merits comment. Excluding the three who have died, and assigning the two Yugoslavs to a special category of their own, there are only four whose position was not shaken by the upheavals following the break between Stalin and Tito, and of these four only one is an inhabitant of the Soviet bloc.

Encounter

ENCOUNTER, Britain's leading monthly edited by Stephen Spender and Melvin J. Lasky, publishes many contributions of interest to students of the Communist states. Recent articles have included 'Farewell to Marx' by F. R. Allemann, 'Chairman Mao' by Richard Walker, 'Varieties of Communist Experience' by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. ENCOUNTER has scooped controversial stories by Abram Tertz and Vladimir Dudintsev.

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Encounter 25 Haymarket London S.W.1

1939 AND ALL THAT

A. V. Sherma

DURING the past couple of years there have been a number of books, pamphlets, and periodical-articles published in the Soviet Union dealing with the history of the Second World War and its origins. Though they adduce no additional material on the events concerned, they do help fill in and round off our picture of current trends in Soviet historiography, which, in turn, throws some light both on current politico-cultural trends and on the approach to foreign policy. In this essay I shall confine myself to material dealing with the origins of the War, the Nazi-Soviet pact, and the events which led up to the German attack on the USSR, since it would be difficult to deal additionally with the whole war period within the compass of a single article.

The outlines of what one might call 'Khrushchevian historiography' emerge from the writing. It still re-interprets past history in the light of present policies; it deals with inconvenient facts in the same cavalier way; and it is a good deal 'harder' in its line than writings of the 'thaw' period. It is concerned to justify in full Stalin's policies during the period under review —with the exception of one comparatively minor action—but in general avoids mentioning Stalin by name, attributing policies to the 'leadership' or 'central committee of the party'.

The writings appear to have three interrelated objectives. The first is to show that the war was caused largely by American machinations, and to draw a close parallel between United States policies then and now. The second is to prove that the party leadership was absolutely correct in its policies of the time, particularly in the Nazi-Soviet pact and in its attitude to the war before Hitler attacked Russia. The third is to produce an interpretation which fits the current *Weltanschauung*—a combination of determinism and conspiracy theory, a renewed and emphatic 'hardness' towards capitalism and 'rightwing socialists', and towards imperialism as the source of war and all evil.

The general thesis regarding the characte of the war is that it broke out as a result o the general crisis of capitalism, which expresse itself in two distinct and conflicting sets of con tradictions: the desire of the capitalist state to destroy the Soviet Union, and the conflict between them over markets and spheres of in fluence. The main role in building up Germa imperialism and inciting it to attack the Sovie Union is attributed to 'US ruling circles', wh are also accused of having inveigled German and the Allies into war.

'The second world war, like the first, brok out as a result of the workings of the law o uneven development of capitalist countries i the epoch of imperialism and the deepening o contradictions inside the capitalist system' These are the opening words of the new part text-book *Modern History, 1939-59*.[1]

The war broke out between the two capitalis coalitions (Germany, Italy, and Japan, versu USA, Britain, and France) fighting for a re division of the world and for world domination the book continues. 'Both sides had been eage to solve their contradictions first and foremos at the expense of the Soviet Union and also t finish with the revolutionary and national liberation movements. To that end the rulin circles in the USA, Britain, and France, carrie out a policy of isolating the USSR, trying t form a unified anti-Soviet front, and to pus Germany and Japan into war against the USSR

The stress throughout is on the leading rol of the US in these policies, and successive pub lications carry US guilt in this respect furthe back in time. Professor Deborin carries U plans and activities in this respect back to th crisis of 1929,[2] while later works carry Amer can plans to revive German imperialism for th

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[1] *Noveishaya Istoriya. Chast II. 1939-59. Uchel noye Posobie.* Published by CC, CPSU (Moscow 1959), p. 5.

[2] G. A. Deborin, *Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina.* Sovi Ministry of Defence (Moscow, 1958), pp. 7, 8.

ttack on the USSR back to the end of the First Vorld War.

'To characterise briefly relations between the JSA and Germany during the inter-war period, ne could say that they demonstrate above all a lear picture of the workings of those two tenencies in modern capitalism, of which Lenin nore than once wrote. During the whole interar period the eagerness of monopoly capital n the USA and Germany to unite in order to rganise a joint "crusade" against the Soviet nion "for the defence of capital" and joint xploitation of other nations, clashed with the ontradictions and conflicts between them which rned into an open struggle', writes the author f *The USA and Hitlerite Germany*, published te last year.[3]

'The tendency to move towards agreement nd a class alliance between the USA and Gerany had already begun at the time of the end f the first world war, 1914-18. . . . The decive factor in the changed policies of the victors, nd above all in the USA, with regard to Gerany lay in the most important event in human story, the establishment of the Soviet Union. . . . The "Dawes Plan" and "Young Plan" nd Locarno were designed to make bourgeoisnker Germany into the main basis of the ordon sanitaire" against the expansion of olshevism and the main striking force in the rojected crusade against the socialist state' . 6).

As a result of the growing contradictions beween US imperialism, on the one hand, and ritain, France, and Japan on the other, who pposed the expansion of American capital, elnikov writes, the USA 'after the first world ar took an active part in the rearmament of erman imperialism, hoping to make it their nior partner in Europe. . . . US policies on e German question were worked out in the 20s'.

In marked contrast to earlier post-war Soviet itings, which dealt comparatively gently with oosevelt, if only to contrast him with his succssors, Melnikov attacks Roosevelt and his onomic policies with an intensity which recalls e-popular front days.

Roosevelt's economic measures, including his policy of subsidies for capitalism and of raising purchasing power were 'social demagogy' which 'was unable to bring about any real improvement in the country's economic situation' (p. 99). The workers, farmers, and unemployed suffered as a result of the New Deal, while the monopolies and banks were the sole beneficiaries. As a result of the diminished purchasing power of the American masses, US productive power was under-utilised, and this led to a search for profitable investment possibilities abroad. American business circles saw the European conflict as a source of profit for America, and therefore 'stood in the way of US participation in collective security, which alone could have saved world peace. . . . The Morgans, Rockefellers, Duponts, Mellons and other real rulers of America—these were in the front ranks of those who thirsted for war, particularly against the Soviet Union, and prepared themselves for it. Not only the machine-tool industry, shipbuilding and steel corporations, but many others too, were interested in the expanded rearmament, derived dollars from it, and looked forward to war itself bringing them even greater profits and superprofits' (p. 241).

The interplay between these economic interests and her political aims are said to have determined US policies in 1939, when 'the US ruling circles' decided that the only way of influencing Hitler and making him take their interests into account, and pushing him into an attack on the USSR, was a formal declaration of war by Britain and France against Germany.

'Therefore, while encouraging the Hitlerites to attack Poland, the ruling circles of the USA at the same time eagerly forced Britain to give up any further attempts to reach agreement with Germany without the knowledge of or against the interests of the USA. In order to put an end once and for all to these attempts on Britain's part and to force Britain into a position of dependence on her and place pressure on the Hitlerites, the USA made use of the German attack on Poland and the Polish-British-French mutual aid pacts'. And he concludes: 'The historical evidence undeniably bears witness to the fact that American-German contradictions and US ruling circles policies of help, encouragement, and agreement with Hitlerite Germany

[3] Y. M. Melnikov, *SShA i Gitlerovskaya Germania* (Moscow, 1959), p. 4.

played a large part in the outbreak of the second world war' (p. 337).

Deborin (op. cit., p. 43) goes further: 'The ruling circles of the USA greeted the outbreak of war in Europe with ill-disguised joy'.

IF the new Khrushchevian line during the 'thaw' aroused anticipations of the possible disavowal of some of the more embarrassing Soviet and other communist policies of the 1939-41 period, the writings under review are 'back to normal'. They go out of their way to insist that the party was absolutely right and the Western Governments completely perfidious from start to finish.

'Only the Soviet Union consistently carried out a policy of strengthening peace, collective resistance to the fascist aggressors, and help to the victims of this aggression. The peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union secured her the support of the toilers of the whole world', *Modern History* writes of the 1939-41 period (op. cit. p. 5).

This attitude is understandable enough. The present Soviet leaders rose into the top rank during this period, when the purges created vacancies, and gained full executive stature during the war. To reject party policies of this time would, presumably, be to undermine the legitimacy of their own power. And just as cold war exigencies apparently demand that American guilt should be carried back to 1918 in order to facilitate denunciations of America's present-day German policies, so the Soviet leadership has to be presented as having always been in the right.

The writers are obviously aware that they are batting on a sticky wicket when they have to defend the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Soviet policies which followed. The drive to re-affirm the correctness of the party's policy during that period is almost invariably presented as refutation of 'bourgeois slanders'.

'During the past ten years a vast body of reactionary literature on the Second World War has been published in the capitalist countries. . . . These falsifiers of history are not being exposed sufficiently in our press', *Voprosy Istorii* complained some eighteen months ago (1959, 1, p. 145).

'The reactionary bourgeois historians deliber ately falsify history, attempting to hide the rea causes of the outbreak of war, to slander th peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR, an to justify the policy of agreement with th fascist aggressors', writes Melnikov (op. cit p. 3).

However, since few Soviet citizens hav access to the publications under attack, it seem probable that the polemics are directed to Sovie readers in whose minds doubts have bee raised either by the events themselves or by th contradictory explanations adduced.

They have three inter-related questions t answer: was the pact morally justified; was i politically wise; and were Soviet policies to wards the war before June 1941 justified i the light of Hitler's attack. The answer on th moral issue is simple enough. The Soviet writer claim that Britain, France, and the USA had n intention of fighting Hitler, indeed that the still intended to support his war against th Soviet Union, which would have been le alone to fight a war on two fronts.

'An attack by Hitlerite Germany and im perialist Japan on the Soviet Union would, i one way or another, have been supported by th reactionary ruling circles of the USA, Britain and France. This was the plan of internationa imperialist reaction, which basically wanted new Munich', writes Deborin. 'Britain an France were already carrying out military pre parations against the USSR. They concentrate troops in the Far East and activised their ant Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. In Jun 1939 the Inspector-General of the British Army Walter Kirk, visited Finland and expresse satisfaction at Finnish preparations for wa against the Soviet Union. Immediately afte him the British Admiral Plunkett visited Fin land and declared that "all guns should b trained on Kronstadt". But another possibilit opened before the Soviet Union. The conclu sion of an agreement with Germany won th Soviet Union a certain amount of time an mixed up the cards of the US, British, an French Governments in their dishonest gam (op. cit., p. 36). This is the nearest that th writings go to claiming that the pact wa Russia's means of embroiling the capitali powers in a war. Though they make a goo

eal of 'contradictions inside the capitalist amp' in general, none of the writers attempts o show concretely why these contradictions hould have led to such a radical change in the elations between Hitler and the Western allies t this period, and made the Western powers nd/or Germany give up their plans for the oint crusade against the USSR, which they are ccused of harbouring as late as mid-1940, if ot later.

Deborin—echoed by the others—adduces a rther justification for the pact; namely that made it more difficult for Germany to attack ne USSR, 'since that would ineluctably have xposed Germany as a bloody aggressor conemptuous of the generally accepted norms of nternational law' (op. cit., p. 38).

All the writers rule out the possibility that the hange in Western policies from alleged comlicity with Hitler to actual war against him vas initiated by the Allies or resulted from a hanged Soviet orientation; they contend that was initiated by Germany with the object of aining time. 'In proposing a non-aggression act to the Soviet Union the German governnent had its own calculations, and in no ay relinquished its aim of a war of conquest gainst the USSR. But it took into account ne enormous difficulties which it would face in uch a war, and therefore felt obliged first to ring the countries of Western Europe into subection, and only then, when it had their reources at its disposal, to attack the Soviet Jnion' is the argument in *The History of the CPSU* (p. 492).[4] Here it is stressed that the Germans never lost sight of this main objective, nd that they put the time they gained to very ood use.

'Fascist Germany began its direct preparaions for war against the USSR as early as the econd half of 1940 . . . she intended to invade ne British Isles only after [conquering the JSSR] since she could not attack so long as the ed Army stood in her rear' (ibid., p. 497). his, incidentally, completely reverses the eborin argument.

Modern History's list of the reasons for itler's initial successes in 1941 shows how well he used the time gained. 'Germany attacked the USSR after having conquered almost all Western Europe with all its economic resources. . . . Germany had freed its land armies on the continent of Europe for exclusive use against the USSR. . . . Germany was joined by Italy, Finland, Rumania, and Hungary. . . . Germany was able to concentrate all its forces on the Soviet frontiers. . . . Germany had gained immense experience of modern warfare in the intervening two years'.

Both the Soviet Union and Germany, it transpires, gained time from the pact, but the question of who gained more—and who lost more—is not directly raised. Stalin is blamed for having made a mistake in the last few days before the German attack on Russia in not 'properly evaluating the military-political situation' (p. 11), but no conclusions are drawn from this regarding Soviet policies in general.

Any change in Soviet foreign policy following the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact is now denied. Neither Soviet denunciation of the Allies as aggressors, nor Comintern 'defeatism', is mentioned. The Soviet Union and the foreign communist parties are again presented as having carried on alone an unrelenting struggle against fascism.

'Anti-Soviet slanders on the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany are based on the charge that the Soviet Union, in signing the pact, changed its foreign policy and abandoned collective means of struggle against fascist aggression. In fact the foreign policy of the Soviet Party and Government remained unchanged. Their line was directed at breaking the Munichite anti-Soviet front in the interests of peace. When they failed to do this by agreement with Britain and France, they did it by agreement with Germany', writes Deborin. The pact proved 'in the circumstances to be a wise and far-reaching step, which ensured a fortunate outcome to the War both for the Soviet Union and for all freedom-loving peoples' (p. 37).

Criticising the Anglo-French Governments for not carrying out effective measures to help Poland, and the Polish Government for its poor military showing, *Modern History* writes: 'The Polish people, however, could not reconcile itself to the occupation. Its best representatives

[4] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo oyuza* (Moscow, 1959).

rose up in struggle against the conquerors. From the very beginning this struggle assumed a national-liberation character. Under the leadership of the Polish communists a movement of resistance to the conquerors began in the enslaved territory' (op. cit., p. 6).

There appears to have been some recognition that this statement is more than usually incredible, since the Polish Communist Party was dissolved by the Comintern in 1938, after its leaders had been liquidated in the purges; the division of Poland agreed upon in the secret annex to the Nazi-Soviet pact was followed. when the agreement was implemented in practice, by the proclamation that the Polish question had been definitively settled. The joint Soviet-German statement of 28 September 1939 announced that

> After the dissolution of the former Polish state, the Government of the USSR and the German Goverment regard it as exclusively their task to restore peace and order in that territory . . . both parties recognise the frontier between their respective states established in article 1 as final . . . and will eliminate any interference by third powers with this decision.

Molotov, at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet a month later, said 'One swift blow to Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles treaty'.

Claims that they initiated and led the resistance are also made for the other communist parties. 'The treason of the French ruling circles evoked the deepest rebellion among the popular masses. The toiling people of France, true to their glorious revolutionary tradition, began an armed struggle against the Hitlerite occupiers. The resistance movement of the French people arose, in which by 1940-41 there were already 250,000 participants. This patriotic movement was headed by the French Communist Party' (*Modern History*, p. 9).

At the same time *Modern History* excludes de Gaulle from any share in the credit for the resistance movement. 'One part of the French bourgeoisie, closely linked with American-British monopolies, grouped itself round General de Gaulle. On 22 June de Gaulle fled from France to Britain; after two days he broadcast a statement assuming leadership of the French. He called on the people of France not to carry on an armed struggle against the German conquerors before the due time but to wait for the invasion of France by the Anglo-American armies' (ibid.).

The character of the war is left rather vague. The Soviet line of that time, which until June 1941 presented it as an imperialist war waged by the Western allies, has not been revived, but apparently no other solution which could reconcile Soviet behaviour at the time with policies after 1941 has been found. 'The war between Germany, Britain, and France began as an imperialist war on both sides. The Polish people, like the peoples of other countries which fell victims to aggression, fought for their independence, but as far as the great powers were concerned—Germany, Britain, and France alike—they followed imperialist aims' (*History of the CPSU*, p. 494).

'However', it continues, 'England and France had a common enemy with all nations—German fascism. . . . As a result of their defeat in 1940 both countries had to think less of realising their imperialist designs than of safeguarding their national independence. At the same time in England and France, as in the USA, the pressure of the popular masses increased, demanding that their Governments carry on an active anti-fascist liberation war. In these circumstances, under the active pressure of the masses the war of England and France against Fascist Germany changed its character in the course of time. Factually it turned into a freedom loving war of the peoples against fascist aggression and took on a liberating character. The war's liberating character was especially strengthened after the entry of the Soviet Union when Britain, France, and later the USA found themselves together with the USSR in a general anti-Hitler coalition'.

This leaves the date when the character of the war changed vague, but obviously puts it earlier than June 1941. An earlier explanation had it that for some time the war bore a dual character, being imperialist for Britain and France, and national-liberating from the very beginning for those countries which had been over-run by Hitler.[5] This appears to rest upon

[5] *Ocherki istorii velikoy otechestvennoy voiny* Academy of Sciences (Moscow, 1955), p. 25.

a rather metaphysical distinction and may explain why the line was subsequently abandoned.

Another essentially contradictory explanation is put forward, namely that from the very beginning the masses demanded an active war against Hitler, while the sin of the Governments was not that they waged war against Germany from wrong motives, but that they waged it so unenthusiastically and inefficiently. Though at one point Professor Deborin declares that the war aims of Germany, the USA, Britain, and France alike 'had a predatory character. All the communist parties condemned the war of conquest', he also insists that as a result of 'deep contradictions' in these countries 'the progressive forces in Britain, France, and the USA called for full mobilisation of all resources for resistance to aggression at the same time as their governments looked for ways of reaching a new anti-Soviet deal with Hitler. . . . The masses demanded energetic action while the governments sought a way out through passivity . . . the ruling circles of the USA, Britain, and France carried out a frenzied hunt against communists, though it was precisely the communists who put forward real proposals for joining forces against fascism'.

In the works under discussion neither de Gaulle nor Churchill is given any credit at all. *Modern History* introduces Churchill to its readers with the phrase '. . . the place of the Munichite Neville Chamberlain at the head of the Government was taken over by the organiser of anti-Soviet intervention in 1919, Winston Churchill'. The Churchill Government, like its predecessor, is accused of having wished to return to a Munichite policy, as late as the Hess visit in May 1941, but 'the British government was unable to accept Hess's offer, above all from fear of a revolt by the popular masses'.

The Labour Party also is excluded from the 'popular masses' or 'progressive forces' at almost every point. 'The international working-class was split by the right-wing socialists who rejected communist efforts to achieve unity', etc.[6] Indeed the British Labour Party is attacked wherever possible. Deborin even drags in their reference to the Nazi-Soviet pact during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Britain in 1956 (op. cit., p. 37).

In general the 'popular masses' or 'progressive forces' have been allotted the role of *deus ex machina* to explain any acts on the part of the British and United States Governments which cannot conveniently be denounced. The actual role of the masses in British foreign policy during the period is not dealt with. The importance of pacifism, Labour anti-war sentiments, left-wing opposition to military preparedness, and the complete lack of correlation between attitudes to Munich on the left-right spectrum are not mentioned at all.

The 'hard line' is strongly in evidence, too, where Finland is concerned. In earlier publications, Finnish 'reactionaries' and their supporters abroad are rebuked only for a 'provocative' attitude which forced the Soviet Government to take steps to defend Leningrad.[7] Now, however, Finland is directly accused of having launched the war against the Soviet Union. 'The imperialists succeeded in provoking the reactionary Finland into war against the Soviet Union'.[8] 'The ruling clique in Finland, incited by anti-Soviet circles in Britain, France, the USA, and Hitlerite Germany . . . launched a war against the Soviet Union in November 1939'.[9] The Kuusinen Government has not, however, been resurrected.

In addition to standard Stalinist invective the writers show a considerable gift for misquoting foreign sources. Books like Deborin's and Melnikov's are studded with footnotes referring to Western books and collections of documents which make quite an impression, until one checks the quotations, when it transpires that they frequently indicate the exact opposite of what they are supposed to. The authors can, presumably, rest assured that their Soviet readers would be unable to check quotations—assuming that they or anyone else would go to such trouble anyway. I shall confine myself to one example here, though I could easily fill pages with them.

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[6] *History of the CPSU*, p. 492.

[7] e.g. *Ocherki Istorii velikoy otechestvennoy voiny* (1955), p. 35.

[8] *History of the CPSU*, p. 496.

[9] *Modern History*, p. 7.

When accusing the British Government of not wishing to reach agreement with the Soviet Union for joint action against Hitler in 1939, Deborin writes that Strang wrote from Moscow to the Government in London 'informing them that he correctly understood the line of his Government as "to continue the discussions in Moscow for several months without reaching any concrete agreement". (*Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. VI, London, 1953, p. 425)'.[10]

The quotation looks terribly impressive. But the reader who actually turns it up will find that Strang said the exact opposite of what is ascribed to him. In his dispatch of 20 June 1939 Strang writes prophetically that Britain needed agreement with the Soviet Union far more urgently than the Soviet Union did, since Britain had no choice but to guarantee Poland and other countries against German aggression and go to war if need be, whereas the Soviet Government had two other alternatives to joining a coalition with Britain against Hitler: isolationism or a coalition with Hitler. Strang therefore pressed the Government to come to agreement with Russia at all costs, however awkward the Russians were making it, and he warned London that if this could not be achieved it would be fatal to break off the talks however difficult the Russians were; it was better to let them drag on for months until agreement was finally reached, for even the fact that talks were going on would discourage Hitler from aggression.[11]

When, in the thirties, Nazi Germany was openly proclaiming its intention of attacking the Soviet Union, the Soviet reply was to play down its anti-capitalist propaganda and to concentrate on the need for unity against the fascist menace. When the Soviet-Nazi pact was concluded, the anti-capitalist line was again resuscitated, only to be abandoned two years later when Hitler attacked. During the 'cold war' it has been polished up once more, and it is perhaps worth noting that despite all the tergiversations of Soviet coexistentialist policy it is now being stressed as heavily as ever. The retrospective historical corrections of the Khrushchev era do not extend to the sphere of international relations: the new look in foreign policy has a strong wrapping of the old propaganda. Like Bourbons, Soviet historians have learnt nothing; but they *have* managed to forget a good deal. Their presentation of historical events that are still fresh in the public memory is designed to make this forgetfulness ritual and universal.

[10] Deborin, op. cit., p. 35.

[11] *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, loc. cit.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN 1935-1960

The Soviet Version

G. B. Morris

SINCE Partition and the transfer of power in 1947 there have been certain marked changes in Soviet thinking on Indian and Pakistani affairs. The present article is an attempt to review the main trends of this thinking as they have appeared in recent Soviet writing on events of the period 1935-59. It makes no claim to completeness, since considerations of space rule out the possibility of treating more than a few selected subjects. Although a wide range of Soviet material has been examined, direct reference is confined to a few of what seem to be the most authoritative and representative works. Of these the most recent is the *History of India since* 1917 (Moscow, 1959), edited by V. V. Balabushevich and A. M. Dyakov and written by various authors. This work is referred to throughout as the *History*. The other sources will be identified as they occur.

The most important event in recent Soviet historical writing on India took place during 1954-56. In 1954, when the old 'Stalinist' policy towards India had already been discarded, translations of Soviet articles on Gandhi reached India and caused a considerable furore, the *Hindu* (13 October 1954) denouncing them as 'fantastically tendentious and perverted'. During the next two years Soviet organs published reassessments not only of Gandhi but of the 'national-liberation fight'—reassessments which from the point of view of Soviet policy were long overdue. In one of the most important of these (A. M. Dyakov and I. M. Reysner, 'The Role of Gandhi in the National-Liberation Movement of the Peoples of India', *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1956, No. 1) the previous Soviet view of Indian politics was faulted on two counts: (1) it had been considered, wrongly, that the proletariat and CPI led the national-liberation movement. In fact the movement was led by the Indian bourgeoisie and Congress; (2) Soviet historians were wrong in thinking that the attainment of independence in 1947 was the result of a deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and the British. The authors of this article had been the most vehement supporters of the old line and Dyakov in particular was making his second public confession of error. The first had taken place when he became 'convinced' of the correctness of the Stalinist line in 1952. Some quotations from the work in which he did so (*India before and after the Second World War*, Moscow, 1952) will be found below.

It should be emphasised that this reassessment did not extend to the history of the British in India, nor to Pakistan. The British continued to be regarded as brutal oppressors, taking everything from India and giving nothing, retaining power by an adroit mixture of the carrot and the stick and, in particular, first creating and then inflaming Hindu-Muslim discord.

A. M. Melnikov in the *History* represents the Government of India Act of 1935 as a British trick to weaken the national-liberation movement; reactionary parties were resurrected in almost all provinces (e.g. the Unionist and Praja Krishak Samiti parties), and the Muslim League gained a mass following for the first time. The activity of the League, in spite of its anti-imperialist slogans, Melnikov writes, was mainly directed against Congress and was a help to the British. The British, in fact, fostered Hindu-Muslim enmity for their own ends. Even the political concessions made by the Act, Melnikov considers, were negligible: it did not give the people even elementary political rights and the continued irresponsibility of the executive nullified the effect of the widened franchise. In spite of such concessions to the bourgeoisie as Provincial Autonomy, the Act received its support mostly by playing on feudalism and caste and religious differences.

Congress ministries are, not surprisingly, regarded as a mistake: 'the acceptance of ministerial posts by Congressmen diverted the attention of the popular masses from the basic

tasks of the national-liberation movement and gave birth . . . to parliamentary illusions'. As if partially to justify Congress in this step, Melnikov drastically simplifies the process of acceptance, stating that an undertaking was given that the Provincial Governors would not resort to their special powers. Even so it is asserted that posts were accepted mainly by right-wing Congressmen and that their policy did not correspond to the interests of the masses. Their relations with Delhi are regarded as those of 'collaboration', although this did not prevent the aggravation of the 'contradictions' between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie.

The Communist Party is regarded merely as part of the left wing of Congress which wanted to create a National Front around Congress. Communist Party members are presented as more consistent and far-sighted in pursuit of this aim, but that is their only distinction. The creation of a National Front Melnikov describes as having been foiled at the Tripuri meeting of 1939 only by disagreement within the left-wing itself, and by the effect of Gandhi's popularity which was used by the right wing.

The period of the Second World War in this *History* is written by A. M. Dyakov, who adopts a very different position from the one he held in his book *India during and after the Second World War*. In the earlier book he wrote (contrasting Congress with the Communist Party): 'Congress, however, in spite of its professed sympathy for the anti-fascist bloc, wanted to use the military situation only to wrest from Britain concessions in the interest of the property-owning classes of India'; and: 'Congress refused to support the British war-effort, although this would have been quite consistent with the continuation of the fight for independence . . . and [never] demanded that Britain open a second front'. In the *History*, however, he writes: 'the refusal of Congress to declare itself unconditionally on Britain's side . . . witnessed, of course, not to Congress pro-fascist inclinations but to . . . acute discontent . . . with British rule'. In spite of profits made from war-work, the Indian national bourgeoisie is said to be 'justly apprehensive that without political concessions on Britain's part it would not be able to retain its positions in the economic field'. In other words, Dyakov now implies that Congress's attitude was reasonable in the circumstances of the time.

On the attitude of Britain, however, he is just as intransigent: the policy of British imperialism is described as continued repression of the anti-British movement, provocation of Hindu-Muslim strife, and bribery of the property-owning classes to compromise by means of vague promises of concessions after the War. The Muslim League, Dyakov holds, had taken up the Pakistan issue mainly in order to have a policy different from that of Congress, and the British 'supported and directed [this demand] through their agents in the League'.

The Cripps Mission, of course, is described as a manoeuvre aimed at bringing about an agreement with Congress and so strengthening the British position. Dyakov gives a sketch of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals and argues that pt. 3 (which allowed Provinces or States unwilling to join the projected Indian Union either to retain their existing relations with Britain or to form separate Dominions) implied the creation of Pakistan and was an attempt to encourage separatist tendencies.

Of the policy of the Communist Party before the German attack on the Soviet Union Dyakov says only that it named German fascism as the main instigator of the War, closely seconded by British imperialism, and that its aim was to make use of the War to drive the British from India. No attempt is made to hide the Party's change of policy on the entry of the USSR into the War. Dyakov does, however, deny that the Party was legalised by the British because of this change of policy and, in any case, he says this legalisation was largely formal. The fact that the British simultaneously banned Congress is explained as an attempt to alienate from the Communist Party the 'broad strata of the workers' who were Congress supporters.

IN the 1945-57 section of the *History* (also by Dyakov) the main theme is the gradual intensification of the national-liberation struggle under the influence of the attainment of national independence by several Asian countries such as Indonesia and China. The movement in India is said to have been led mainly by Congress; the left wing of the movement (including the Communist Party) differed only in it

greater consistency and determination in demanding independence. This situation, Dyakov argues, ultimately forced the British to concede political power in the hope of preserving their position in India's economy. Partition is also seen as an attempt to preserve some measure of political power by weakening both of the new Dominions. Those proposals of the Pethwick-Lawrence Mission which called for the creation of two groups of provinces, Hindu and Muslim, were 'a concealed form of the partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan' and prove that 'the British government had already decided the question of the partition of India'. Religious strife is also put down to the activity of the British 'network of agents' within the Muslim League which is represented throughout as the creature of the British. The Calcutta killing of 16 August 1946, was caused by 'hired agents of the secret police' who 'infiltrated the ranks of the demonstrators and began to destroy Hindu shops and homes'. Similarly, the Punjab disorders in 1947 were a 'result of the provocative agitation of British agents'.

In his description of the Mountbatten Plan Dyakov states that it allowed the Princely States, if they were unwilling to join either of the new Dominions, to preserve their treaty relations with Britain, and goes on to say: 'this was no accident. The British imperialists counted on turning some of the States into British bases within the new Dominions'. (This assertion is repeated in the next section of the *History* by Yu. P. Nasenko, who adds the allegation that the British intended to set up a military base in Hyderabad.) There is no mention of Mountbatten's strong suggestion to the States that they should join either India or Pakistan (except in the case of Kashmir where it is rather peculiarly interpreted).

In his summing up on Partition Dyakov states that the British, forced to relinquish political power in India, partitioned the country with the intention of weakening both Pakistan and India and of provoking disagreements between them by which they could assume the role of 'arbitrator'. He stresses the absurdity of a partition which gave Pakistan 10 per cent of the proved natural resources of the sub-continent and India 90 per cent and which separated the areas of the jute and cotton industries from the areas where jute and cotton are grown. Nevertheless he regards the acquisition of Dominion status by India as valuable because it gave power to the national bourgeoisie who began to develop the country's economy and to do away with feudal survivals. This marks another change from the previous line (see above) according to which 'the big Indian bourgeoisie, frightened by the mass movement . . . capitulated and came to a full agreement with the British imperialists who also made concessions, renouncing direct . . . rule in India'. Dyakov concludes in the *History*, again in sharp contrast to his earlier opinions, that 'the calculations of the British imperialists that they would keep their political influence in India proved erroneous'.

A. I. Levkovski writes in the *History* about the economic position in India in 1935-9 that 'British finance capital continued to control the most important commanding heights of the Indian national economy'. In foreign trade India's imports were as before predominantly British industrial goods and her exports—raw materials and unfinished products. Although the volume of Indian exports had increased since 1927 the difference between the price of imports from Britain and Indian exports had also increased 'and bore witness to the increased exploitation of the Indian people by British monopoly capital'.

Agriculture 'was in a state of profound stagnation'. Both sown acreage and production fell as a result of the 'economic slump caused by the imperialist yoke'. Meanwhile industry continued to expand, which led to 'the growth of contradictions between the Indian bourgeoisie on the one hand and the British imperialists and the Indian land-owning class on the other. . . . The economic basis of the growing contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the colonial regime was the battle for the sharing of profits, a battle made more intense by the reduction in the relative size of the profits of individual strata of the Indian bourgeoisie'.

During the War period, according to S. M. Melman, 'the policy of British Imperialism was to preserve India's colonial backwardness. As a result her potential was far from fully used for the destruction of the fascist aggressors. At the same time British imperialism managed to place immense burdens on the shoulders of

the Indian people'. Melman justifies this, at first sight self-contradictory, statement by references to the Bengal famine of 1943, caused in the main by the British colonialists and the Indian traders and moneylenders they protected; to Indian industrial activity during the War when, 'while British and Indian businessmen were making immense profits . . . the relative and absolute impoverishment of the Indian working class was intensified'; and finally to the burden of War-expenditure on India, demonstrated, paradoxically enough, by the existence after the War of Indian sterling credits in place of her previous indebtedness. In March 1946, Melman writes, India had a sterling balance of £1,200m. She had also liquidated a debt of £300m. and lent Britain £30m. This, together with direct military expenditure of £1,275m., gives a grand total of £2,800m., on which Melman comments: 'the burden of military expenditure laid by Britain on the shoulders of the working masses of India indeed reached unprecedented dimensions'.

Melman concludes: 'the crisis of British rule in India . . . became especially pronounced at the end of the Second World War. The liberation of the country from the oppression of British imperialism became historically necessary as never before'.

The *History of India since 1917* which has been the main source so far has one characteristic unusual in Soviet historical writing—an unwillingness to draw sharp black and white conclusions (except, of course, about the British). These conclusions continue to be drawn, however, as in I. Ya. Podkopayev's *The Renascent East* (Moscow, 1959), where it is pointed out that even after liberation 'in countries where state power is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie . . . while progressive forces are trying to follow the path of social progress and the strengthening of national independence, interior reactionary forces, frequently encouraged from abroad by the imperialists, are carrying on a completely opposed policy'.

SOVIET writers assign great importance to 'imperialist' activity in India, its most important manifestations (apart from 'economic imperialism' which will be considered later) being the question of the States, especially the Kashmir issue, and continued Indian membership of the Commonwealth.

As has already been noted, Yu. P. Nasenko, writing in the *History* on the 1947-49 period, alleges that the British wished the large States to remain outside the two Dominions and in treaty relations with Britain so as to construct military bases on their territory. Kashmir is his prize example: it was important to Britain and the USA because it is strategically placed near the USSR, Afghanistan, and China; Mountbatten's request to the Maharajah to join either India or Pakistan, writes Nasenko, 'was equivalent to a demand to join Pakistan, since three-quarters of the population of Kashmir were Muslims who, in Mountbatten's opinion, could wish for nothing more than to become the inhabitants of a Muslim state'. The invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen and members of the Pakistani Army is taken as proving the collusion of the British Governor of the North-West Frontier Province and of the British officers in the Pakistani Army, including even General Auchinleck, at that time CIC of the armies of both Dominions, a point which Soviet authors consider highly suspicious.

Indian membership of the Commonwealth after the declaration of a Republic in 1950 is a phenomenon which Nasenko finds puzzling since 'the broad masses of the Indian people insisted that India should leave the British Empire'. Nasenko, however, seizes on the point that the Indian Constitution makes no mention of India's relations with the Commonwealth and hails this as proving that 'not only has India put its foot on the path of independent political development but has confirmed this in its Constitution'. He hopes, in other words, that in the future India will correct her mistake.

In an article written in 1957 ('Ten Years of India's Foreign Policy', *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, 1957, No. 2), S. Mikoyan states that with the transfer of power 'India received the opportunity of carrying out an independent foreign policy'. He praises her resistance to the West's alleged attempts to draw her into military alliances and her perseverance in support of the Five Principles. However, he does not forget to point out that a country's foreign policy reflects the interests of its ruling class, and that the India

bourgeoisie is interested in protecting the home market against foreign monopolies, and its peaceful development.

The *History* (Nasenko) 1947-50 uses the same argument but points out that at the same time the Indian ruling circles wanted British and American economic aid, were unwilling to leave the Commonwealth, and were afraid of the effect on India of a further upsurge of the liberation movement in Asia, so that 'the foreign policy of India during this period . . . [was] basically neutralist but with a definite trend towards the Western powers'.

Nasenko considers that during the 1950-52 period Indian foreign policy lost its pro-Western trend: India came out against the Korean conflict, refused to send a contingent to the UNO forces and even came forward as a peacemaker. However, he writes, she was not wholly consistent, sending a medical detachment to Korea, allowing the recruitment of Gurkhas into the British Army, and allegedly permitting French troop-carrying aircraft on their way to Indochina to land at Indian aerodromes.

Only during the period 1952-55, Nasenko considers, did Indian foreign policy reach its full flower. During 1953, although it is again alleged that French flights to Indochina took place via India, nevertheless India supported the entry of China into UNO, the return of Formosa, and the cessation of the Korean conflict. During 1954 Indian foreign policy entered a new stage 'of active battle for the . . . unification of the anti-imperialist forces, for friendship with the USSR and China'. In this year Chou En-lai and Nehru signed the 'Panch Shila' agreement, India joined China and the USSR in bringing about a cease-fire in Indochina and arranged the Bandung Conference with Burma and Indonesia. The Bandung Conference crowns Nasenko's description of a period when India's 'international authority grew immeasurably. India became an important factor in the strengthening of peace and friendship between the peoples of Asia and Africa fighting against colonialism'. The picture given is one of a growing rapprochement between India and the USSR and China as Western political influence declines. Since the Indian-Chinese disagreement there have been no Soviet comments except the well-known Tass statements.

To show how much the Soviet view of India's foreign policy has changed since 1954 it is only necessary to quote some passages from Dyakov's earlier work. On Nehru's declaration in 1946 that India would pursue a policy of neutrality he wrote: 'This declaration . . . was also an obvious manoeuvre carried out with the intention of applying pressure to the British government. However, soon after Partition . . . the policy of the government of the Indian Union began to deviate considerably from this line.' He characterises Nehru's position on Korea as vacillating and accuses him of helping Burma to 'crush the national movement'. 'If India has not yet entered one of the aggressive blocs . . . this is explained not so much by the Indian government's desire to carry out a policy of genuine neutrality as by sharp Anglo-American contradictions'.

THE comments in the *History* on India's economy since Partition are not so favourable. Agriculture is backward, the standard of living of the masses is extremely low, and 'British monopoly capital continues to occupy key positions in the national economy'. British investment has increased in trade, finance, and the processing industries. In 1954, according to the Indian Minister of Trade, one-third of India's export trade in fats was controlled by four British firms and the tea, jute, leather, and hide export trades were dominated by foreigners. 'Since . . . British private investments . . . have grown by comparison with 1947 we can suppose that they serve as a source of considerable profit'.

The main reason for the country's economic malaise is seen as the agrarian problem. However, the Agrarian Reform was only partially successful, the resistance of the landowners being encouraged by some groups of the bourgeoisie who have connections with agriculture. There is still insufficient land for the peasant, causing 'relative agrarian overpopulation'.

Industry is admitted to have developed considerably since 1947 but it is pointed out that factory industry is still a small proportion of the total. Also the impoverishment of the peasantry (90 per cent of the population has less than one rupee per day to spend) limits the

size of the home market and thus the production of industry.

The second Five-Year Plan is welcomed but regarded as insufficient: land should be given free to the peasants and the burden of financing the plan should be borne by Indian and foreign capital, not the Indian workers. The use of foreign capital is said to be 'pregnant with danger for India's independent economic development'.

The Soviet view of Pakistan's economic development is even less favourable since the whole ruling class, not merely a section as in India, is regarded as being involved in feudalism. V. G. Rastyannikov and S. A. Kuzmin conveniently summarise the position in their book *Problems of Pakistan's Economy* (Moscow, 1958). As in India, they write, the main problem is the feudal agrarian system which, by preventing the development of capitalism in agriculture, deprives industry of a market for agricultural machinery and, indirectly, of a market for consumer goods also, since the peasants, 74 per cent of the population, are in a state of beggary.

Although industry has developed since 1947, they write, it has not developed enough to absorb the flow of peasants from the land and, furthermore, has developed disproportionately, with too little emphasis on the basic industries of steel, machine-tools, and power. This has increased Pakistan's dependence on imperialist powers for the means of production.

The inefficiency of agriculture has made it necessary to import food and to decrease state expenditure on industrial development. As Pakistan is becoming objectively more dependent on imperialist powers, according to Kuzmin and Rastyannikov, both for food imports and for very many industrial goods, Pakistan's industrial development cannot solve the 'contradictions' between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, i.e., at the present stage of historical development, between the Pakistani people and imperialism.

The allegedly evil effect on Pakistan's economy of the Western connection is one of the subjects treated by Ahmed Farid Khan, apparently a Pakistani writer, in 'Pakistan under the Foreign Yoke' (*International Affairs,* 1959, No. 10). Farid Khan blames Pakistan's low standard of living on her dependence on foreign imports, that is to say on America and Britain. America, he alleges, uses her aid to subordinate the economy of Pakistan to that of America by hindering the growth of Pakistani heavy industry and by weakening the state sector. Ahmed Farid Khan, although a Pakistani, here expresses the official Soviet view.

Pakistan is considered of value to the West not merely as a field for 'economic imperialism' but also because of its strategic position near China, the USSR, and Afghanistan. For this reason, according to B. Teplinski ('Military Bases and American Strategic Doctrine', *International Affairs,* 1959, No. 9), it is an important link in the chain of American anti-Soviet bases in the Middle East (i.e. between CENTO and SEATO). In the above-mentioned article Farid Khan also wrote about the hordes of 'arrogant, meddling American "advisers" ' who are living illustrations of Pakistan's enslavement by the USA. Teplinski deals further with the military aspects, arguing that as Pakistan is surrounded by peaceful or neutral states her membership of Western military blocs cannot be defensive in intention. American military installations, airbases and rocket-launching pads in Pakistan, he writes, are directed against Pakistan's peaceful neighbours, especially the USSR. N. A. Khalfin ('The Pushtunistan Problem', *Kratkie Soobshcheniya Instituta Vostokovedeniya,* Vol. XXXV, 1959) alleges that America 'has tried persistently to exploit Afghan-Pakistani quarrels . . . and under the guise of mediation to strengthen American positions in these countries'. F. Matveyev ('A Year of Unfufillled Hopes', *Sovremenny Vostok,* 1960, No. 3) makes obvious the importance assigned by the USSR to the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier when he writes that Pakistani proposals for a joint Pakistani-Indian defence of the North-West Frontier were an attempt to draw India into the Western system of military blocs. The same article argues that Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO is not only unnecessary, since Pakistan is not threatened, and dangerous, since these alliances will involve Pakistan in America's wars, but also unprofitable, since (a) the American military equipment given to Pakistan is out-of-date; (b) during 1959-60 three quarters of the budget is allocated to military

expenditure, an increase of 33 per cent over the pre-military agreement period. This means that the budget cannot be balanced without foreign loans, and even these are rapidly becoming insufficient; (c) increased dependence on the USA has given the latter the opportunity of stunting the growth of the state sector and of heavy industry.

THE Soviet opinion of the political situation within Pakistan before General Iskander Mirza's coup d'état has been conveniently summarised by V. N. Moskalenko ('The Political Situation and the Problem of General Elections in Pakistan, 1947-57', *Pakistan: History and Economy,* Moscow, 1959). The political situation, he writes, was characterised by 'frequent changes of government, party splits, intrigues, machinations, unprincipled compromises . . . and their rejection at the first convenient moment, and by corruption of the State apparatus'. The bourgeois-landowner parties had no 'programmes which would really answer the national interests of the country and provide measures for improving the position of the masses' and in default 'engaged in the most shameless demagogy'. Moskalenko does not regard the ensuing 'military dictatorship' any more favourably, however: it was planned, he alleges, because the newly worked-out Constitution did not allow Pakistan's ruling circles to carry out their anti-national policy of acceptance of Western aid and participation in military blocs under a smokescreen of parliamentary democracy, and it was considered that Army rule would be more appropriate for this purpose.

This short and incomplete account has given some indication of the present Soviet view on the history of India and Pakistan since 1935 and of the differences between this view and its predecessor. It is now held that during the colonial period the 'contradictions' between the Indian bourgeoisie and imperialism were so strong as to make the former, not the Indian proletariat, the natural leaders of the national-liberation struggle. 'The Indian bourgeoisie . . . *in its own interests* . . . could not avoid making democratic demands' (I. M. Reysner, 'The Basic Stages of the Battle for Freedom of the Peoples of India from the Beginning of the British Conquest to 1947', *Independent India,* Moscow, 1958). At that stage in India's development, it is now admitted, the CPI could not undertake this role. The Soviet view of British imperialism as of a cruel oppressor, scorning no manoeuvre to preserve power, remains unchanged.

After the achievement of independence also, it is now thought, the Indian bourgeoisie preserved its position as leader of India, since India is still not regarded as completely free: she remains in the Commonwealth, accepts Western aid, and welcomes foreign investment. In the past these were regarded as signs of a 'semi-colonial' status. Now, however, Soviet writers content themselves with noting that 'contradictions' between the Indian bourgeoisie and imperialism still exist. The Indian bourgeoisie consequently deserves support because it must in its own interests fight imperialism in order to increase India's independence and develop her industry, and is therefore interested in the preservation of peace. It is this vested interest in peace that accounts for India's neutral foreign policy, the aspect of modern India which Soviet writers most praise and which leads them to deal more mercifully than they otherwise might with certain other aspects of India's development.

Similarly it is Pakistan's policy of membership of military pacts which calls down upon her the full force of Soviet denunciation, not only against her membership of these pacts but also against her home policy and economic development. Although it is not suggested that there is no difference between India and Pakistan in these respects, it seems obvious that if Soviet writers applied the same standards to both countries on these matters India would come off less well than in fact she does. There is little doubt that it is India's foreign policy, and the leadership of the uncommitted Asian countries which Soviet writers admit it has brought her, which has secured her this favoured position. The present Indian-Chinese rift may cause the USSR to make an agonising reappraisal of its Indian policy but all the evidence so far available shows that she will go to great lengths to avoid this. The strength of India's position is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the USSR should even hesitate to support a fellow Communist power.

THE WAR IN THE SOVIET NOVEL

From the Heroic to the Prosaic

S. Lochtin

IMPORTANT historical events, elemental disasters, and wars, overpowering in their intensity, tend to leave the individual in a daze and he looks back on them only with reluctance, anger, or distaste. But with the passage of time he tries to revive old memories and relive events in his imagination, and it is this that makes war novels and memoirs a success. It also explains why immediate postwar years are usually barren of war novels, for then those who fought, the heroes and victims, victor and vanquished alike, relax and hope to enjoy the peace which follows war.

Even more potent was the reason why war themes were avoided in the Soviet Union in the fifteen years which followed the Second World War: the general atmosphere prevailing at that time made certain problems of the war politically taboo. Although the Soviet leaders brought their war to a successful conclusion, they considered it a dangerous subject, full of explosive ideas and unlikely to enhance the cause of communist construction.

A very high price had been paid for that victory. The prestige of the communist government had suffered when the country was caught unprepared by enemy invasion, the legend of invincibility built round the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army had been smashed by eighteen months of almost continuous defeat, the myth of the loyalty of every Soviet worker to the Communist Party had been undermined by mass desertions, and the appearance in the front lines of an anti-Soviet army composed of Soviet citizens. In such circumstances, it became politically inadvisable to write about the war; the post-war climate did not lend itself to historical and literary research into the psychological atmosphere which prevailed in wartime USSR, and the issue became even more complicated when the cold war with the West brought down a curtain of oblivion on Allied assistance to the USSR during the war

The Soviet writer wishing to produce a war novel found himself handicapped on every side. He had to steer clear of the obstacles inherent in the current political issues, while at the same time compelled to offer his readers a highly political work in line with Communist Party demands. Applied to the Second World War, this meant that he had to prove that victory had been achieved under its wise leadership, accomplished by the iron will of Stalin, and made possible by the absolute loyalty of the Soviet people to Communist ideology, the Party, and to Stalin personally. This deliberate mockery of historical truth proved a stumbling-block for many a writer. It was difficult enough to put it across to the reader, but even more difficult to satisfy the Party, since the Party image of the war was constantly changing. It was apparent to anyone reading Soviet books as they became available that even the terms of reference used by their authors were undergoing changes between 1941 and 1950. At first the war was depicted as 'a struggle against the onslaught of the Nazi invader'. A little later, it became 'a Russian struggle against the Nazi-German attack'. The terms 'the Russian people' and even 'the Russian nation' appeared in print in preference to 'the Soviet people'. But when the war was won and the German Communists were offered a republic of their own all references to Russo-German antagonism faded away and the term 'the Nazi invasion' was restored to its former place. All this may seem trifling to the western reader, but the Soviet writer did not and could not take it lightly. He had to revise every new edition of his works and adapt them to the current political trend.

No wonder, then, that even the most famous Soviet novelists were unable to produce anything remarkable. Even Mikhail Sholokhov, the renowned author of *And Quiet Flows the Don*, was unable to write a really good book about

ne war. In 1943 he did produce *They Fought or their Fatherland*,[1] a rather naive and flat tory set during the retreat behind the Don in ne summer of 1942, just before the battle of talingrad.

[N this book, a Soviet infantry regiment, reduced to 117 men, wearily marches east-vards after many encounters with the enemy. Ordered to take up a defensive position near a amlet on the banks of the Don, the regiment ghts for some time, repelling German tanks and nfantry attacks. The Soviet soldiers are ex-austed, they have no anti-tank guns, only anti-ank rifles, machine-guns, and carbines. Never-heless, they destroy several tanks, shoot down n enemy bomber, and hold out until ordered o withdraw across the river under cover of arkness.

The basic theme of the book is the spiritual trength and resilience of Soviet man and on his the author has built up a superstructure—he image of the ordinary soldier's loyalty to ne Soviet system. The hero, Rifleman Lopa-hin, a former miner and shockworker, is a atural political officer, capable of explaining in imple words the grim realities of war. His ormulas, however, are a little too close to the fficial Party utterances to ring true. His ex-lanation for all the defeats of the Soviet army s that 'not all Soviet soldiers have yet learned o fight'. The main thing, he says, is to hate ne enemy and turn anger and hatred into a veapon of victory. To criticise superior officers s not enough if the ordinary soldier is to over-ome his own failings; even the sick have no ight to sickness, for this is War. That is the um of his philosophy. The battle itself is full f near-miracles. The hundred-odd men destroy anks and planes with their anti-tank rifles and riumph in bayonet attacks over the vastly uperior forces of the enemy. Their supporting rtillery has uncanny luck, too: although far ehind the front line, the gunners score direct its on the tanks with their very first shots. ny soldier of the last war would view this icture with a certain amount of suspicion, as theoretical possibility but hardly likely to happen in reality. And so it goes on. When the remnants of the regiment are safely behind the Don, a revolt starts brewing among the soldiers. Instead of submitting to the order to proceed to the rear, they want to join other fighting units on the river. Only twenty-seven of them have survived but all, to a man, want to stay and fight. Yet it only takes a single speech from their warrant officer on the virtues of military discipline to make them change their minds. They assemble in front of their colonel's quarters and the commander, wounded but still full of energy, gives them a second talking to in which he lavishes praise on the Great Stalin and forecasts the storming of Berlin. All this, too, while German panzers are racing towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus, while the Soviet army is suffering defeat after defeat, and its reserves are still far behind the front line.

Sholokhov's novel thus dismally falls into the category of patriotic and romantic books for schoolboys. His soldiers are all heroes and their leaders invincible. Even his masterly descriptions of peasant life in the Don steppe, his vivid and colourful portrayal of minor characters cannot save the general picture. Sholokhov's war is unreal and untrue.

Thus, the didactic nature of Socialist Realism proved to be an almost unsurmountable obstacle. It frustrated writers at every attempt to translate the war years of fear, effort, and ultimate rejoicing into terms capable of conveying to the reader an idea of what really happened. All the limitations inherent in Soviet literary theory contributed to circumscribe the writer's field of vision and compelled him to move within a narrow, restricted sphere. His aim was to educate future Soviet generations in the virtues of official patriotism and devotion to the military traditions of the Red Army, and this left little room for deeper exploration of the human and psychological problems of war. Fear, curiosity about the enemy as a man, and the workings of the instinct of self-preservation under the blows of mechanised war, had to be avoided at all costs.

In the last few years, however, the atmosphere has changed. The extent of this change can best be judged by the fact that it is now possible to record a protest against shallow patriotism and the artificial presentation of the

[1] Mikhail Sholokhov, *Oni srazhalis za rodinu* Moscow, 1959.

last war in literature. One such protest has come recently from the pen of Viktor Nekrasov, a writer well-known for his war stories. Last year he visited the Stalingrad Battle Museum which stands on top of Mamai Hill, the scene of some of the bloodiest battles of 1942. The Museum, with its vast painted battle panorama, struck Nekrasov as overdone and unrealistic and he expressed his views and his reaction to his visit in an essay 'On the Presentation of Life in Literature'. 'One feels compelled to ask why it was thought necessary to paint a picture of events which did not actually take place on Mamai Hill,' he wrote. 'Our soldiers did not storm the water tanks on the hill with their battle colours flying and their rifles at the trail. Who wants all this noise and falsity? Are they here for the sake of beauty? But do we need this kind of beauty? What is more, is it really beautiful?'

Nekrasov's words and their publication are in themselves proof that something has changed; the Stalinist idea of the Second World War is making way for a new approach in Soviet writing.

Two recent books are worth mentioning in this connexion; one comes from the pen of Grigori Baklanov, the other from Konstantin Simonov.

BAKLANOV'S novel *An Inch of Ground*[2] is an attempt to picture the war without the trimmings of ideology. Contrary to the sanctified Party recipe, it does not present an overall panorama of events, nor does it try to explain them. This in itself is exceptional in Soviet literature. The story is limited in time and space and takes place within the boundaries of a small Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the River Dniester in 1944. Its heroes are junior officers and other ranks of an infantry brigade. Surrounded by the Germans and cut off from their comrades by the river, they know nothing of developments outside their tiny foothold, nothing of the war raging elsewhere. From time to time they try to imagine how their own situation fits into the jigsaw of events in neighbouring sectors, but generally speaking their main concern is for themselves. They have n time for political propaganda since their da and nights are fully occupied with the despera struggle to survive. The bridgehead is domi ated by the enemy on an overlooking ridge an he spares no efforts to obliterate the Sovi troops on his side of the river.

The principal character is young Lieutenan Motovilov, an artillery officer attached to th brigade, and the story is unfolded through h eyes. Motovilov had joined the army straig from school and is reaching manhood in th course of the war. He is a good Soviet citize a patriot, and an enemy of his country's enemie He even has a certain grasp of the ideologic differences separating communists and nazi Not very profound, he is all the same since and honest. There is little politics as such i this novel and, for once, references to Stalin an the Party are but fleeting. The story conce trates on the battle and its technical and huma problems. Survival is the overriding questio 'Either I kill the German, or he kills me', o of the soldiers sums up the whole situation i the bridgehead. Acts of courage and heroi appear side by side with suffering, atrocit stupidity, and even cowardice. Baklanov's Re Army men look like the fighting men of a country, proud and modest, subdued and hop ful, brave and fearful, trustworthy and lyin The world in which they live is far remov from anything to be found in a propaganda tex book. Reason and justice have no place her a hero dies at the moment of his ultimate t umph, a well-meaning but utterly exhaust officer is reduced to the ranks and transferred a punitive battalion, a coward is promoted.

Perhaps the most unorthodox note yet to sounded in Soviet war writing is the story the coward in *An Inch of Ground*. Priva Kozintsev, a former dance-band trumpet playe is the coward. After spending the first thr years of the war entertaining Germans in night club in occupied Odessa, he is conscript when the town is liberated and posted as signal corps private to the bridgehead wi Motovilov. The lieutenant sends him out repair a damaged telephone line; Kozintsev ji at the order which removes him from the co parative safety of the dugout and exposes hi to enemy fire. He goes out to inspect the li

[2] Grigory Baklanov, 'Pyad Zemli', *Novy Mir*, 1959, 5 and 6.

soon returns to report that everything is order. When the German attack comes a hours later, the lieutenant discovers that his nalman has lied, for the line is dead.

But luck is on the coward's side. Far behind, the rear areas beyond the river, the artillery gade commander rests in a safe village, busily ganising a brass band for his troops. There a place here for the trumpet player Kozintsev d he is recalled from the front line. Motovi- cannot spare his telephone operator and his willingness to obey the order earns him a ntence of five days' confinement to barracks. is is a completely meaningless punishment the heat of battle but it wounds his pride. e trumpeter crosses the river in good time fore the Germans attack and survives, escap- the slaughter on the bridgehead.

Baklanov's book has drawn criticism from rious quarters and three different reviewers ok him to task in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* last ar. But he had his supporters, too. The main ntention of his opponents was that he was ilty of 'Remarquism'—imitation of the style d form of Erich Maria Remarque's war vels—a tendency which has for long been wned upon by Soviet critics.

KONSTANTIN SIMONOV'S *The Living and the Dead*[3] belongs to a different literary nre. The author himself was too long a war rrespondent not to be attracted by the idea presenting the war in its totality and giving cross-section of events at all levels, from the neral staff right down to the infantry platoon. is kind of picture is, of course, much nearer the accepted Party vision of the war than the tailed account by a subaltern of what hap- ned in his own limited sector in Baklanov's ok. This alone brings Simonov's book into e ranks of the Party-line novels.

Accepted Soviet dogma makes it compulsory a writer to enunciate certain general prem- s and then to make the events in his story fit War as a literary subject is understood as great panorama with the individuals in the ckground and important political develop- nts nearer to the fore. Events only serve to provide an illustration for the ideas developed and to explain the reasons behind human achievements and failures.

Simonov's treatment of the subject does, to a certain extent, follow this pattern. His hero, Political Officer Sintsov, walks for hundreds of miles, comes into contact with numerous individuals, talks with soldiers, listens to generals and high ranking commissars. He is a witness, the lens of a camera into which all trends and events are focused. His adventures are more psychological than physical; political considerations of the moment criss-cross his mind and he is more busy explaining to himself the nature and reasons for Soviet reverses than taking part in the actual fighting.

Sintsov's wanderings around and across the front give Simonov the chance to present an overall picture of the situation at the front and in the rear. Politically, it is a Stalinist picture, and Sintsov believes in the Party and in Stalin personally. All the evil that befalls him and the country is a 'mistake' and not due to Stalin's misjudgment. There are undertones of accusation against the leaders of the political police and unflattering references to their chief Yezhov. There is also an incident in which state security officers bring about the wholesale destruction of a fighting unit whom they had disarmed in accordance with instructions issued in regard to troops who had escaped from behind the enemy lines.

Taking all this into account, Simonov's choice of the early months of the war as a subject makes the book a little unorthodox. For those were the days when the Soviet army suffered defeat after defeat, when thousands of its soldiers and their generals surrendered, and the very existence of the Soviet Union seemed to hang in the balance. Seen in this light, Simonov's decision to deal with that period seems to be an act of political courage. No nation can be expected to take lightly to recollection of defeat, surrender, and disaster, and how much more so is this the case with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it must be remembered that it was Khrushchev himself who raised this very point in his 'secret' speech in 1956 and so made the subject safe for writers. For us now, the important question is who has gone further in his analysis, Simonov or Khrushchev?

Konstantin Simonov, 'Zhivye i Mertvye', *Znamya*, 9, 4, 10, 11.

The answer is difficult. Even remembering Simonov's extraordinary agility on the political tightrope and the apparent confidence with which he moves on the very brink of nonconformity, it is obvious that he has achieved something new in Soviet war literature. He has given a cautious but vivid picture of the Soviet army in defeat. We see this army scattered and reeling under the hammer blows of surprise attack. Its soldiers are like straying sheep and its generals waver and lose hope. We also see them later when they recover and counterattack, but it is the first impression that remains uppermost.

SIMONOV gives us vividly contrasting portraits of two Soviet generals, both of whom play a prominent part. The one has made a career by siding with the government in its purge of independent officers with minds of their own. A sycophant in peacetime, he blunders when the fighting starts and loses his formation in action; escaping to the forests, he tries to hide and to conceal his identity. The other general is a victim of the purge. Arrested on a trumped-up charge, he spends several months in confinement and is released only when enemy invasion compels the government to bring back its more competent generals. He is honest, courageous, and a good commander. Encircled by the Germans, he inspires his men to break out of the ring and fight their way back to the Soviet lines. During this fighting withdrawal the two generals meet again and the former victim now summarily courtmartials the other for cowardice and dereliction of duty; stripped of his rank, he meets an ignominious death.

Simonov goes even further in disclosing the unpleasant secrets of the early stages of the Soviet-German war. In the second part of the book he gives a powerful and dramatic picture of the Soviet capital in the throes of panic. With the Germans already on the outskirts of the city and expected to make a victorious entry, the Muscovites flee eastwards. Ministries and newspaper offices are evacuated, the roads are jammed and the populace besieges the railway stations and storms every train going east. This is a scene which has never before appeared in Soviet literature.

And yet the central theme of the book is no the fighting or the adventures of commissa Sintsov. It is really Sintsov's sufferings as result of his losing his Communist Party mem bership card.

Sintsov is wounded in the head during short engagement with a party of Germa soldiers in the forest. Covered with blood, h is left for dead and one of his comrades collec his personal belongings and documents to de liver to his family. When Sintsov regains con sciousness he is alone and no longer a commi sar but just another straggler without identit He has lost his Party card and this, in Sovi eyes, is a crime equal to treason. He is to b punished accordingly.

Sintsov wants to continue the fight but unable to join any regular unit without fir standing trial and clearing himself. Faced wit this almost impossible task, he decides to mak his way back to Moscow on foot. He sneak past the checkpoints on the outskirts of the ci and enters Moscow without having presente himself to any authority. Desperately trying t re-establish his identity, he is at last assisted b a humane commissar who allows him to enli as a private in a volunteer workers' battalio This part of the story and the subsequent adve tures, Sintsov's confessions, and the efforts his superiors to promote him and to get th Party to accept the prodigal son back into th fold, must strike the western reader as almo meaningless and completely artificial. Fro the Soviet point of view, however, it is a typic story of what must often have happened duri the war.

It is precisely the tribulations of a Party mem ber who has lost his membership card whi make *The Living and the Dead* a well-writt Party novel. In the interplay of intelligent opposed elements of invasion and defenc defeat and recovery, opportunist officials a the hero-figure of Stalin, Simonov reveals hi self as a faithful Communist.

His book is not a real criticism of the Sov political reality of 1941. Simonov does discu subjects that were taboo in the postwar yea he writes openly of panic in the first months the fighting, he makes a point of Stalin's 'm takes', and he even goes so far as to say th

e Soviet authorities were really more con-
rned with hunting down alleged spies and
boteurs than with organising effective defence.
it throughout the novel he is careful not to
ess the point too far. He explains everything
om the Party point of view, and at times the
ok, for all its excellent descriptive passages,
ads rather like one of the better *Pravda*
aders in which denunciation of failure is im-
ediately followed by an ideological analysis
oving that, after all, everything is fine.
The book is not only Soviet, which it must
, but also Communist and Social-Realist. The
rtain rises and a tremendous historical drama
enacted before the reader's eyes; but not for a
oment must he be left alone with the tale and
s own reflexions. A Party political officer is
nstantly at his elbow, ready to explain any-
ng that might be misunderstood or wrongly
mmented on. The author himself takes his
ader by the hand and leads him along the
ht path, all the while assuring him that things
re not really as bad as all that in 1941.
Nonetheless, it marks a turning away from
e novel of straight propaganda, crudely curs-
g the 'barbarian invader' and extolling the
eat and omniscient Stalin'. *The Living and*
e *Dead* is a new departure in which the Com-
nist point of view is presented with intelli-
nce and sometimes even sophistication.

THIS is not to say that pure propagandist
. literature on war themes is outmoded and
tinct. It still fills many pages of literary maga-
es and the best example of its kind is, per-
ps, Georgi Berezko's *Greater than the Atom,*
ich describes events alleged to have happened
the time of the American landings in the
banon in 1958.[4]
The story takes place in and around the
rracks of an airborne division in a small
vn in Byelorussia—Mogilev or Borisov to
lge by the description. The division is sud-
nly ordered out on manoeuvres and in the
evailing atmosphere of secrecy and political
sion the troops are under the impression that
y are actually going to war with the West,
ir immediate mission being to occupy an
American base to be used for atom bomb and missile attacks on the USSR.

The manoeuvres are in fact being held for the benefit of a visiting general on a routine tour, and to show that the division is fully trained and equipped. Eventually, the excitement subsides and the troops return peacefully to their barracks.

The atmosphere throughout is tense and maintained at fever pitch although nothing really exciting happens in the course of the narrative. The tension is built up and maintained by the highly biased descriptions of political events outside the Soviet Union with which the author ends each chapter. These slogan-like sentences, printed in italics, play the part of the chorus in a Greek tragedy. The last paragraph of the concluding chapter, for instance, reads as follows:

'Thus came the second half of the twentieth century, the century of the liberation of peoples from poverty, injustice, ignorance, and capitalism. Never had the inhabitants of the earth been so near to the fulfilment of their desires. But an unheard-of danger cast its shadow over them—in its retreat and resistance, capitalism had threatened mankind with the H-bomb'.

In the few weeks covered by the novel, the main characters of the story undergo a psychological evolution. There is, for instance, the intellectually arrogant private, a member of the intelligentsia, who with his educational background considers hmself a cut above his comrades. He evolves from an outspoken critic of military discipline and spit-and-polish into a modest and devoted soldier. Then there is the neurotic parachutist who suffers agonies of fear every time he has to jump, for a nervous shock sustained in his childhood during the war has left him with the fear of everything conneected with weapons and military life. Derided by his comrades and the object of his superiors' contempt, he develops into an almost heroic figure in the atmosphere of imminent war.

All this fits perfectly into the Party line prescribed for writers dealing with military subjects. The novel is political through and through; it extols the Soviet parachute troops as the great power that is capable of beating nuclear bombs, and suggests that in atomic war capitalism will meet its doom while the Soviet army will prove

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Georgi Berezko, 'Silneye Atoma', *Znamya,* 1959, 10, and 11.

stronger than any atomic or nuclear weapons the enemy might use.

Berezko is even more explicit; there are features in the book which are directly tied to Party pronouncements at the time of Marshal Zhukov's dismissal. The instruction to the Army was intended to strengthen the hand of the political officers and was aimed at those regular officers who were thought to be 'arrogant' in their views on the Party.

The general commanding the airborne division in the novel personifies the military 'cult of the individual'. A hero of the last war and a stickler for discipline, he sees the officer as the supreme and undisputed master over his subordinates. He treats his regimental commanders in the same way as the Prussian non-commissioned officer treated recruits. But his unpardonable offence is not to consult and even to oppose his political deputy. The exercise, ordered by his superiors, is a triumph for everybody except the general. For him it is catastrophic and ends in his being relieved of his post and probable demotion.

This is how Berezko puts it: 'His corps commander had seen many similar cases: a brilliant and most promising general, he was unable to avoid the pitfalls of conceit or resist the sweet taste of promotion and honours. Like many good veterans, he was transformed into a vainglorious egoist. And all the rest followed; he began to surround himself with colourless and subservient subordinates, to tolerate lack of initiative, and to suspect and fear anything new and unorthodox'.

Although Berezko's book is not particularly interesting or original in its criticism of Soviet brasshats, it does give a glimpse of the inside of a Soviet barracks. If any credence can be given to this account, it appears that for the last few years Soviet soldiers have been living in a state of near-hysteria, expecting a nuclear war to break out any day. It is not only the rank and file but also their officers who believe that the hour has struck. Waiting on a blacked-out airfield for the transports to take them to the dropping area, they discuss the war which they fully believe to be already upon them. Their wives and families, too, believe that war has started and rumours fly around that the West has already dropped its first atom bombs. The women gather at the flat of the general's wi and start recalling those fateful days in 194 Moscow Radio broadcasts music but they refu to believe their ears; one of them even remar that in 1941 the decisive announcement had al followed a concert. That the inhabitants Soviet military cantonments should so strong believe in the imminence of war surely indicat considerable political naiveté. War hysteria, Soviet propagandists have so often pointed ou is a contagious disease. This novel is itself carrier of the disease.

ANOTHER interesting question was touch upon in a wide controversy over the natu of 'Soviet Humanism' last year. The discussi centred on two publications in which the pro lem of former Vlasov soldiers and their pos war rehabilitation came to the fore.

A short story by S. Voronin, 'In his Nati Village' was published in 1959 in *Neva*, a Leni grad literary journal.

The hero of the story comes back to h native village and discovers there his long fo gotten classmate. This man happens to be former anti-Soviet Vlasov soldier who ha quietly returned home after the war. To avo punishment, he has not revealed the secret his wartime activities. Now his friend is fac by a dilemma: should he help the authoriti to bring yet another traitor to justice, or shou he help the man to forget the past. He choos the second alternative. This solution arous the righteous ire of Sergei Smirnov, editor chief of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. The idea of a humanitarian concessions to a former Vlasovi seemed incomprehensible to him. 'Voron has violated a sacrosanct and immutable Par principle which forbids us to pardon the ba deeds of our enemies', he wrote.

Smirnov's outburst must be understood the light of the discussion of A. Kalinin's nov *Rough Fields*. It was first printed in sever instalments in the journal *Molodaya Gvardia* Moscow and later published in book form.[5]

The controversial part of this novel deals wi a Vlasovite who comes home some time aft the war and goes unpunished, as does t character in Voronin's story. In *Rough Fiel*

[5] Anatoly Kalinin, *Surovie polia* (Moscow, 195

is a village Party official and a writer who lvocate that he should be forgiven and offered chance to become a good citizen again. They gue that he had been a victim of the tragic cumstances of the last war, that he should helped and not banished, and they win their int against the rather dogmatic opposition a kolkhoz chairman.

The critics took up the issue with the author. me were against his conclusions, others con-nded that he was right. Writing in *Novy Mir*, epan Zlobin represented the view that it was 'shame' and a kind of 'political clumsiness' put the words of pardon for a former traitor to the mouth of a Party official. He thought at this idea was inspired by 'non-political manitarianism'—a concept out of place in viet society.

A. Dementyev, editor of *Novy Mir*, thought at Zlobin was wrong in his appraisal of the vel. In an article which accompanied Zlobin's view, Dementyev said: 'I am arguing against lobin not only because I am anxious to arrive the right conclusion about Kalinin's book, it also because it is impossible to solve the estion of the aesthetic values of socialist-alist literature without a proper understanding Socialist Humanism and the humanitarian aracter of our literature'.

A NEW era has begun for the Soviet war novel. The old law of obedience to Party ctates still holds good, but within far more xible limits. *Kommunist*, the journal of the entral Committee of the Soviet Communist rty, dealt recently (1960, 4) with the 'main trend in literature' and mentions cases of 'individual approach'. While not explicitly encouraging the individual approach, *Kommunist* does find it possible to say that absolute conformity of style and approach is not required under the rules of Socialist Realism. This must be understood as tacit acknowledgment of the artist's right to choose his own form of expression and to use unconventional formulas for commonly accepted ideas.

Now this, in itself, is something that writers longed for under Stalin. Of course, it does not mean much to a western reader, still less to a western literary critic; but as far as Soviet writing is concerned, it is a step forward. The *Kommunist* formula applies to all forms of writing, including war novels, and it is worth noting that the journal mentions the stand by Nekrasov on the subject. But (and this is a big but) it must not be forgotten that this relaxation of hitherto iron rules concerns only the *form* of literary approach and *not its ideological content*.

The last few years have also shown that the range of wartime subjects has been widened and the ban on the delicate problems of 1941-45 has been lifted. Simonov deals with the early defeats of the Soviet Army, Sholokhov in his *Fate of a Man* depicts the life of a Soviet soldier in German captivity, and Voronin in the short story *In His Native Village* openly discusses the return home of a former trooper of the renegade Vlasov army. Baklanov's *An Inch of Ground* was even proposed for a Lenin Prize this year. It was sponsored by a group of writers but did not withstand the scrutiny of the Government Committee for Lenin Prizes.

BOURGEOIS CRITICS AND MODERNISM

Decadent Art Under Fire

In 1948, the first convention of the peace partisans in Wroclaw, Alexander Fadeyev made tha famous remark about the jackal that would write like T. S. Eliot or Sartre if only it had a pen. Thi was in the heyday of Stalinism. Twelve years have passed and Alexander Fadeyev himself—lik Zhdanov and Stalin—is no more among the living. The study of any single number of a Sovie literary journal shows that the party attitude towards Western culture has become more sophisticated But the limits of this sophistication are equally obvious and are clearly delineated in two recen symposia: Against Bourgeois Concepts and Revisionism in Foreign Literary Criticism, *and* Agains Revisionism in Art and Art Criticism. *Both books went to press in late autumn of 1959, both includ essays on a great variety of topics of which only a few excerpts can be presented. This is a matte for regret, since no excerpt can possibly convey the full flavour and all the implications of th complete original. The translation attempts to render faithfully the style of the Russian tex Quotations in these excerpts from English texts are re-translations from the Russian. The footnote are reproduced from the original.*

R. N. Yurenev: 'The Influence of Revisionism on Cinema Art in Poland'.

Soviet films in Poland

Naturally enough we were interested in the attitude of our dear guests towards our Soviet cinema art. Indeed, a most telling indication of this is a column in the Polish magazine *Film* amusingly entitled 'The Nine Angry Men'. This column lists the marks allotted to the currently shown films according to the following scale: 5 marks—masterpiece; 4 marks—very good film; 3 marks—good; 2 marks—mediocre; 1 mark—bad. These marks are accorded by nine film critics (who include our five guests) each in his own column. These nine men have to give a concise evaluation of each film, either recommending it to the filmgoer, or warning him against a loss of time and money. . . .

The highest marks accorded by the 'Nine Angry Men' for 1958 went to:

'The Escape of the Condemned', by the French catholic director Bresson—4.5 marks.

'Ashes and Diamonds'—the last film by Wajda—4.4 marks;

'Vitelloni', hopeless, pessimistic film by the Italian Federico Fellini about empty, vicious, and fruitless youth—4.3 marks;

'Les diaboliques', a mystic Grand Guignol by the reactionary French director Henri Clouzot—3.6 marks;

'The Cranes are Flying', a Soviet film—3.8 marks. Now see the rating allotted to other Soviet films:

'Quiet Flows the Don'—2.6—not even good

'Communist'—2—mediocre;

'Stories about Lenin'—1.8—below mediocrity

'Sisters'—1.7, and finally our poetical film cartoon based on Andersen's fairy tale 'Snow White'—1 mark!

'The Nine Men Angry at the Soviet Cinema should be the title of the column in the magazine *Film*. In full fairness one must say that these ratings disturbed many Polish filmgoers and cinema critics of a different orientation. In particular, the journal *Screen* sharply attacked them. The fact remains, however, that nine most authoritative Polish cinema critics took part in the rating.

V. N. Prokofiev: 'Abstractionism and its historical mission'.

Abstract Painting

When contemporary revisionist exponents of art and culture leave their broad 'criticism' of the methods of socialist realism and attempt to formulate their own 'positive ideal', one discovers the utter absence of anything new they have to offer. While calling on art to march forward, in reality they drag it back on to the road of slavish imitation of the most barren and reactionary aspects of bourgeois culture whose very novelty is suspect. Abstractionism occupies a special place among these phenomena.

Abstractionism, proclaimed today as one of the latest 'achievements' of Western art is not in fact, anything new. It originated at the ve

ginning of this century in the works of M. arionov and R. Delaunay, of M. Kandinsky id K. Malevich. During the second decade of is century it had already reached its full devel- ment in the art also of Mondrian, Van Does- irg, Brancusi, Arp, Klee, and others. Fun- amentally abstractivism, which could well lebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 1959, is of e same age as cubism. It proved, however, uch more viable. Cubism already belongs to e history of art, while abstractivism, which sorbed many principles of cubism, as well of futurism, expressionism, dadaism, and ally surrealism, is now in the forefront of the ntemporary scene, having eclipsed all other rmalist schools.

Of all the People's Republics, Yugoslavia was e first to adopt an intensive cultivation of stractivism. The Yugoslav pavilion at the iennale exhibition in Venice in 1956 was as lly dominated by abstract art as were those of e Federal German Republic, Switzerland, or ny other capitalist country. Certain significant lapses into abstractivism can be noted now in e art of Czechoslovakia and especially in that Poland. The Polish journal *Art Survey* pro- unds it, alongside other decadent movements, a source of 'new Polish art'. This is why the ruggle against abstractionism and for the ex- sure of its anti-artistic essence, has now come especially imperative.

Imperialism and Abstractionism

ntil the Second World War abstract art found congenial medium and reached highly devel- ed forms in two different countries—Russia id Germany.

It is well-known that the non-figurative school as born, and first obtained wide support, in ussian artistic circles soon after the failure of e 1905-1907 revolution, at a time described Gorky as 'the infamous decade in the history the Russian intelligentsia'.

It was born in the days of extreme reaction id of a prolonged general crisis of Russian iddle class—bourgeois society, in the days hich immediately preceded the total collapse that society. Abstract art appeared in con- tions of decay which affected the ruling asses of Russian society, in conditions of lin- ring demoralisation of the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia. It was raised on the crest of the wave of mysticism, agnosticism, anarchism and fear which swamped a certain part of that society. The rapidity of the development of Russian formalism, which then suddenly 'over- took' its Western counterpart, is obviously paralleled by the rapidity of the decay of all 'official' forms of political and ideological life in the Russian empire—which then proved to be the weakest link in the chain of world imperialism.

Indeed, when in 1913 in France (that acknow- ledged hothouse of the most extreme forms of 'avantgardism') G. Apollinaire was only fore- casting an era of 'pure' (i.e. cleansed of all representation) art, in Russia this art had already existed for a considerable time and in a most developed form. Already in 1909 M. Larionov created 'Rayonism'; already in 1910 Kandinsky's canvases anticipated contempor- ary 'tachism', already in 1913 Moscow saw Malevich's 'Black Square'. By then the theoreti- cal programme of 'anti-figurative' art had already been formulated here, the programme which still serves as a basis for all abstractivist theories. While in Europe up to the end of the First World War and in America up to the second half of the 30's abstract art tendencies appeared only hesitatingly and existed only in isolated pockets, in Russia by the beginning of the 20's abstract art had already become an important movement and attained a predomin- ant place in the history of art.

True enough, the activity of Russian abstract art spread over into the period of the socialist revolution and civil war, when its representa- tives temporarily seized control of some leading art organisations of the young Soviet republic. We should not, however, deduce from this any evidence for a coincidence of interests between the revolution which was destroying the old world in order to build a new one, and abstract art, derived from the anarchist nega- tion of all the cultural heritage of the past and incapable of any positive creativity. Abstract art was not the herald of the revolutionary explosion but the hall-mark of the utter putre- faction of the old society. Whether they knew it or not, its representatives played in art the role of the last despairing gamble of the 'reac- tion', a kind of 'Danaean gift' perfidiously

bequeathed to the new social system by the defeated and decayed world.[1] Very soon after the old order in Russia slipped into oblivion, abstract art became aware of its own powerlessness before the constructive problems presented by the new social system, and quietly, without any official or administrative interference, withered and eventually died away. Contemporary apologists of abstract art have created the legend of alleged persecution suffered by Russian exponents of 'non-representational art' in the early 20's. In fact there was no persecution whatsoever. Abstract art in the Soviet Union died a natural death, deprived of that putrid soil which earlier on had brought it to life.[2]

In the 20's Germany became another centre of development of abstract art, a Germany which had only just suffered a military defeat and the collapse of the revolution of 1918, a Germany held fast in the vice of inflation, economic devastation, poverty, which had lost all faith and all beliefs. Here, too, abstract art grew and flowered in a country which was passing through a period of severe and prolonged crisis.

The Germany of the early 20's, like Russia ten years earlier, was a meeting place of all the contradictions of the bourgeois world, one of the weakest links in the bourgeois system. Germany found herself at a historical crossroads. She vacillated between revolution and extreme forms of reaction. But unlike Russia, here the forces of reaction succeeded in winning the battle and, after a prolonged and exhausting struggle, threw her into the arms of Fascist dictatorship.

Abstract art flowered in Germany during these same years of vacillation. Here, during the early 20's, the chaotic, intuitivist abstractionism of Kandinsky and the mysticism of Paul Klee, an offspring of Dada circles, came together. Dadaism gave Kandinsky's 'non-representational' method a theoretical formulation, as a method of 'pure psychic automatism' in creative art. At the same time Lisitsky, who temporarily took up residence in Germany, established contact with the French purists and with the Dutch non-representationalists—Mondrian, Van Doesburg, and others. Kandinsky, in addition to Klee, established a permanent contact with Hans Arp. Conditions were thus established for an international unification of all movements with abstractionist tendencies. Simultaneously, abstract art revealed its power to assimilate the 'experience' of other extremist movements of formalistic art, to borrow from them all that is reactionary and destructive. It is this characteristic of non-representational art which largely explains its extraordinary viability in the conditions of bourgeois cultural disintegration.

Now again the reactionary forces fasten on to abstract art, seeing in it one of the most effective means towards social demoralisation. Abstract art serves to divert the artistic intelligentsia from the struggle of the hour. It entangles it in false problems, it develops in the masses an acceptance of the absurd as true; it deprives them of art as a means to understand present-day life and the fight for progress. Non-figurative art, consequently, serves reaction as a weapon in this struggle against historical progress. And this irrespective of whether the exponents of non-figurative art realise their disruptive role or believe that they are assisting the revolution. It is significant that today American imperialism widely exploits abstract art in the service of ideological expansion. During the Sixth International Festival of Youth in Moscow in 1957, the well-known Mexican painter Bustos gave numerous examples of how the Americans export abstractivism to Latin America in order to suppress national progressive culture there.

On the other hand one must note that in the USA itself the exponents of non-figurative art have been many times subjected to criticism

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[1] Similarly fashioned by alien influences is the abstract art which is now being resuscitated in some of the People's Democracies.

[2] One should note that the government of the Soviet Republic displayed an exceptional tolerance towards the 'left', and with it abstract art. This latter, on the other hand, demonstrated an extreme aggressiveness against, and refusal to allow an existence to, other movements. Thus, in 1921, K. Malevich accused all who thought differently of 'counter-revolutionary' activity and demanded administrative measures against representational art and its adherents as 'an army of imperialism' (see K. Malevich, *The Problem of Representational Art*, Smolensk, 1921, p. 12).

y extreme right circles. Let us remember also hat in Germany the expansion of the non-gurative movement was cut short by brutal olice repression as soon as Fascism came to ower.

The Leninist explanation

)ne can assert that wherever the reaction is nsure of its position it seeks the support of bstract art, hoping to exploit its basically nega-ve role in artistic and cultural life. As soon, owever, as it feels itself secure and strong, it ither rejects its services altogether or uses them rimarily for expansion abroad. For then ab-tract art appears to it on the one hand as too narchistic, and on the other as quite incapable f creating that illusion of a 'positive' pro-ramme which it needs to educate the masses in n aggressively anti-human spirit. The reaction nen treats non-figurative art as 'the Moor' who as done his work and who can and should go way, disappear—the sooner the better.

Consequently, whenever the social conflict resolved either in the direction of revolution r in that of extreme reaction, abstract art ither dies of itself, being deprived of the nur-uring soil of a decomposing society, or else is orcibly destroyed in order to clear the way for n art in which reaction bears the character of political programme and is no longer camou-aged.

Western apologists of abstract art love to raw a dubious parallel between the fate of bstract art in the Soviet Union and in Fascist ermany, especially underlining the fact that andinsky emigrated from both these countries. his parallel, as becomes evident from every-ing said before, is but the fruit of dishonest isinformation. On the contrary, the processes f the gradual self-immolation of abstract art the USSR and of its destruction by the police Fascist Germany are quite distinct, both in eir substance and causes as in the forms they ssumed.

In this connection we may recall the fate of bstract art in France right up to the Second orld War. However paradoxical it may ppear, France did not play any significant role its development before the 40's. She was ore of a refugee for the non-figurative artists ho fled from Germany than a birthplace of native abstract art. The number of French exponents of abstract art was insignificant. Admittedly, the first international exhibition of abstract art was held in Paris in 1930, and the journal *Cercle et Carré* began its life at the same time. This was the second printed organ of non-figurative art, the first being the Dutch magazine *De Stijl*. Admittedly, it was in France that there appeared in 1931 the organisation 'Abstraction-Création', which united the forces of the post-cubists (Gleizes, Villon), the Dada-ists (Arp, Klee), the non-figurativists (Kandin-sky, Baumeister, G. Hartung) and the surreal-ists (Miro, Yves Tanguy, Masson). Let us note. however, that their activity coincided both with the economic crisis of 1927-33 and with the growth of French Fascism, which attempted to seize power in 1934 during the *Croix de feu* disturbances.

Nevertheless, on the first count, the organ-isation 'Abstraction-Création' was more of an international than a purely French creation. Secondly, its activity was manifested as yet only on the periphery of French art and attracted little interest from the public, collectors, or even the critics. And on the third and final count. which should be especially underlined, the acti-visation in France in the early 30's of non-figurative tendencies was short-lived. Already by 1934-35 it was beginning to suffer from internal conflicts, and in 1937, at the time of the Popular Front, and of general anti-Fascist struggle, the organisation 'Abstraction-Création' came to its end. Through these years of bitter open struggle between the progressive forces of anti-fascism and the reactionary forces of fascism, abstractivism again withdrew from the scene. It could not develop in the stormy atmos-phere of those years, so different from the stagnation and putrefaction of former times. It is significant that it is then that certain younger members of 'Abstraction-Création' sev-ered their connections with abstract art. This refers to the French painter Jean Lurcat and to the now-renowned Swiss painter Hans Erni who has been awarded the International Peace Medal.

The present reanimation of abstract art in France started much later, during the early 40's under the occupation. A group of so-called 'painters of the French tradition' came into

existence which was strongly attracted towards non-figurative ideas and from which later issued many leading masters of contemporary French abstract art.

It has already been mentioned that reaction has called on abstractivism in periods of particular difficulty, when it was constrained to make use of its services from necessity rather than choice.

Abstract art could, however, be finally adopted only when the overall crisis of the capitalist system attained its highest point and when the decline of bourgeois culture reached its extreme. Only in these conditions could abstract art crown this decaying culture, could claim to be its final issue. And only in these conditions could bourgeois reaction, having exhausted all its demagogic 'arguments', recognise abstract art as its 'favourite child'—may be for the very reason that it is the last.

These conditions were reached in the capitalist world at the end of the Second World War. And it is then that abstract art enjoyed rapid expansion in the USA, in Western Germany, in Japan, in Italy, and in France.

Such is the 'historical mission' of abstract art—one of the last weapons of reaction, a weapon which can no longer create even the illusion of a 'positive' programme, which serves only the destructive forces, thus fully demonstrating its reactionary essence. At the same time, the wider the scope of abstractivist movements in bourgeois countries, the clearer becomes the utter bankruptcy of bourgeois culture, and the necessity to replace it by a new, progressive, and healthy culture.

I. Ya. Ryzhkin: 'Atonal Dodecaphonic Music'.

Schönberg and Co.

The support given to the atonal school by the bosses of the capitalist world can be clearly exemplified by the following instance. Some years ago a school was opened in Brazil for the instruction of young composers in music based on atonal-dodecaphonic technique. One can confidently assert that the setting up of such an 'educational establishment' was not dictated by the interests of the Brazilian people and runs counter to the development of native Brazilian artistic culture. Now why should young Brazilian composers be taught atonal technique? For the reason that the initiative (in the founding of this school) came from one of the financial magnates of Brazil, the owner of a string of newspapers connected with the reactionary circles in the USA.

All this demonstrates the necessity for an earnest, sharp, and systematic struggle against the atonal school. The seriousness of this task is increased by the fact that certain foreign composers, albeit associated with the progressive movement, take up an inconsistent stand with regard to atonalism. Even Hans Eisler, such a prominent member of the international revolutionary musical movement, a tried communist and active contributor to the cultural achievements of the GDR, thinks it permissible to make use of an atonal-dodecaphonic technique.

Now and again socio-aesthetic debates among foreign musicians are set off by certain declarations made by Eisler in honour of Arnold Schönberg—his late teacher of musical composition. One of these discussions, which took place in 1955 and in which musicians from the GDR and other countries participated, was reported on the pages of the magazines *Sinn und Form* and *Musik und Gesellschaft*.

A. D. Alexeyev: 'Modernism in Music and Questions of Artistic Freedom'.

Musique Concrète

'Concrete', or 'objective' music, as it is at times called, is based on the reproduction of noises and sounds of motors, running water, wind etc. All these are recorded on a magnetic tape then suitably edited ('electronic' music is a recording of the sounds made by an electric generator). Obviously, there is absolutely no justification to speak of the presence here of any human element; unless, perhaps, the author inserts into his work the sound of the human voice (with or without words) as one of the 'voices of nature'. (Such attempts are to be found in a number of works of 'concrete' music.)

The work of the 'concreticists', no longer music in the true sense of the word, is generically close to the work of those modernists who are dedicated to the industrial theme. We have in mind those offspring of musical urbanism

nd other modernist movements, where the nachine becomes self-sufficient and over-nadows the man. This century has produced uite a few of these works; such as 'A Walk' by oulenc; 'Airplane Sonata' by Anteuil; with us -'The Factory' by Moslov; 'Rails' by Deshe-ov, etc. The most notorious work of this kind as 'Pacific 231' by Arthur Honegger.

We have no intention of asserting that the arious 'noise effects' with which the 'concre-cists' are at present experimenting can have o practical application. To a certain degree ney could probably be used in films, radio, ometimes even in combination with music his is the only way they should be treated and nen no one could object to it. But to see in ese 'noise effects' the 'music of the future', claim that they are due to replace musical t, is to lead aesthetic culture into a blind ley.

Consequently, these extreme modernist move-ents, which are now backed by bourgeois eologists, do not broaden the composer's tistic scope, but restrict it and do not contri-ute to the progress of art; the preaching of rtistic freedom' leads the artist to sever his ntact with today's progressive ideas and to eglect the interests of the public.

Progressive artists and art critics must counter is illusory 'artistic freedom', hawked by bour-ois ideologists, with genuine freedom which sures the development of art along the road progress. . . .

Certain modernists, in their search for novelty all costs, assume that the exploration of the oblem of 'folk idiom' does not at present hold it any worthwhile artistic perspectives; that e problem has been already sufficiently ated by the classics. A view is held among odern composers, especially the younger ones, at a change to 'folk idiom' thematics would strict the possibility of expressing one's own dividuality.

These views are deeply erroneous. Only self-lated individualists, completely ignorant of e, could speak so. What could be richer than e surrounding world of human individuals th their different characters; their ideas, unit-g or separating them; their social inter-rela-ns and the variety of their behaviour? Every-e could find in this everchanging living stream a multitude of enthralling objects which could furnish food for artistic creation. This is especially true of our own time—a time of unprecedented upsurge of peoples' activities, of a hitherto unprecedented liberation of their spiritual forces.

A. A. Elistratova: 'The problems of English Romanticism in the Interpretation of Reactionary Literary Criticism'.

Herbert Read

Even extreme 'left', 'ultra-revolutionary' slogans are at times utilised in this campaign against realism. 'Realism is a bourgeois prejudice'—exclaims, for instance, the leader of English surrealists Herbert Read, author of numerous books on the history of English Literature, recently knighted for his work. In his search for allies this enemy of 'bourgeois prejudice' calls on the aesthetic authority of Edmund Burke, the reactionary eighteenth-century critic and publicist who has been characterised by Marx as that 'run of the mill bourgeois' who 'always sold himself to the highest bidder'. Read contends that Burke, the author of the well-known essay 'On the Sublime and Beautiful', would surely have preferred the Gothic novel of horrors 'which can temper the soul to a degree of purity well beyond the reach of our vile realism', to the realistic novel of the English Enlightenment.

He is echoed by J. M. C. Tomkins, who associates himself with Read's gibes at the creators of the English realistic novels of the eighteenth-century—the national pride of English Literature. 'The heavy coach of the English novel of character and manners supported—as Saintsbury used to say—by the four wheels: Richardson, Fielding, Smollett and Sterne—did not get far on them—at most it managed a short detour', he writes with mockery.

Mario Praz

These attempts to represent the beginnings of modern realism as a kind of misunderstanding, or but a fortuitous episode, a 'short detour' in the development of national literature, are very characteristic of contemporary reactionary literary thought. The above-mentioned examples of settlement of accounts with realism should

not be taken as peculiar to the writings of Read and his fellow-thinkers. We can quote the example of the Italian literary critic Mario Praz, whose works have often appeared in English translation and are widely known in England and the USA. His book *The Crisis of the Hero in the Victorian Novel* examines, in an ironic light, both the beginnings of the realistic representation of life in Walter Scott's 'Waverley' novels, and the later satirico-realistic social novels of Thackeray as manifestations of the general process of 'going bourgeois' of English romanticism. Even Shelley, the herald of revolutionary romanticism, is taxed with the same 'going bourgeois'—his call for a 'Holy War' against melancholy and despondency, which gained a temporary hold over European literature during the time of reaction, is disrespectfully treated by Mario Praz as just a 'bourgeois pose'.

Graham Hough

Graham Hough, author of the recent popular book *The Romantic Poets* speaks (when dealing with the art of Shelley) with unconcealed distaste of the attempts by revolutionary romanticists 'to save the world through the word'. He is vexed not so much by the illusoriness of the romanticists' notions of the power of poetry, as by the 'seed of rationality' which is to be found in these illusions—the deeply felt conviction that 'the breach between the rude reality and the radiant attainable ideal' 'must be wiped out by a spark and that this spark must be poetry', as Hough ironically puts it when speaking of the views of Shelley.

The stand of contemporary reactionary literary criticism with regard to the heritage of revolutionary romanticism—and in particular of its leading representatives Byron and Shelley—is full of unconcealed hostility whose ultimate cause is a more or less conscious realisation of the lasting effectiveness of the passionate, freedom-loving enthusiasm of their work.

John Wain and Byron

The latest biographers and commentators of Byron, gauging the poet with the shabby yardstick of contemporary decadent schizophrenism and Freudian psycho-analytical 'complexes', are trying to 'dismiss' him from the social and political struggle of his age of turmoil. The deny the great revolutionary romantic, the 'rule of thoughts' of the most progressive minds o his time, both integrity of character and in tegrity of inspiration. The author of 'Child Harold', of 'Cain', of 'Don Juan' is reflected i the distorting mirror of their writings as a pitifu neurotic midget who, enacting a deliberatel assumed part, convulsively strikes some tellin pose in order to purge himself of the torment of his 'inferiority complex'. This idea is nc new: in 1927 a certain Lee Wilson Dodd pro pounded it in an article mockingly entitled 'Th Golden Complex'. The viability which this ide displays now may serve as clear evidence o the dismal banality within whose narrow rang reactionary 'Byronology' dawdles. What wa published thirty years ago in the America magazine *Saturday Review of Literature* as th latest Freudian conception is repeated now a the last word in criticism in the 'highbrow' an snobbish *London Magazine*. In his articl 'Byron: the Search for Identity', John Wain one of the literary 'angry young men', denie Byron any character whatsoever (naturall treating him, without proof or appeal, as 'neuropath'). The great poet, thinker, fighter turns out to be but a faceless nonentity, 'a ma without personality' who intentionally assume now the pose of a romantic, now that of satirist, and who wrote his works under a affected identity, all the while playing a self inflicted part. This selfsame imaginary 'lac of personality' of the poet proves to be, accord ing to Wain, the decisive factor in his literar biography: 'These same causes prevented Byro from establishing wholly satisfactory relation with his poetical imagination' . . . Wain is irr tated by Byron's satire no less than by hi romantic inspiration. 'Byron wallows in th mud like a crocodile and drags his victims dow to him'. This metaphor, wicked in its incor gruity, clearly demonstrates all the hostility th critic feels towards the great poet.

T. S. Eliot unmasked

All this, however, has the appearance of forced concession, made with reluctance an against his will. Byron's poetical heritag annoys Eliot by its very existence. He grow angrily that, in general, Byron wrote too much

he bulk of Byron's poetry is distressing in oportion to its quality; one would suppose at he never destroyed anything. . . . We have me to expect poetry to be something very ncentrated, something distilled; but if Byron d distilled his verse there would have been thing whatever left'.

The very flat finality of the verdict bears tness to the utter impotence of Eliot's schol- ic formalism before such a vast literary phen- nenon as the revolutionary-romantic work of ron. This devotee of decadent poetry, 'dis- ed' beyond all reason, freed of all logic, of earthy human passion, of all responsibility fore the country, indeed cannot but feel en in the poetical world of Byron, with all tempestuous dramatic conflicts and the ever- ting surge of social and spiritual strivings. . . . ie bitter vehemence with which Eliot assails elley the poet and Shelley the thinker clearly poses his full awareness of the significance Shelley's revolutionary social ideas, and of futility of any attempts to decry them, in te of all evidence, as nothing but some casual, idental element in his poetry. It is edifying witness how the midget Eliot is constrained unmask himself when face to face with such overpowering antagonist as Shelley. Invet- te formalist, ardent prophet of 'pure art', o scornfully denies the value of idealistic teria in aesthetics, he takes up arms here marily against Shelley's ideology: 'I find his as repulsive'.

F. R. Leavis

nother conservative custodian of 'tradition', R. Leavis, a professor at Cambridge University, comes forward as Eliot's supporter and fellow-thinker. His book, *Revaluation, Tradition and Development of English Poetry*, published two years after Eliot's Harvard lectures, has much in common with them.

Leavis takes up and repeats as his own Eliot's scornful assertion portraying Shelley as a paltry childish versifier for paltry childish readers. . . . Amazed at the solidity of Shelley's poetic reputation, Leavis is reduced to seeking an explanation in some 'force of inertia', and smugly to reproach the poet for seemingly giving way to 'sentimental banalities'; for 'submitting to a hypnotic round of cherished figures, associations and words'; and for starving the reader's 'critical faculty'. Even the well-known word of Matthew Arnold is dragged forth, albeit with a significant 'correction'—Leavis refuses to see anything angelic in Shelley. 'One is left with an impression of vanity and emptiness (how right Arnold was) as well as monotony'. Such is the conclusion reached by the author on valuing Shelley's heritage—a conclusion truly pitiful and shameful, not for the poet but for that bourgeois philology which Leavis represents.

Conclusion

An important and timely task of Marxist literary criticism is to repulse all forms of falsification of world classics and, in particular, all attempts by contemporary decadents to 'settle the account' of revolutionary romanticism which they especially hate for its incandescent spirit of rebellion, for its freedom-loving inspiration, and for its surge towards a future of universal happiness.

REPORT ON SOVIET MUSIC

Progress in Harmony

Sebastian Grave

THE most important events on the Soviet musical scene in recent weeks have been the First Congress of Composers of the RSFSR, headed by Shostakovich, and the Fifth General Assembly of Composers of the Soviet Union, headed by Kabalevsky. The latter was preceded by performances of a number of compositions, which may be regarded as representative of the principal trends in contemporary Soviet music. After the concerts, some very frank criticism of the works by composers from all over the USSR were published in the April volume of *Sovetskaya Muzyka*—the official organ of Soviet musicians. They were unanimous in their praise of a new work by G. Sviridov entitled *Pathetic Oratorio*, but many other compositions were sharply censured. Before examining Sviridov's composition and attempting to assess the present state of Soviet music (no easy task as, unfortunately, we know so little of their work), it is well to make a brief survey of the development of Soviet music over the last few years.

'There is nothing so difficult as to find a melody that can be immediately understood even by an untrained person and is at the same time original. Here a composer is exposed to great danger: he may easily become trivial and vulgar, or he may reproduce that which has already been said'.[1] These words of Prokofiev, written on the eve of the famous decree of 10 February 1948, clearly state the problem with which the modern Soviet composer is confronted. It is, admittedly, a difficulty which he has been obliged to face since the almost complete freedom of the early years of the Revolution was followed by the ever increasing pressures of State control. Soviet musicians, and, for that matter, Soviet writers and artists, have long been accused by Western critics of writing in an outdated idiom, of being content to reproduce pastiches of nineteenth century Russian compositions. Indeed, into the words of some critics there creeps a note of sympathy as they bewail the fate of Soviet composers who are compelled to conform to the precepts and doctrines laid down by the Communist Party. There is, of course, a substantial element of truth in this, but, on the other hand, the true criterion of Soviet art is the works themselves. If conditions have been as bad as we are commonly led to believe, then we must congratulate the Soviet musicians on what can only be termed an incredible achievement, for their record of composition over the last forty years is anything but a succession of anaemic imitations; rather within the framework of conventional forms and means of expression, Soviet musicians have succeeded in producing works, often of the highest standard, ranging from operas to children's songs, and in developing the old established forms such as the symphony, the quartet, the oratorio, and infusing new life into them. Never was there a better illustration of necessity being the mother of invention. Another criticism which is sometimes levelled at Soviet composers is that their work is shoddy and unpolished. This, of course, is completely unfounded, certainly in so far as the writers of large scale works are concerned. The training of a Soviet musician may often last for up to twenty years during which time he is given frequent opportunities to familiarise himself with the European and Russian classics from all periods of music besides studying fugue, harmony and counterpoint, orchestration, musical history and often several languages in addition. The modern State Conservatoires, particularly those in Leningrad and Moscow, are extremely well equipped and every incentive is given to the encouragement of study, in the form of additional financial emoluments or the performance and publication of their works. Comparison with Western practice does not show to our advantage. Particular emphasis is laid on youth, and

[1] S. Prokofiev, in *Sovetskaya Muzyka*, January-February 1948, p. 66.

hildren showing promise or outstanding musi-
al abilities are given awards in order to enable
iem to follow their creative paths and be of
alue to the State. It is this last factor which
of the utmost importance in assessing the
osition of the modern Soviet composer. His
ork is valueless unless it serves some social
urpose. Of course, there have been occasional
eviations from the party line during the last
our decades, usually followed by a re-affirma-
on of Soviet policy; outstanding is the figure
Dmitri Shostakovich, whose opera *Lady*
lacbeth of Mtsensk (1936) was condemned for
urrendering to the power of decadent forms
foreign expressionist opera and departing
om the traditions of the Russian classical
pera'.[2] From the point of view of the present
ticle, however, by far the most important of
ese 'directives' to composers was given in
948 by Col.-General A. A. Zhdanov, a Secre-
ry of the Central Committee, speaking at the
ll-Union Congress of Soviet Composers. The
casion for this conference was the public
view of Muradeli's opera *The Great Friend-
ip*, which, after being commissioned by the
oscow Bolshoi Theatre to mark the occasion
the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revo-
tion in 1947, proved to be a complete fiasco.
ie State, having spent some 600,000 roubles
this production, was not unnaturally moved
enquire into the cause; it soon appeared
at all was not well within the confines of
e Soviet musical camp. The gist of Zhdanov's
eech may be summarised as follows:[3] Soviet
mposers had strayed on to a false path; there
is an absence of constructive criticism, with-
t which there could be no forward movement;
viet composers must look more to the people
their inspiration and to the [Russian] classi-
heritage; their music must incorporate folk
isic and occasionally be written to a pro-
amme; innovation must not be an end in
itself; music must reflect the spirit of the epoch,
the spirit of the masses; what was unintelligible
to the people was unnecessary to the people;
in short, Soviet composers had two tasks: the
first to go on developing and perfecting Soviet
music: the other to prevent Soviet music from
absorbing elements of Western bourgeois deca-
dence.

TO what extent have these requirements been observed during the last ten years? On glancing through the titles of recent Soviet works, one is struck by the large number making use of national subjects. This, of course, has always been safe ground for Soviet musicians, and since the first days of the Revolution composers have constantly turned to the national epics or heroic figures of Russian or Soviet life for their inspiration. Invariably these compositions are based either on revolutionary or mass songs, folk music (fortunately, a seemingly inexhaustible source), and, more recently, the music of the national republics, which likewise offers a vast and hitherto little exploited field of fresh material. National music mostly exists in its own right, but is sometimes combined in order to give the impression of national unity.[4] It is quite likely that in the development of the music of the republics lies the future course of Russian music; indeed, the possibilities are endless. In the years following the Zhdanov decree, there was an increased emphasis on opera, but as Professor Keldysh observes, 'to this day, the problem of writing a realistic opera about the working masses, the life and welfare of the Soviet people, has still not been solved. If different composers do turn to such themes, then their artistic representations are not of their best, and often result in a direct distortion of truth, a lowering of the thoughts and feelings of the Russian people'. Such was the case with Dzerzhinsky's opera *Far from Moscow* (1954), based on V. Azhaev's novel of the same name. More successful was G. Shantyr's opera *Town of Youth* which was performed in 1957 in the

Yu. Keldysh, *RSFSR*, Moscow, 1958. The term
ssical opera' is used by Soviet musicologists to
nify the major operas written during the nineteenth
tury by Glinka and the 'Kuchka' (Borodin, Bala-
ev, Cui, Mussorgsky and Rimsky-Korsakov).

The complete text is published in translation in
Supplement to Rena Moisenko's *Realist Music*
ndon, 1949), and in Andrey Olkhovsky's *The
ony of an Art* (London, 1955). The original tran-
ipt was published in Moscow in March 1948.

[4] The prototype for this practice is Borodin's 'musical picture' *In Central Asia*, in which a Russian folk theme is combined with an oriental melody to suggest national unity.

Chelyabinsk Theatre of opera and ballet. It is described as being suffused with romantic colouring, with simplicity and sincerity of emotional expression. G. G. Kreitner's opera *Tanya*, based on a play by A. A. Arbuzov, was also well received; its theme was socialist life, but it was marred by 'cheap, sentimental melodrama which lowered and vulgarised it'. Together with themes taken from social life, the struggle of the Russian proletariat against Tsarism, the oppression of capitalist exploitation, the events of the October Revolution and the civil war have also received attention in a number of operas, e.g. D. G. Frenkel's *Ugrium-reka* (Solemn-river), based on a novel by V. Shishkov. However, composers taking these subjects are often accused of inability 'to reach an organic combination of intimate lyrical and heroic-revolutionary lines of action', in other words to achieve a compromise between melodious, comprehensible vocal writing and dramatic music. Outstanding is Kabalevsky's *Nikita Vershinin*, based on Vs. Ivanov's play *The Armoured Train*, which received its first performance at the Bolshoi Theatre in 1955. Taking as its theme the struggle of the partisans against the white guards and the foreign interventionists during the civil war, it is distinguished by an intricate action coloured by vivid mass scenes —an almost inevitable ingredient for any successful Soviet opera. A significant character to appear in this is the young Chinese Sin Bin-U, who sacrifices himself for the good of the revolution. The principal figure, the peasant Vershinin, is vividly drawn. However, even this opera is marred by a certain 'over-loading of the action', 'un-operaticness' of occasional scenes, and episodes in which 'the music performs an illustrative role rather than being the leading dramatic factor'. Undoubtedly one of the most interesting of recent Soviet operas is Shaporin's *The Decembrists* (1953), which was the result of many years labour. Based on the rising of 1825, Shaporin's opera follows closely the traditions of the nineteenth century; crowd scenes alternate with revolutionary songs, dramatic arias, instrumental interludes, pathos and drama, the whole being permeated with burning patriotism. Unity is given to this otherwise rather unwieldy canvas by the use of motto themes, which are particularly effective and remain in the mind. By Western standards, th opera seems archaic, but its emotional powe and moments of great beauty cannot be denied Keldysh regards it as 'the best of the Sovie historical operas, making an impression by it breadth and the monumentality of its concep tion, clarity and expressiveness of melodic lan guage, the union of a lofty epic quality wit warm expressive lyricism'. Historically speak ing, *The Decembrists* forms a companion piec to Prokofiev's opera *War and Peace*, also work of enormous dimensions, which took u much of the last years of Prokofiev's life.

Interesting facets of Soviet opera are comi opera and operetta, which in recent years hav begun to acquire great popularity, perhaps o account of the general easing of political tensior Their themes tend to favour the satirical an grotesque, though ostensibly centred on th Soviet citizen and his everyday life. The Rus sians have always excelled in the miniature indeed it was through a succession of musica numbers and spoken dialogue that Russia opera first arose in the eighteenth century, an the modern Soviet comic operas and operetta are successful because of their brevity and us of short lively melodies, parallel to some exten with the light-hearted songs of Dunaevsky an Aleksandrov in earlier years. Typical are Shos takovich's *Moskva Cheremushka* (the name of new housing district in Moscow) and Kabalev sky's *Vesna poët* (Spring sings) (1957).

IMPORTANT in Soviet music are the Ora torio and Cantata, which, like Soviet opera draw their inspiration from patriotic subjects though recently there has been an increase emphasis on the theme of peace. Basically, th modern Soviet oratorio springs from Prokofiev' cantata *Alexander Nevsky* (1938) which, a though not the first example of this genre brought the cantata to its highest peak of deve opment. A glance at the structure of *Alexande Nevsky* enables one to grasp immediately th essentials of its modern counterparts. Originall

[6] A. D. Kastalsky, the distinguished authority o Russian folk-song, was the first Soviet composer t embody revolutionary themes in a large-scale music form, his most important work being the cantata *Th Year 1905* (1925), written for unaccompanied choru

itten for a film by Eisenstein in 1937, it subquently acquired independent existence and s frequently been performed in the Soviet ion and elsewhere. It tells how Prince Alexder Nevsky repelled the invasion of the Teuic Knights in the thirteenth century, the tinction between Nevsky and the invaders ng made by the use of Russian melodies and nedieval plain-chant respectively.[6] Undoubty the high spot of the whole work is the h movement—the Battle on the Ice—with armies silently confronting each other, the ady march of the Teutonic Knights, the fury the battle, until there creeps into the music theme from the fourth movement, 'In our ive Russia, in our great Russia, no foe shall '. *Alexander Nevsky* is the perfect answer to danov's requirements. It is comprehensible to ryone, it uses a heroic, patriotic theme, is uenced by folk music, is eminently singable, ical, dramatic, and it also bears the unmisable imprint of the hand of a master. The jority of these tendencies are discernible in r oratorios. Shostakovich's *Song of the rests* (1949) takes as its subject the struggle Communism. In comparison with his preling works, there is a marked increase in cism and 'singability'. His cantata *Over Our untry Shines the Sun* (1952) is shorter and pler in construction. Prokofiev's oratorio *Guard for Peace* (1951) is interesting in that nakes use of a narrator between the various tions, a repetition of his practice in *Peter l the Wolf* (1936). An offshoot of oratorio l cantata which has acquired popularity in ent years is a series of large scale choral npositions, often in the form of cycles, which written round a common subject. Such, for mple, is Shostakovich's very popular *Ten ms* (1951) for unaccompanied chorus, revoonary poems set to music which displays at ingenuity and diversity of effects, remarke considering the limitations of the medium. ticular use is made of choral declamation. g cycles of this nature have also been written Makarov and Shebalin.

The symphony has always received close attention from Soviet musicians, it being considered the most concentrated means for the large-scale expression of matters of serious content. Myaskovsky (1881-1950) is probably the most prolific composer of symphonies since Haydn, having produced a total of no less than twenty seven in addition to a host of other works. The other principal symphonic composers are Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Kabalevsky, Knipper, Shcherbachev and, in recent years, Balanchivadze, though most composers of any standing have at least one to their credit. As in opera, there is a preference for works on a large scale in symphony too, the outstanding example being Shostakovich's 11th Symphony (1957), which has been well received abroad. It is subtitled 'The Year 1905' and each of its four massive movements represents one aspect of revolutionary activity. The score, which is augmented by a large chorus, also includes passages for rifle-fire; Shostakovich's 11th Symphony is yet another manifestation of the cult of patriotism united with colour and gigantic forces. Other symphonies of importance, the majority of which, like Shostakovich's, have a programme basis, are Myaskovsky's 27th, which was written in the year of his death, Kabalevsky's 4th (1956), which is distinguished by its lyrical content, and Knipper's 13th.

AN impetus has been given to the writing of concertos by the presence of a number of Soviet instrumentalists of world famous virtuosity—the violinists Polyakin, Kogan, and the Oistrakhs, the pianists Gilels, Richter, and Oborin, and the cellist Rostropovich.[7] Some of the recent concertos have shown remarkable freedom of construction, Shostakovich's Violin Concerto (first performed 1955), for example, consisting of four movements instead of the usual three, which are labelled Nocturne (a slow movement), Scherzo (grotesque), Passacaglia (tragic), and Burlesque (scintillating). Also of interest is Prokofiev's Concerto-Symphony for cello and orchestra (1951-52), so-called on account of its monumental size and unorthodox

This system of contrast, which features so promitly in Russian music, may be considered to spring n Glinka's *A Life for the Tsar* (1836), in which Russians are contrasted with the Poles. It is not cult to trace the influence of Glinka's music in t aspects of Soviet music.

[7] Moscow seems more concerned to propagate the fame of Russian performers than to disseminate Soviet compositions.

construction. Generally speaking, there is a desire for novelty, a typical example being Kabalevsky's 'youth' concertos for violin, cello, and piano respectively. As opposed to the vast dimensions of other contemporary works, these are notable for their small size and technical simplicity, ideally suited for young performers. A return to simplicity is noticeable also in Shostakovich's 2nd Piano Concerto (1957). Among the young composers, the Violin Concerto of A. Y. Eshpai (1954) is interesting in that it uses folk melodies of his native Mari and other nationalities.

No survey of trends in Soviet music would be complete without mention of chamber music and ballet. During the nineteenth century, with the exception of Borodin and Taneev, chamber music was comparatively neglected, but in the Soviet era it has received widespread consideration, the most important contributions being the 4th, 5th, and 6th string quartets and the 24 preludes and fugues for piano by Shostakovich, the 11th, 12th, and 13th quartets by Myaskovsky, the 9th piano sonata and the sonata for cello and piano by Prokofiev, and the 7th quartet and piano trio by Shebalin. With the increasing prevalence of string playing among the younger generation, there seems reason to suppose that this will receive even greater development in the future. The position as regards ballet remains more or less unchanged, and to compose ballet music is regarded as an essential task for any Soviet musician. The result of the Zhdanov decree was immediately discernible in Glière's *The Bronze Horseman* (1949) with its lyrical melodies and imitations of early nineteenth century Russian songs. By far the most significant ballet of recent years is Khachaturyan's *Spartak* (1956) in which the composer, to use his own words, 'wished to create living pictures of the distant historical past' by use of a Roman setting. Professor Keldysh speaks of its 'elevated pathos' and its 'vivid colours' but criticises the lack of individuality in the part of Spartacus.

AND now to 1960. The April number of *Sovetskaya Muzyka* contains some interesting comments on the present state of music. Particularly illuminating are the criticisms of the works performed at the concerts preceding the 5th Assembly of Soviet Composers, whic included a 'Cosmic Symphony' by Y. Ryae (an Estonian composer), a violin concerto b Shostakovich, a cantata *Together for Ever* b V. Muradeli, a violin sonata by A. Babadzhan yan, an oratorio entitled *Nagasaki* by A Shnitke, a quartet by E. Tamberg (anothe Estonian), a cello concerto by M. Weinberg a violin concerto by T. Khrennikov, a voca cycle to words of M. Dzhalil by R. Yakhin, vocal-symphonic poem *Western Shore* by V Kapp, a *Pathetic Oratorio* by G. Sviridov, an several other works. With the exception of th works by Sviridov, Shostakovich, Weinberg an Khrennikov, most of the remainder were cen sured on account of their experimental natur their lack of melody and their pessimism. A R. Glezer of Moscow put it:

> It seems to me that this time two extrem have appeared in the work of young com posers. The one is an attraction to gloom tragic concepts, the other a desire for supe ficial diversion. And in both cases, true co tact with the audience is lost. . . .
>
> Many compositions are dedicated to th memory of famous people or deceas warriors. But what is surprising is that these compositions the figures of the perso to whom the works are dedicated are ve poorly drawn. . . .

As Sviridov's oratorio is regarded as a wo of considerable importance (it is given an artic to itself in *Sovetskaya Muzyka*) it is wor examining in some detail. Yuri Kremlev de cribes it as follows:

> The *Pathetic Oratorio* made a powerful a very pleasing impression on me. . . . It permeated with optimism, with great pow of assertion . . . The music is highly drama and filled with conflict, but is in no w tragic. In the first place there are no doub no contradictions, but a firm, unshaken bel in victory and a joyful awareness of the n world coming into being.
>
> The *Pathetic Oratorio* is an innovato work. And it is a real innovation. The co poser is not seeking novelty, pretentiousne harmonic, rhythmic, or acoustic curiositi but simplicity, clarity, and a faithful expr sion of the leading ideas of our time. Tru and naturalness are the guiding principles. Sviridov underlines the passionately hum and poetical content of Mayakovsky, not

external forms and the deliberately coarse lexicology of his verse. . . . Yet beauty never becomes mere prettiness. Sviridov preserves the austerity, the manly aspirations, the heroic. A realist, he bases his oratorio on the intonations of mass song. In this, I think, lies the essence of his innovation. In conformity with the conditions and tasks of our era, Sviridov appears as a faithful follower of the principles of Glinka. . . . How often, alas!, do our composers neglect in large scale works the most important and most representative genre of the Soviet epoch—mass song! Sviridov pays maximum attention to this and has gained a victory of principle.

In my opinion, this oratorio is still insufficiently appreciated by musicians. There is a feeling current at present that everything of value in art must be completely comprehensible at first hearing. There is an opposite opinion that everything worth while and, moreover, of an innovatory nature, must be inaccessible from the start, incomprehensible, finding the road to recognition only with difficulty. Both opinions—deliberate extremes—are incapable of serving as a basis of pure aesthetic criteria. The first opinion may provide a cover for various forms of primitivism, the second may found a false innovation. . . . On the whole, I consider the *Pathetic Oratorio* a model production of its kind. If you look for historical analogies, then, I dare say, you would most likely find them in the development of the mass tendencies of the pathetic, formally-graphic style of Berlioz. The oratorio sounds well, revealing a pleasant unity of concept and realisation. The enormous [vocal and instrumental] forces employed do not seem superfluous. Yielding, seemingly, to the latest fashion for bells and organ, Sviridov uses these instruments not for effect but from necessity.

It will be seen from the above that the main task of the Soviet composer is still to write music in the established traditions of the nineteenth century—music which holds itself sternly aloof from the heterogeneous and often conflicting tendencies of the West.[8] *Sovetskaya Muzyka* also contains references to the unsatisfactory state of Soviet music, particularly opera, which must be 'not only contemporary in its theme, but reflect our very life, profoundly, diversely, must grip the listener by the overpowering force of its characters, its musical-drama'. Similarly we read of anxiety over the desultory study of folk music, the need for symphony orchestras in the Republics, of the slow development of certain national musical cultures, of the need for greater flexibility of Soviet composers in meeting people and sharing a communal life, of the desire for better libraries, less 'red-tape', and finally, the need for 'an organ of the press—the creation of an all-Russian musical paper, or, in the last resort, a combined journal on literature and music'.

In short, the picture is a many-sided one. To embrace the whole of Soviet music within such a limited space is impossible; there is the emphasis laid on children's music, children's suites, children's games, and the innumerable compositions dedicated to Soviet youth; one could mention the works for folk instruments and folk orchestras, the pieces for village communities, for town bands, invariably centring on the basic themes of love for the people and the Motherland; one could discuss the efforts of the Soviet government to elevate the popular taste—hence the constant appearance of song cycles and choral works, many of them of considerable difficulty.

The Soviet attitude towards Western music seems to be unchanged, although articles on subjects such as 'Australian Music', 'Music in Western Germany' appear from time to time. The attitude towards Stravinsky, for example, is one of hostility: 'Igor Stravinsky, who had already lived several years abroad even before 1917, severed his connection with his native land after the October Revolution. He openly demonstrated his irreconcilable enmity to the Soviet Union in his autobiography and in other writings. . . . He departed from the realist traditions of Russian classical music. In his mature years he totally abandoned Russian subjects and the use of elements of Russian folk-song. In his compositions of the last few decades, wild constructivism is combined with cold neo-classical stylisation, with expressions of nihilistic scepticism, with Catholic obscurantism'. Rachmaninov is reviewed in a more favourable light: 'As opposed to Stravinsky, S. V. Rachmaninov remained a Russian composer and never ceased to praise the beauty and poetry of his native Russia, the spiritual greatness of the Russian man. He preserved the deepest respect and love for the classical heritage of Russian art, for Russian folk-song, and wholeheartedly censured those modernist-composers who "turned their back on the simple folk-song of their native-land" and in the pursuit of false originality "became renegades, people without a country". During the Second World War, Rachmaninov proved himself a sincere and ardent patriot' (Keldysh, *op. cit.*).

MARXISMUSSTUDIEN

Rediscovery of a Native Son *

Iring Fetsche

IN the last 30 years the influence of politics has been deeper and more decisive in Germany than in almost any other European country. In view of the well-known remoteness from politics of German intellectuals this may seem paradoxical, but in fact it was just this apparently a-political attitude of wide circles of the cultured middle class which made it possible for Germany to fall for twelve years under the heel of the most unintellectual and brutal exponents of its society and to be exposed to the dictatorship of a barbaric ideology. It is important to remember this political background when considering the post-war discussion of Marxism in Germany. However grotesque the utterances of Nazi writers may seem to us, it is necessary to recall their theses to see where political discussion had to start from after 1945, to appreciate the prejudices it had to overcome, and the errors it had to correct.

In the Nazi view Marxism was above all 'Western' and 'Jewish' and therefore 'un-German' in a double sense. In a Nazi manual on political-ideological training we read:

> The founder of this doctrine (Marxism) was Karl Marx. Marx was a Jew and this fact in itself explains the whole nature and influence of his views. He was no proletarian but came from a bourgeois-Jewish background. He was also not a labour leader but a typical littérateur. He was deeply influenced by the liberal-capitalist writings of the English economists. There is no greater antithesis than between Karl Marx and Adolf Hitler.[1]

This account of Marx contains all the fictitious figures whom the Nazis declared to be their 'enemies': the Jew, the intellectual, the bourgeois, the capitalist, the English. The description was intended to combine a number o firmly established prejudices. The romanti attack on the Enlightenment, on reason an modern economic methods, was fused into a extremely telling symbol and set against th incarnation of the Good in Adolf Hitler. Th intellectual discussion of Marxism was rejecte as superfluous and even dangerous. Anti-sem tism was also called in to help destroy th bridge between the alleged 'socialism' of th Nazis and that of the Marxists. In accordanc with the myth of the Jewish conspiracy it wa stated that 'the aim of Marxism is the same a that of capitalism: the dominion of Worl Jewry' (*ibid.*, p. 119).

Adolf Hitler tried to exploit the widesprea prejudice against Hegel and Marx for his ow ends and to play off the rights of the individua against Marx's collectivism. The Jew was un masked once again as the mysterious powe behind the scenes of world history:

> Marxism represents the purest form of th Jewish attempt to eliminate the outstandin personality from all spheres of human lif and to replace it by the masses (*Mein Kamp* II, 438).

Consciously or unconsciously, Hitler was specu lating on the resentment of the little men wh are lost in the masses but like to think of them selves as 'outstanding personalities' and a happy to be supplied with a plausible reaso for their own failures, which also allows the to transfer their resentment to an 'enemy'.

The Nazis did not tone down this hostility t Marx and Marxism even during the brief perio of friendship with Stalin, whom they regarde as the liquidator of Marxist internationalis and—though they did not admit this openly the creator of a totalitarian system which ap peared to be akin to their own. During the wa against the Soviet Union far more stress wa laid on the alleged 'inferiority of the East' tha on Soviet Marxism, and this was made the pr text for their own behaviour in Russia.

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* Editor's note: *In this and the following article we are continuing our series on* Revisionism, Reformism, Orthodoxy.

[1] Dr. H. Männel, *Politische Fibel*, Richtlinien für die politische-weltanschauliche Schulung, Berlin, 1940, p. 115.

When the war ended in 1945 with the total efeat of the Nazis, many Germans knew arcely anything of Marx except the name and iat he was a Jew. Apart from Sigmund Freud, ardly any of the great thinkers had fallen so iuch into oblivion or been interpreted so one-dedly as Marx. From the outset, however, itellectual life developed in opposite directions i the Eastern and Western zones of Germany. /hereas in the Eastern zone the German Com-iunists who had returned home developed rge-scale Communist propaganda and an edu-itional programme under the protection of the ed Army's bayonets, cultural and political fe in the Western zones was able to develop ith a large measure of freedom. The few ommunists who banded together in the West-n zones were, considering the smallness of ieir numbers, astonishingly active, but they hieved few successes outside the circle of eir old supporters. Under the leadership of urt Schumacher, social-democracy had turned s back on Marxism completely, though it con-nued to honour the memory of Marx himself.

Marxism would, however, certainly have ood a chance in Western Germany if it had ot appeared in the shape of Soviet Marxism, an instrument of the Stalinist imperialism of hich millions of Germans had had direct bitter rsonal experience. They might otherwise have en attracted by the fact that it could provide relatively plausible explanation of the pheno-enon of National Socialism, and one less perficial than ascribing it to the pathological ialities of Adolf Hitler and his subordinates making out that all Germans were devils. or the Marxists, Nazi totalitarianism was a olitical form which a completely obsolete pitalism was bound to assume in its latest ase in order to maintain itself vis-à-vis the scontended masses; Nazi ideology was a noke-screen hiding the interests of the mono-olistic capitalists.

This thesis would certainly have fallen on ore receptive ears if it had not been counter-lanced by the experiences undergone by Ger-an prisoners of war and the victims of the nsfers of population, and also by the hostility wards 'Eastern ideology' which was still felt many former Nazis. In a free competition of ideas Marxism had no political prospects whatsoever.

That is the reason why the serious study of Marx and Marxism was taken in hand exclusively by those circles which—though not personally interested in Marxism—thought it necessary to come to grips with it in view of developments in the Eastern part of Germany. In the first place, the two main Christian denominations have for ten years devoted themselves to this task and produced an ever increasing output of publications on the subject. At the same time, there have been the beginnings of a critical discussion of the economic theories of Marx and Soviet Marxism in trade union circles.[2] Finally, scholars with no party axe to grind have repeatedly referred to the philosophical anthropology of the young Marx or based cultural analyses on his theory.[3] As far as the discussion of Marxism in the Soviet zone of Germany is concerned, it is so dependent on Soviet Marxism that so far it has not merited separate treatment.[4]

The Catholic Criticism of Marxism

Even though the Catholic church had occupied itself with the study of Socialist ideas long before 1945, it was the developments of the post-war period that made it necessary for the Church to come to closer grips with Marxism. In the countries of the Eastern bloc a predominantly Catholic population was for the first time exposed to the unremitting influence of Marxism

[2] Cf. for example Ernst Bose, 'Das Elend der Verelendungstheorie', in *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, January 1958, and also Karl Kühne, 'Karl Marx und die moderne Nationaloekonomie', in *Die neue Gesellschaft*, II, 1-4, 1955.

[3] Cf. above all the following works by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer: Horkheimer-Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Amsterdam 1947; Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben, Frankfurt 1951; *Prismen, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt 1955.

[4] This applies anyway to the work of writers living in the Soviet zone of Germany with the exception of the special case of Ernst Bloch, whose work belongs, however, to the period before 1933. Georg Lukacs had, until 1956, a considerable influence, above all on the younger intellectuals in the Soviet zone, through his writings which were published by the Aufbau Verlag, a firm which does not belong to the Party. He was, however, always regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by the SED, and is now even described as an 'enemy of Marxism'.

as an official State doctrine (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), and two of the oldest Catholic countries (Italy and France) came to have the largest Communist parties in the Western world. Quite soon after the war there appeared the Italian edition of a book on Soviet Dialectical Materialism by Father Gustav Wetter, S.J. Professor at the Pontificum Institutum Russicum in Rome.[5] This book, which has since become a standard work, provides a historical survey which becomes more detailed from Plekhanov onwards, and it then expounds systematically the main principles of the dialectical materialism of the Stalin era which it criticises objectively and in purely philosophical terms. In the first edition the author's catholic and indulgent approach was more evident than in the later editions: he endeavoured to discover the positive qualities in dialectical materialism and points of contact for a future Catholic mission. Among the positive elements which he discovered were first of all the epistemological realism of Leninism which, though blended with an ontological materialism, can be logically separated and made a 'valuable precondition' for the development of a genuine (Thomist) philosophy. Secondly, Wetter emphasises the difference between a dialectical materialism which acknowledges the qualitative differences between the various spheres of existence and the mechanical, vulgar materialism which is the only kind of which most people are aware. Finally, however, he tries, like so many Catholic authors who have followed him, to play off the dialectic of Soviet Marxism against materialism itself and to establish their mutual incompatibility. Incidentally, he takes dialectical materialism perfectly seriously as a philosophy—in spite of its low level formally—and he examines and criticises it in all its aspects and peculiarities with great care and patience.

Catholic scholars may have been helped in their appreciation of Soviet philosophy by a certain similarity between the argumentative method which it employs and the method of the scholastics.

At the same time as the Austrian Wetter's great work appeared, the works of the Polish emigrant J. M. Bochenski were beginning to be known in Germany.[6] Bochenski is a Professor of Philosophy and head of the Eastern European department in the Swiss university of Fribourg. He starts out from a more pronounced philosophical position than the historian Wetter. Above all, he has provided valuable analyses of the Soviet discussion of logic (from 1951 onwards). Like most other Catholic authors however (de Vries, Ogiermann, Meurer, for example),[7] Wetter and Bochenski display a comparative remoteness from history and a lack of familiarity with the historical dialectic of Hegel. Apart from the Thomist point of departure the reason for their remoteness from history is that they have studied Marxism primarily as it appears, in a decayed form, in present day Russia, rather than in its original shape. It would appear, however, that some of the above-mentioned authors are now endeavouring to overcome this one-sided approach. Their interpretations are also to some extent one-sided inasmuch as they approach in purely philosophical terms phenomena the objective meaning of which can often be explained only by examining the function they are intended to fulfil in the execution of certain political or economic decisions. In other words, they imply that Soviet philosophy enjoys an autonomy which is not in accordance with the facts.

One of these Catholic writers has, however, devoted himself to a critical study of the young Marx and the revolutionary élan which he kindled: Jakob Hommes, Professor of Catholic Philosophy in the Philosophical-Theological College of Regensburg.[8]

For Hommes Marxism is a product of the decay of the theory of natural law of the Christian Middle Ages, the restoration of which is probably his fundamental concern. His criticism of Marxism is therefore combined with

[5] Gustav A. Wetter S.J., *Dialectical Materialism*, London, 1958.

[6] I. M. Bochenski O.P., *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (*Diamat*), Berne and Munich 1950 (2nd. edition; 1956).

[7] Josef de Vries, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus*, 1958; Helmut Ogiermann *Materialistische Dialektik*, 1958; Joseph Meurer *Wissenschaft im Kollektiv*, ein neuer Versuch zum Verständnis des dialektischen Materialismus, 1959.

[8] Jakob Hommes, *Der technische Eros*, das Wesen der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, 1955; by the same author, *Krise der Freiheit*, Hegel-Marx-Heidegger, 1958.

riticism of modern ideas in general (cf. Jacques Maritain in France and Gerhard Krüger in Germany). For him the distinguishing mark of Marxism is its radical humanism and historicism, its dissolution of all established traditional structures and their abandonment to the sovereignty of man. Hommes no doubt appreciates the original intentions of Marxism better than the other Catholic writers, but by passing sentence on the whole intellectual development of modern times he places himself in a hopeless position and deprives himself of all means of mastering the modern reality. The weakness of his interpretation of Marxism lies, however, not so much in his hopelessly conservative approach as in the reversal of the error committed by Wetter and Bochenski. Whereas they identify Soviet Marxism with Marxism itself, Hommes overlooks the fundamental change that has taken place in Marxist thinking since the time of the young Marx.

The future development of Catholic criticism of Marxism will probably consist in the mutual correction of these one-sided positions and in the reception of dialectical elements into Catholic thought itself. It is almost inevitable that Thomas will be supplemented and enriched by Hegel if a historical philosophy equal to authentic Marxism is to be developed. A number of French Catholics have already taken a lead in this direction.

The Evangelical Study Group's Commission on Marxism[9]

The only institutional centre of Marxist research in the German Federal Republic is the Commission on Marxism of the Evangelical Study Group which was set up in the Spring of 1951. It is made up of scholars of the most diverse disciplines, theologians, philosophers, lawyers, historians, economists, slavists, political scientists, who usually meet twice a year for working sessions. The original centre and organiser of the circle was Erwin Metzke, the Tübingen Professor of Philosophy who died in 1956. It was thanks mainly to his skill and far-sightedness that it was possible for such a heterogeneous circle to develop so quickly into a vital working fellowship. It is typical of the way in which Marxism was regarded by the Commission that it conceived it from the outset not as something alien and remote, which confronts modern man entirely from the outside, but as a doctrine which is still capable of facing us with important questions and which can cause us to re-think our historical position. This readiness to question one's own position is characteristic of Evangelical Christianity, which regards the Christian faith and ideological fixations as complete opposites. Just because a man is committed to a faith he is freed from the necessity of protecting himself ideologically and is able to discard the encasement in which his contemporaries secure and exclude themselves from reality.

In the search for what is relevant to modern man in Marxism, the Commission soon came upon the anthropology of the young Marx and his criticism of the modern world as 'alienated'.[10] Just because it was intent not on mere contradiction but on discovering the real strength of Marxism, it had to return to this part of Marxist thought even though it has been neglected or even thrown overboard, as 'pre-Marxist', by Soviet Marxism. It was impossible, however, to stop at the young Marx, since it is scarcely possible to understand his thought without referring still further back to that of Hegel. Most of the philosophical contributions to the Marxist Studies published by the Commission culminated in a detailed study of Marx's universal dependence on and antithesis to Hegel.[11] Erwin Metzke pointed out that Hegel, who has been so often decried as unrealistic, is in fact far more realistic than Marx for whom in the end historical existence is something to be used and manipulated.

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[9] Some of the papers read at the meetings of the Commission have been published in the three volumes of *Marxismusstudien* which appeared in 1954, 1957, and 1960 (Tübingen, Verlag, J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck).

[10] Apart from the contributions published in the *Studien* the following have been published by members of the Commission: Helmut Gollwitzer, 'Zum Verständnis des Menschen beim jungen Marx', in *Festschrift Günther Dehn*, 1957, p. 183-203; Erich Thier, *Das Menschenbild des jungen Marx*, Göttingen 1957.

[11] This applies to the papers by Ludwig Landgrebe in the first and third series of the *Studien*, by Erich Metzke in the second, and by me in the second and third series.

No doubt certain of the ideas suggested in this context owe their origin to Martin Heidegger, the greatest contemporary German thinker, and especially to his 'Letter on Humanism'.[12] Heidegger now interprets the whole development of the West as the result of a 'forgetfulness of Being' which has been the mark of all metaphysical thinking since Aristotle. A forgetfulness of Being has been man's fate since that time. The decline has culminated in the absolute rule of technical thinking and led to the terrible homelessness of modern man, and it must be superseded by a new era of which there are already certain signs, which Being will itself bring about and to which we have to attune our thinking. From this angle Heidegger finds a kindred concern in Marx:

> Homelessness is becoming the fate of the whole world. It is therefore necessary to think of it in terms of the history of Being. What Marx discerned as the alienation of man, deriving this insight in an essential and significant sense from Hegel, reaches back in its roots to the homelessness of modern man, which has been brought about by metaphysics, consolidated by it and concealed as homelessness. Because Marx, through his experience of the alienation of modern man, is aware of a fundamental dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is superior to all other views (p. 27).

The kinship of Heidegger's thought to that of Marx arises from the fact that for both of them the modern alienation of man and its expression (which Heidegger finds in metaphysics, Marx in ideology) are the result of a basic process by which man is overwhelmed. Heidegger leaves it unexplained, describing it as 'a fate of Being', whilst Marx interprets it as an inevitable social and economic development. Disregarding this important difference, it might be possible to identify the theories of the two thinkers, as Jakob Hommes has done though in a negative rather than a positive way.

At this point, however, the disciples of Heidegger will rightly point out that for him the distinguishing mark of 'Being' is that it is essentially outside human control: it is not 'available' to man, whereas Marx believes that it is possible for the proletariat to take in hand its own destiny and that of humanity in general. It is therefore hardly right to condemn both Marx and Heidegger as representing a 'technical eros', as Hommes has done, since Heidegger's rejection of the whole of metaphysics arises from the charge that it has exalted a type of purely technical thinking which is entirely 'forgetful of Being'. The difference between Heidegger and Marx vanishes only if one disregards Marx's reference to revolutionary action and only takes into account the no-longer-controllable past. But this no-longer-controllable past has itself given rise to the proletariat, which has the power to put an end to its own passively endured fate and turn it into 'real history', moulded and controlled by itself as the 'subject-object' of history. There are echoes of Heidegger's position above all in the works of Erwin Metzke and Ludwig Landgrebe, though they both give a markedly Protestant turn to his thought.

As the interest of the Commission on Marxism was centred on the young Marx, it became necessary to define more closely the relationship of the early to the later Marx and also to Friedrich Engels and the later Russian and Central European Marxists.

Quite a number of publications included in the *Studies of Marxism* have been devoted to this topic. In a detailed analysis of Engels' preliminary work on the *Communist Manifesto*, Hermann Bollnow[13] has shown that the 'Principles of Communism' of 1847 already contain features typical of Engels, as distinct from Marx himself, which were to emerge more clearly after the death of Marx: a type of thinking based more on natural law and straight-line progressivism as opposed to the historical-dialectical thinking of Marx; a greater appreciation of scientific technical progress as such, and a relative blindness to the phenomenon of 'alienation' analysed by Marx. These characteristics explain, incidentally, the confusion, observed by Georg Lukacs, of 'revolutionary action' with industrial production in Engels's

[12] Martin Heidegger, 'Über den Humanismus' in *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, Bern 1947 (written in the autumn of 1946 as a letter to Jean Beaufret), reprinted Frankfurt a.M., no date.

[13] H. Bollnow, 'Engels Auffassung von Revolution und Entwicklung in seinen "Grundsätzen des Kommunismus" (1847)', *Marxismusstudien* (first series), p. 77-144.

ıti-Dühring, a lapse which shows how little ıgels had assimilated the idea that in capitalist ciety men are not at all the free subjects of ir own actions but dependent on an over- ling objective context, that they are, as ıkacs puts it, 'not actors but acted upon'.

Other works, including those of Richard irnberger, H. H. Schrey, and myself,[14] deal th the characteristic qualities of Leninist arxism, with copious illustrations. Erich ıthias and Christian Gneuss have described ideology of German Social-Democracy as it peared before the first World War in its two ost characteristic personalities: Kautsky and uard Bernstein. It is clear from these studies t even before 1914 German Social-Democ- y was already far removed from revolution- Marxism.

The idea that Engels served to some extent a bridge between revolutionary and revisionist arxism cannot be entirely rejected even after tudy of the unabridged text of his preface to ırx's *Civil War in France*. Certain statements his correspondence with Bebel are very ealing: for example, the praise which he tows on Lord Randolph Churchill for his ıchalant criticism of the government of his n Tory party (12 May 1891), and his whole phasis on the constitutional freedom enjoyed England, which is expressed in numerous ers written during the later years of his life. is also typical of Engels that he admits a ference for Eduard Bernstein 'as the exact posite of Kautsky' on account of his greater ree of realism (cf. his letter of 25 August 1).

My own essays in the second and third umes of the *Studies* are an attempt to analyse iologically and critically the whole develop- nt of thought from the young Marx right up to Stalinism and its disintegration: an analysis from which emerges the picture of a tragic dialectical change from a humanistic point of departure to an anti-human end. At the same time my study is intended to reveal the inner tension which lies in the Soviet system, with its Marxist pretensions, which differs fundamentally, in this respect, from Nazi totalitarianism, the ideology of which was entirely homogeneous with the reigning system of terror.

The tension between Marxist ideology and Stalinist practice formed one of the driving forces behind the October crises in Poland and Hungary. Young intellectuals were able to express their displeasure with Stalinist tyranny with the aid of categories which they had acquired from the study of Marx's early writings.

The demand, made by the young Marx, for the abolition of all ideology with its deceptive appearance of independence, by means of a new definition of the relationship between historical consciousness and historical action, had been abandoned. That is already clear from the fact that the word 'ideology' has ceased to be used critically but has been adapted to the American usage which makes it possible to say, for example, 'my ideology is christian'. Soviet Communists boast likewise of having a 'marxist ideology'. Both obviously run counter to the original conceptions of Christianity and Marxism alike.

The result of the investigations into the changed relationships between Marxism and Hegel was similar. The question illustrates the whole change in function and meaning which Marxism had undergone. Here too, though he regarded Hegel's philosophy as limited only by the limits imposed on philosophy as such, Marx tried to surpass those limits by transforming theory into revolutionary activity, whereas Engels and his Soviet followers turned Marxism into a materialist philosophy in competition with other ideologies: a philosophy which has to emphasise its opposition to Hegel the more blatantly, the more the difference in fact tends to disappear. The development may be summarised in the form of a paradox: Soviet ideologists turned increasingly away from Hegel the more their political practice became Hegelian and the more their dialectical materialist ontology acquired characteristics of the Hegelian

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Richard Nürnberger, 'Lenins Revolutionstheorie, Studie über Staat und Revolution', *Marxismus- lien*, (first series) p. 161-172; the same, 'Die nzösische Revolution im revolutionären Selbstver- ıdnis des Marxismus', loc. cit (second series), 1-76. H. H. Schrey, 'Geschichte oder Mythos bei rx und Lenin', loc. cit. (first series) p. 145-60. s work has been strongly criticised by members he Commission because it obliterates the essential erence between the thought of Sorel and Lenin. Fetscher, 'Von der Philosophie des Proletariats proletarischen Weltanschauung', loc. cit. (second es), p. 26-60; the same, 'Das Verhältnis des Marx- us zu Hegel', loc. cit. (third series), p. 66-169.

system. It is not surprising that such criticism, based as it was on Marxism itself, was especially unwelcome to the apologists of the Soviet system who claim to be Marx's sole heirs. For this reason they have repeatedly attacked the *Studies of Marxism,* though they have been unable to produce any cogent philosophical arguments worth mentioning. The weakness of these anti-critics is evident from the fact that in defending themselves against arguments based on Lukacs, Bloch, Korsch, etc., they have the presumption to maintain that these writers were never Marxists.[15]

In contrast to the sterility of these polemical attacks, the criticism which Jürgen Habermas has made of certain of the *Marxist Studies*—and indirectly of the whole contemporary discussion of Marxism—really does pinpoint a weakness due to the neglect of a fundamental aspect of Marxist thought.

A Criticism of the Discussion of Marxism in Post-War Germany

It is remarkable how intensely the present-day discussion of Marxism in Germany is concentrated on philosophical topics and how little attention is paid to the scientific claims and the empirical scientific components of Marxist theory.[16] In the Catholic thinkers this one-sidedness is due partly to the fact that they concentrate entirely on the contemporary form of Marxism in the Soviet Union, which exhibits a tendency to isolate the ideological philosophical element which has only latterly begun to be corrected. In the Evangelical authors and the scholars associated with them, the reason for this one-sidedness is to be found, however, more in an idealistic conviction, which is not clearly expressed, according to which the ultimately decisive driving force behind the movements of history is to be sought in philosophy. They therefore presuppose something that should first be proved—against Marx. Jürgen Habermas has made this the starting-point for his attack. He criticises Landgrebe, Metzke, Popitz and others[17] for mistakenly making Marx's biographically important descent from Hegel the systematic basis of his theory. He continues:

> In strict accordance with the meaning of a materialistic dialectic, philosophy starts by reflecting on the position in which it finds itself; it proceeds therefore from the alienation which it at once experiences and from an awareness of the practical necessity for the alienation to be overcome. This consciousness rises to the level of self-consciousness where philosophy sees itself as an expression

[15] Cf. D. Bergner, W. Jahn, *Der Krezuzzug der evangelischen Akademien gegen den Marxismus,* Berlin, 1960. The following statements, which are contrary to the facts, are there made concerning Lukacs and Bloch: 'Both represent the left wing of the Frankfurt Circle for Social Research and are certainly sympathetic to the workers' movement. But there is a difference between sympathising with the working class and standing by them on their own ground'. [Lukacs entered the Party a month after the foundation of the Hungarian Communist Party and from March 1919 onwards he was a member of the Central Committee, deputy People's Commissar for Education in the government of Bela Kun, etc. I.F.] 'Politically decisive situations show where the individual belongs. When the counter-revolution raged in Hungary in 1956 Lukacs stood objectively on the side of the counter-revolutionaries, and Bloch on the side of the revisionists in Poland and Germany. Ideologically neither of them has *ever taken the position of Marxism-Leninism*' (p. 16).

Another work attacking the criticism of Marxism, described as the 'joint work of the Chair of Philosophy in the Institute for Social Sciences in the Central Committee of the SED' and which is entitled *Die Philosophie des Verbrechens* (The Philosophy of Crime), Berlin, VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1959, is even sharper in its tone and even weaker in its arguments.

[16] I have dealt with the 'scientific claims of dialectical materialism' in a radio talk which is printed in the collective volume *Christen oder Bolschewisten* Stuttgart 1957, pp. 81-96. But I did not deal with the question of the scientific nature of a differentiated economic analysis in the spirit of Marx, but only with the claim of the Soviet dogmatists.

[17] Heinrich Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch,* Basel 1953, in a dissertation prepared under the supervision of Karl Jaspers which is far above the usual level of German dissertations and the first recent work to renew interest in the humanist approach of the young Marx. Karl Jaspers' own critical position in relation to Marxism was already apparent in his small book *Die geistige Situation der Zeit,* 1931. In the first place he criticises Marxism, from the point of view of Max Weber's conception of science, on account of its claim to make binding and scientific statements about situations which are based ultimately on the free value judgments of men. Secondly, Jaspers attacks in the Marxist system a form of thinking below the level of the great philosophies which has always tried to limit the open horizon of human endeavour. His stand against Marxism coincides with his fight against other creators of philosophical systems such as Hegel, Schelling, Heidegger. Simplifying the matter a little, one might call this criticism existential Kantianism.

of the very situation which has to be annulled and henceforward makes the aim of its critical practice criticism by practice. It knows that it is working towards the abolition of itself qua philosophy to the extent that it is endeavouring to realise its own immanent existence. Such criticism leaves . . . the stage of contemplation. It has seen through the facade of its own autonomy by which it has been led to believe that it is able both to prove and to realise itself.[18]

At this point, however, where philosophy cognises its own limitations and the abolition the reality by which it is conditioned as its ue goal, it proves that it is dependent on an mpirical scientific understanding of the facts om which the conditions making this aboli- on (i.e. the Revolution) feasible can alone be rived: 'The dependence of criticism on sci- ce, on empirical historical, sociological and onomic analyses is so final and unalterable at, within the theory, it can only be refuted ientifically. That does not mean, however, at it could be proved sufficiently by scientific eans. Once given the scientifically ascertain- le conditions for a potential revolution, the volution itself would still need the grasping the possibility . . . the practice stimulated t not determined by an understanding of the actical necessity'.[19]

Habermas here points to a distinction which overlooked by present-day Marxists—or left the dark for propaganda reasons: the dis- ction between a theoretical necessity which poses itself with the inevitability of a natural w, and a practical necessity which is depend- t for its realisation on deliberate human tion. According to the Marxian analysis the velopment of the capitalist method, which poses itself against the will of individual per- ns, is a theoretical necessity. On the other nd, the socialist revolution which is by no eans already determined by the mere recog- ion that it is possible, is a practical necessity. here the distinction is ignored, the essential ference between the deductive Hegelian lectic, as opposed to the dialectical empiri- m of Marx, is lost

[18] Jürgen Habermas, 'Zur philosophischen Diskus- n um Marx und den Marxismus', in *Philos. ndschau*, V, (1957), p. 165-235, p. 192.
[19] *ibid.*, p. 192 f.

According to Habermas's interpretation of Marx, the necessity of progress is a practical, not a theoretical one, since '. . . otherwise historical dialectic would not be historical and also not contingent, and the assertion that Marx had based himself, without discussion, on Hegel's *Preface*, would be correct. In the face of such a presupposition all empirical analyses would be a mere epilogue, deprived of their power of falsification without which it is impossible for science to achieve any scientific stringency'.[20]

Habermas is doubtless right. But it has to be said that his Marxism is merely one possible form and not the one propagated in the Soviet Union today and presumably also not the one for which Marx himself stood. Certainly, in later life Marx wanted to investigate the conditions making for the possibility of revolution and referred again and again to the empirical situation but, since at that time the facts seemed more or less in accordance with the trend for which he hoped, he did not, like present-day Marxists, undergo the embarrassment of having to falsify his hopes.

The point that Habermas makes with the greatest ease in the last part of his essay, that the contemporary proletariat in industrial countries is neither able nor inclined to abolish by revolution the conditions under which it lives, in order to make an unalienated existence possible for all men, would have meant for Marx the surrender of his lifelong hopes. It is hardly to be assumed that he would have reconciled himself to a position from which Marxists living in the West today still shrink. Even with this qualification, however, there remains a good deal of positive value in Habermas's critical enquiry.[21] He is, for example, perfectly right to point out that for thinkers who do not acknowledge the dependence of Marxist theory on empirical research, the 'surplus' over and above the rational elements in Marxism seems

[20] *ibid.*, p. 193 f.

[21] Incidentally, in a footnote, Habermas himself points out that the distinction between the two kinds of necessity was later 'obliterated in particular in the preface to the first volume of *Das Kapital* and in the final paragraphs of that work', and he attributes responsibility for this development to the influence of Engels and his, 'in the metaphysical sense, "materialistic" thinking'. Note 48, p. 193, loc. cit.

like a secularised theology[22] or gnostic cosmology (Ernst Bloch). Even in Habermas himself, however, there is a surplus: the impulse which has to be added to the mere recognition of the possibility of revolution in order to transform it into reality.

It can hardly be called anything but an ethical impulse. And thus we reach the ethical motivation of Marxian socialism which has been constantly rejected by Marxists of all schools. The alternative is only too clear: either deterministic materialism or an ethical motivation for the socialist revolution.

* * *

Germany was once the intellectual home of Marxism. Only since 1945, however, has it been possible to discuss Marxism freely once again. In Eastern Germany it takes the form of a Soviet Russian import and, at any rate partly, denies its origin. In Western Germany there is something abstract and unreal about the discussion of Marxism, which is hardly carried on at all by its followers and believers. The discussion has been concentrated on purely philosophical problems and has only rarely dealt —for example in the analysis of the Soviet world with the aid of Marxian categories—with the society of the present day. Conversation with scholars of other countries, for example England and America, Poland, France, might help to liberate the German discussion of Marxism from this one-sidedness. What seems most desirable, however, is the inclusion of economic and sociological problems. Only when the whole range of questions which Marx confronted and combined in himself has come into view again will the criticism of Marxism reach the point of enriching and fertilising learning in the free world generally.

[22] In his book *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen* (Stuttgart, 1953) Karl Löwith has described Marxism as the 'story of salvation in the language of economics'. In his other works (*Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*) and above all in the *Gesammelten Abhandlungen*, Stuttgart, 1960 (which contain the long essay on Max Weber and Karl Marx of 1932), Löwith goes beyond this one-sided view of Marxism.

Mehr denn je stehen die osteuropäischen Vorgänge für Deutschland und die gesamte Weltöffentlichkeit im Vordergrund des Interesses. Wer ständig und zuverlässig über die Entwicklung in Osteuropa und in der Sowjetunion unterrichtet sein will, liest

OSTEUROPA

Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens. Herausgegeben von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde. Schriftleitung Dr. Klaus Mehnert.

OSTEUROPA bringt laufend aktuelle und sachkundige Informationen über alle von Moskau beherrschten oder mit ihm verbundenen Gebiete und erscheint seit Januar 1957 monatlich. (Einzelpreis DM 3.–, Jahresabonnement DM 30.–.)

„. . . die für alle Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens unentbehrliche Zeitschrift."
St. Galler Tagblatt

„. . . dokumentarische Rückblicke und statistische Unterlagen, wie man sie in dieser zuverlässigen Gedrängtheit sonst selten findet." Der Tagesspiegel

DEUTSCHE VERLAGS-ANSTALT STUTTGART

ROSA LUXEMBURG

Freedom and Revolution

F. L. Carsten

AMONG the rather unimaginative and pedestrian leaders of the German Social-emocratic Party of the early twentieth century who were occupied with the task of achieving tter living conditions for the workers and ssing high-sounding resolutions against the ils of bourgeois society (which did not oblige ybody to take any action)—one was entirely ferent: a fiery woman of Jewish-Polish origin, all and slender, slightly lame from a child-od disease, an orator who could sway the sses, a professional revolutionary who seemed belong to the Russian world from which she me rather than to modern Germany. Rosa xemburg was born on 5 March 1871 in the all Polish town of Zamosc near Lublin into fairly prosperous Jewish middle-class family. r span of life coincided almost exactly with at of the German Empire which Bismarck had nded at Versailles a few weeks before her th; its collapse in November 1918 she out-ed only by some weeks. Her family sympa-sed with the aspirations of the Polish national vement, and at the age of sixteen Rosa xemburg joined an underground revolution-Socialist group called *Proletariat* and par-ipated in its clandestine activities among the rkers of Warsaw. In 1889, when threatened h arrest and imprisonment, she was smuggled t of Poland by her comrades and went to rich, the centre of the Russian and Polish litical émigrés. There she studied at the uni-sity and took part in the intense political l intellectual life of her fellow Socialists, in heated discussions where the battles of the ning Russian revolution were fought out in vance.

Her political activities remained intimately nected with Poland. She was a co-founder the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom Poland and Lithuania in 1894 and a chief tributor to its paper published in Paris. She s opposed to the slogan of independence for and, which was advocated by another Polish Socialist party, the PPS; instead she advocated the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy in alliance with the Russian working class as the primary task of the Polish revolutionary movement. She aimed at the establishment of a Russian democratic republic within which Poland would merely enjoy cultural autonomy. To Poland she returned during the revolution of 1905 to participate in the revolutionary struggle. There her party had become a mass party which issued papers and leaflets in several languages, organised trade unions and strikes, and co-operated closely with the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party. After a few months of great political activity, however, Rosa Luxemburg and her lifelong friend Leo Jogiches were arrested. She was kept in prison for four months, but was then released on account of her German nationality (she had contracted a *pro forma* marriage with a German comrade so as not to be hampered in her political work) and expelled from Poland, never to return.

It was in Germany that she made her home at the end of the nineteenth century; there she worked together with Karl Kautsky, the editor of the theoretical weekly of the German Social-Democrats, *Die Neue Zeit*, and the propounder and populariser of Marxist theories. In the columns of this paper and at German Party congresses she crossed swords with Eduard Bernstein, who had just published his articles on 'Problems of Socialism', emphasising the evolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism and 'revising' orthodox Marxism in a Fabian sense.[1] In the columns of *Die Neue Zeit* Rosa Luxemburg soon crossed swords with another redoubtable figure of the international socialist movement, V. I. Lenin, on the question of the organisation of Russian Social-Democracy and the powers of the central

[1] See *Soviet Survey*, No. 32, April-June 1960, pp. 14ff. Rosa Luxemburg's attack on Bernstein was published in 1900 as a pamphlet with the title *Sozialreform oder Revolution?*

committee of the Party, which showed that she was well aware of the dangers threatening the revolutionary movement from within. There too she commented vigorously on the Russian revolution of 1905 and discovered in it a new weapon of primary importance, the political mass strike, which she attempted to transfer to Germany. Her close association with Kautsky came to an end after some years during which she learned to distrust his Marxist jargon and to doubt the readiness of the Social-Democratic leaders to accompany their revolutionary words by similar deeds.

DURING the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War Rosa Luxemburg became the acknowledged theoretical leader of a left wing within the German Social-Democratic Party, whose adherents claimed that they were the only true heirs of Marx's revolutionary ardour. She also published her most important theoretical work, *The Accumulation of Capital*,[2] in which she tried to demonstrate that capitalism could expand only so long as it had at its disposal non-capitalist, colonial markets: with their progressive absorption and their conversion to capitalism through the division of the world among the imperialist powers the system was bound to reach its 'final phase':

> Imperialism is simultaneously a historical method of prolonging the existence of capitalism and the most certain means of putting an end to its existence in the shortest possible time. This does not imply that the final goal must be reached inevitably and mechanically. Yet already the tendency towards this final limit of capitalist development expresses itself in forms which will make the last phase of capitalism a period of catastrophes.[3]

She maintained in conclusion that

> the more capital, through militarism, in the world at large as well as at home, liquidates the non-capitalist strata and depresses the living conditions of all working people, the more does the daily history of capital accumulation in the world become a continuous chain of political and social catastrophes and convulsions which, together with the periodic economic catastrophes in the form of crises, will make the continuation of capital accumulation impossible . . . even before capitalism has reached the natural, self-created barriers of its economic development.[4]

In Rosa Luxemburg's opinion capitalism was doomed and its final crisis was inevitable: a point on which she differed from Lenin, whose *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written a few years later, contained certain analogies with her analysis of imperialism, but avoided any definite pronouncement on the 'inevitability' of capitalist collapse.[5]

It is not, however, on economic theories such as these that Rosa Luxemburg's fame as a socialist writer rests. This is, above all, due to her uncompromising stand against war and militarism. In February 1914 she was arrested and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment on a charge of inciting soldiers to mutiny because she had declared publicly: 'if they expect us to murder our French or other foreign brothers then let us tell them: "No, under no circumstances!" ' At the outbreak of war in August 1914 the German Social-Democratic Party—like most other socialist parties—decided to support the fatherland and to grant the war credits demanded by the government; this decision was opposed only by a small minority in the party caucus and by not a single deputy at the decisive vote in the Reichstag on 4 August. Rosa Luxemburg from the outset hotly attacked this policy and never forgave the party's leaders for their betrayal of the ideals to which they had once subscribed:

> With the 4 August 1914 official German Social-Democracy and with it the International have miserably collapsed. Everything that we have preached to the people for fifty years, that we have proclaimed as our most sacred principles, that we have propounded innumerable times in speeches, pamphlets, newspapers, and leaflets, has suddenly become empty talk. The party of the international proletarian class struggle has suddenly been transformed as by an evil spell

[2] English translation, London, 1951.

[3] Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals, Gesammelte Werke*, VI, Berlin, 1923, p. 361.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 379-80.

[5] Hence Rosa Luxemburg has always been criticised by her 'Marxist' commentators: see, for example, the remarks of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institut beim Z.K. der SED in Rosa Luxemburg, *Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften*, I, Berlin, 1955, p. 408.

into a national liberal party; our strong organisations, of which we have been so proud, have proved to be totally powerless; and instead of the esteemed and feared deadly enemies of bourgeois society we are now the rightly despised tools of our mortal enemies, the imperialist bourgeoisie, without a will of our own. In other countries more or less the same breakdown of socialism has occurred, and the proud old cry: 'Working men of all countries, unite!' has been changed on the battlefields into: 'Working men of all countries, slit each other's throats!'

Never in world history has a political party become bankrupt so miserably, never has a proud ideal been betrayed so shamefully.[6]

ıe explained why German Social-Democracy ıs able to change its policy so quickly and ccessfully, without encountering any major ›position inside the party:

It was precisely the powerful organisation, the much-lauded discipline of German Social-Democracy, which proved their worth in that the whole organism of four millions allowed itself to be turned round within twenty-four hours at the behest of a handful of parliamentarians and let itself be joined to a structure, the storming of which had been its lifelong aim . . . Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, Liebknecht, Bebel, and Singer educated the German working class so that Hindenburg can lead it. The better the education, the organisation, the famous discipline, the building-up of trade unions and party press is in Germany than it is in France, the more effective is the war effort of German Social-Democracy in comparison with that of the French.[7]

›on Rosa Luxemburg and her circle of friends, ›ellectuals like herself, began to organise ›position to the war and to issue clandestine ti-war leaflets, signed with the pen-name of ›artacus: hence their group came to be known *Spartakusbund* (Spartacus League). Thus ›y remained faithful to the resolution that had en voted for the first time by the Congress the Socialist International at Stuttgart in 07 at the suggestion of Rosa Luxemburg, ›nin, and Martov:

If the outbreak of war threatens, the workers and their parliamentary deputies in the countries in question are obliged to do everything to prevent the outbreak of war by suitable means. . . . If war should nevertheless break out, they are obliged to work for its speedy termination and to strive with all their might to use the economic and political crisis created by the war for the mobilisation of the people and thus to hasten the overthrow of capitalist class rule.[8]

THEIR underground activities soon landed most of the leaders of the Spartacus League in prison. Rosa Luxemburg was arrested in February 1915 and, with the exception of only a few months, spent the remaining years of the war in various German prisons—until she was freed by the revolution of November 1918. In prison she wrote her most eloquent denunciation of the war, in which she clearly established the responsibility of the German Imperial government because the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had been issued with its consent, because it had assured Austria in advance of German support in case of war, and because it had given Austria 'an entirely free hand in its action against Serbia'. *The Crisis of Social-Democracy*, written under the pen-name of Junius, bitterly condemned the war and even more bitterly condemned the policy of the German Social-Democrats:

This world war is a relapse into barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of civilisation—sporadically during a modern war, and finally if the period of world wars which has now started should continue without hindrance to the last sequence. We are today faced with the choice, exactly as Frederick Engels predicted forty years ago: either the triumph of imperialism and decline of all civilisation, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, one vast cemetery; or the victory of socialism, that is the conscious fight of the international working class against imperialism and its method: war. . . .

Yes, the Social-Democrats are obliged to defend their country during a great historical crisis; and this constitutes a grave guilt on the part of the Social-Democratic Reichstag fraction, that it declared solemnly on 4 August 1914: 'We do not desert the fatherland in

Underground leaflet of the Spartacus League of ril 1916: *ibid.*, II, Berlin, 1951, p. 534.

Die Internationale, No. 1, 1915: *ibid.*, II., p. 521.

[8] *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress Stuttgart 1907*, Berlin, 1907, p. 102: Thursday, 22 August 1907.

the hour of danger'; but it denied its own words at the same moment, for it *has* forsaken the fatherland in the hour of its greatest peril. The first duty towards the fatherland in that hour was to show it the real background of this imperialist war; to tear away the tissue of patriotic and diplomatic lies which surrounded this attack on the fatherland; to proclaim loudly and clearly that for the German people victory or defeat in this war is equally disastrous; to resist with all force the muzzling of the fatherland by the state of siege . . . finally, to oppose the imperialist war aims of the preservation of Austria and Turkey—that is of reaction in Europe and in Germany—by the old truly national programme of the patriots and democrats of 1848, the programme of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle: by the slogan of the united, great German republic. That is the banner that should have been raised, a banner that would have been truly national, truly liberal and in conformity with the best traditions of Germany, as well as of the international class policy of the working class.[9]

Rosa Luxemburg's voice became the symbol of opposition to the war, but it remained a cry in the wilderness. Although many Germans became war-weary on account of mounting casualties and increasing hunger, the Spartacus League never mustered more than a few hundred members, and the non-revolutionary, pacifist Independent Social-Democratic Party became the mass opposition party in the later years of the war. Although the Spartacists joined this party, its leaders were men far removed from Rosa Luxemburg's revolutionary idealism, men like her old enemies Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky. Even after the revolution of 1918 it was the Independent Social-Democratic Party which became the mass party of the radicalised section of the German working class; while the newly founded German Communist Party, the successor of the Spartacus League, remained a small sect.

It was in prison, too, that news reached Rosa Luxemburg first of the February and then of the October revolution in Russia: her revolutionary ideals seemed at last to have reached the realm of reality, if not in Germany then at least in Russia. And it was in prison too that she wrote what must remain the most important testimony to her independence of spirit, a trenchant criticism of Lenin's policy after the October revolution. As early as 1904, at the same time and for the same reasons as George Plekhanov,[10] she had criticised Lenin for his advocacy of

> a ruthless centralism, the chief principles of which are on the one hand the sharp distinction and separation of the organised groups of the avowed and active revolutionaries from the surrounding, if unorganised, yet revolutionary active circles, and on the other hand the strict discipline and the direct, decisive intervention of the central authority in all activities of the local party groups. It is sufficient to remark that according to this conception the central committee is authorised to organise all local committees of the party, therefore also empowered to decide upon the personal composition of each Russian local organisation, from Geneva and Liège to Tomsk and Irkutsk, to impose upon them its own local rules, to dissolve them altogether by decree and to create them anew, and thus finally to influence indirectly even the composition of the highest party organ, the party congress. Thus the central committee appears as the real active nucleus of the party and all other organisations merely as its executive tools.[11]

Against Lenin's formula that the revolutionary Social-Democrat was nothing but 'a Jacobin who was inseparably linked with the organisation of the class-conscious proletariat', Rosa Luxemburg emphasised that it was in a conspiratorial organisation of the type created by Blanqui that tactics and activity were worked out in advance, according to a fixed plan, that its active members were but the executive organs of a higher will which was formed outside their sphere of action, and blindly subordinated to a central authority which possessed absolute powers. In her opinion, the conditions of Social-Democratic action were entirely different,

> not based on blind obedience, nor on the mechanical subordination of the party militants to a central authority; and it is equally

[9] *Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften*, I, pp. 270, 372-73.

[10] See *Soviet Survey*, No. 32, April-June 1960, p. 9

[11] 'Organisationsfragen der russischen Sozialdemokratie', *Die Neue Zeit*, XXII, Stuttgart, 1904, pp. 486-87.

out of the question to erect an absolute partition between the nucleus of the class-conscious proletariat, which is already organised in firm party cadres, and the surrounding sections which are already engaged in the class struggle and are being drawn into the process of class education.

cording to her, Lenin's ideas amounted to

a mechanical transfer of the organisational principles of the Blanquist movement of conspirators into the Social-Democratic movement of the masses of the workers.

cial-Democracy was not 'linked' with the ganisation of the class-conscious workers, but s 'the proper movement of the working class', that Social-Democratic centralism had to be an entirely different quality from that of unqui. Local organisations had to have sufficnt elbow-room so that they could deploy ir initiative and make use of the existing portunities to further the struggle; while the ra-centralism advocated by Lenin was signed to control, channel, and regiment the ivity of the party.[12]

THUS Rosa Luxemburg realised at a very early stage the dangers inherent in the lshevik type of organisation; but this did not vent her from co-operating with Lenin durlater years and from welcoming the Russian olution as 'the most tremendous fact of the rld war'. Her criticisms of Lenin's policy er the October revolution were above all ected against his agrarian policy and against anti-democratic, dictatorial tendencies inent in Bolshevism. Lenin, at the time of the tober revolution, had taken over the agrarian gramme of a non-Marxist party, the Social volutionaries, which sanctioned the division the expropriated estates of the nobility ong the peasants and created a strong class peasant proprietors. Rosa Luxemburg pretted that this policy would

reate for socialism a new and powerful class of enemies in the countryside, whose opposition will be much more dangerous and tencious than that of the noble landlords had ver been

l that

n enormously enlarged and strong mass of easant proprietors will defend their newly cquired property tooth and nail against all socialist attacks. Now the question of a future socialisation of agriculture, and of production in Russia in general, has become an issue and an object of a struggle between the urban workers and the peasants.[13]

How right she was the years of Stalin's forced collectivisation were to show; but she did not consider whether, in the conditions of 1917, Lenin, if he wanted to seize and to retain power, had any alternative but to sanction occupation of the land by the peasants, which was proceeding spontaneously and independently of his orders or wishes. On this point she was more orthodox than Lenin.

Far more weighty was Rosa Luxemburg's criticism of the anti-democratic policy of Lenin and Trotsky, of their suppression of free political life, of their establishment of a dictatorship not of the masses, but over the masses. She declared quite unequivocally that

> it is an obvious and indisputable fact that without a free and uncensored press, without the untrammelled activity of associations and meetings, the rule of the broad masses of the people is unthinkable.[14]

And she prophesied correctly that

> with the suppression of political life in the whole country the vitality of the Soviets too is bound to deteriorate progressively. Without general elections, without complete freedom of the press and of meetings, without freedom of discussion, life in every public institution becomes a sham in which bureaucracy alone remains active. Nothing can escape the working of this law. Public life gradually disappears; a few dozen extremely energetic and highly idealistic party leaders direct and govern; among them in reality a dozen outstanding leaders rule, and the élite of the working class is summoned to a meeting from time to time to applaud the speeches of the leaders and to adopt unanimously resolutions put to them; *au fond* this is the rule of a clique—a dictatorship it is true, but not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in the bourgeois sense.[15]

Rosa Luxemburg had not become an adherent of 'bourgeois democracy', nor was she against dictatorship. She stood on the platform

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 488-89, 491-92.

[13] Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Russische Revolution*, ed. Paul Levi, Berlin, 1922, pp. 86-87.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

on which Marx had stood in 1848; dictatorship of the broad masses of the people was to her the same as revolutionary democracy, a dictatorship against the small minority of capitalists and landlords, but not against the people:

> Dictatorship, certainly! But dictatorship means the way in which democracy is used, not its abolition; it means energetic, resolute interference with the acquired rights and economic conditions of bourgeois society, without which there can be no question of a socialist revolution. But this dictatorship must be the work of the class, and not of a small, leading minority in the name of the class; i.e., it must originate from the continuous active participation of the masses, must be directly influenced by them, must be subordinate to the control of the whole people, and must be borne by the increasing political education of the masses.[16]

These masses must participate actively in the political life and in the shaping of the new order, 'otherwise socialism will be decreed and imposed from above by a dozen intellectuals'.[17]

The masses, however, cannot acquire political education and experience without political freedom: it is here that Rosa Luxemburg realised the deep gulf which separated her libertarian socialism from totalitarian socialism:

> Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party—however numerous they may be—that is not freedom. Freedom is always freedom for the man who thinks differently.[18]

It is proof of her political genius that she could write these words a few months after the inauguration of the Bolshevik dictatorship. The essay was not published in her lifetime, however, but only some years after her death by her pupil Paul Levi (who succeeded her in the leadership of the German Communist Party) after he had broken with Moscow.

THE German revolution of November 1918 freed Rosa Luxemburg from prison. She spent the remaining few weeks of her life in feverish activity, exhorting the masses to revolutionary action, pouring scorn over the moderate Social-Democratic leaders who suddenly found themselves in power, writing numerous articles for the communist paper, *Die Rote Fahne*, which she edited together with Karl Liebknecht. In contrast with the majority of communists, she considered it necessary to participate in the elections to the German National Assembly which were to take place in January 1919; but she did so for reasons entirely at variance with those of the large mass of German socialists, who put their faith in the introduction of parliamentary democracy, and not in the continuation of violent revolution. She wanted to use parliament as a revolutionary platform, as a means of furthering the cause of revolution:

> Now we stand in the midst of the revolution and the National Assembly is a counter-revolutionary fortress which has been erected against the revolutionary proletariat. It is thus essential to besiege and to reduce this fortress. To mobolise the masses *against* the National Assembly and to summon them to battle, for this the elections and the platform of the National Assembly must be used.
>
> It is necessary to participate in the elections not in order to pass laws together with the bourgeoisie and its mercenaries, but to chase the bourgeoisie and its partisans out of the temple, to storm the fortress of the counter-revolution and above it to hoist victoriously the flag of the proletarian revolution. To do this a majority in the National Assembly would be required? That only those believe who render homage to parliamentary cretinism, who want to decide upon revolution and socialism through parliamentary majorities. It is not the parliamentary majority *inside* which decides the fate of the National Assembly itself, but the working masses outside in the factories and in the streets. . . .
>
> The elections and the platform of this counter-revolutionary parliament must become a means to educate, rally and mobilise the revolutionary masses, a step in the struggle for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship.[19]

Although the masses of the German workers proved more than reluctant to follow the communist lead, Rosa Luxemburg never lost her faith in them. The day before she was murdered by counter-revolutionary thugs, on 14 January 1919, she wrote in her last article

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[19] Article in *Die Rote Fahne* of 23 December 1918, *Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften*, II, pp. 652-53.

hich contained an appraisal of the attempted izure of power by the extreme left in Berlin, e so-called Spartacist rising:

The masses are the decisive element, they are the rock on which will be built the final victory of the revolution. The masses have stood the test; they have made out of this 'defeat' one link in the chain of historical defeats which constitute the pride and the power of international socialism. And this is why out of this 'defeat' victory will be born. . . . Tomorrow already the revolution will arise again in shining armour and will frighten you with her trumpet-call: I was, I am, I shall be! [20]

e course of the German revolution was to ow how unjustified her faith in the masses l her revolutionary optimism had been, and en the masses in Germany moved they moved a direction totally different from that which had so confidently predicted.

A FEW weeks before Rosa Luxemburg was murdered, the German Communist Party s founded in Berlin. In its programme, pub- ied in December 1918, Rosa Luxemburg e more gave expression to the ideas which l inspired her criticism of Lenin's policy after October revolution, to her clear refutation the rule of a minority over the working class l of all putschist tactics (which so tragically ne to a head in the Spartacist rising of uary 1919):

The proletarian revolution requires no terror o achieve its aims, it hates and despises murder. . . . It is no desperate attempt of a minority to fashion the world according to s own ideals, but the action of the many millions of the people, which is called upon o fulfil its historical mission and to trans- orm historical necessity into reality. . . . The partacus League is not a party which wants o seize power over the working class or through the working class. . . . The Spartacus League will never seize power unless it be through the clear, positive wish of the large majority of the working masses in Germany, never otherwise than on the basis of their conscious approval of the views, aims and political methods of the Spartacus League. . . . s victory stands not at the beginning, but t the end of the revolution: it is identical with the victory of the many millions of socialist workers.[21]

It was a tragedy, not only for itself, that the new party did not heed this advice of its founder; throughout its history it remained devoted to putschist tactics, and when it finally came to power it did so as a clique ruling over the workers and maintained in power by the bayonets of a foreign army.

In the new party programme Rosa Luxemburg also emphasised what in her opinion constituted the essential features of socialism:

> The essence of a socialist society consists in this, that the great working mass ceases to be a regimented mass, but lives and directs the whole political and economic life in conscious and free self-determination. . . .
>
> The proletarian masses must learn to become, instead of mere machines employed by the capitalists in the process of production, the thinking, free, and active directors of this process. They must acquire the sense of responsibility of active members of the community which is the sole owner of all social wealth. They must develop zeal without the employer's whip, highest productivity without capitalist drivers, discipline without a yoke, and order without regimentation. Highest idealism in the interest of the community, strictest self-discipline, a true civic spirit of the masses, these constitute the moral basis of a socialist society.[22]

It is in ideas such as these, in her searching criticism of the conceptions of Lenin, in her emphasis on the moral and democratic basis of socialism that the lasting value of Rosa Luxemburg's thought can be found. Her theory of the inevitable collapse of capitalism, her blind faith in the masses and in revolution as such, her vast optimism as to the future of socialism have been disproved by events which she did not live to see. Yet enough remains to make her one of the outstanding exponents of modern socialist thought. It is no accident that she has been classified as a heretic in Eastern Europe and that the only recent edition of her writings omits all that is truly important among them. For Rosa Luxemburg, socialism and freedom were inseparable: those who have abolished freedom have no use for her ideas.

Article in *Die Rote Fahne* of 14 January 1919: , p. 714.

[21] *Was will der Spartakusbund?* ed. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund), Berlin, 1919, pp. 17, 22-23.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

Interview with an Ex-Insider, II

THE PARTY THAT VANISHED

W. In 1938 the Polish Communist Party was dissolved as 'contaminated by hostile elements' Very little is known about the background of this act. Could you throw some light on it?

P. One introductory remark to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation: I was not a member of the Communist Party in Poland, nor was I connected with the Polish section in the Comintern during my work in Moscow. My reminiscences are based only upon contacts with friends among the Polish communists and on information I got at meetings of different committees, etc. Later I learnt many things in prisons and camps from Polish and other communists who were arrested in the Yezhov and Beria periods.

These reminiscences, like those published in the previous issue of *Survey*, are based on memory only (not on documents), and I must apologise in advance for any errors in dates, names, and details. What I try to recall, after 30 or 35 eventful years, are the essential facts, in large part unknown till now, which may be a contribution to an objective and truthful record of the epoch.

First of all I want to point out that during those years it was not a question of a single act of persecution of the Polish Party which finished with its complete liquidation. It was a longer process. I think it had been going on for eight or nine years. It must have been about 1929 that the Polish Party, and especially those who had been active in Polish political life before joining the Party, either in the Russian Social-Democratic Party or the left-wing Polish Socialist Party, began to be suspect, and more and more driven outside the orthodox party collective, and considered first as not entirely reliable, then not reliable at all and thus dangerous, and in the end becoming enemy number one. Later on in a camp I met two Party members who had been arrested and exiled at that early period. Certain articles about the history of the Polish Party have appeared which emphasise that the chief reason for all that happened was ideological. I refer to the articles in *Les Temp Modernes* last year about the history of th Polish Party, and also in other publications. was stated there that the chief reason was idec logical. I think this was one of the chie reasons, but that in the course of time the idec logical reason became less important. In m opinion there were two other reasons. Fc ideological reasons alone Stalin would neve have taken such measures, and the struggl would never have become so bitter and brough the victims to total extermination. The two othe reasons were, in my opinion—and in the opinio of many observers who have studied this ques tion—the following: first, the fact that Polis communists who were in Russia were closel linked with the Russian membership, mor closely than any other foreign communist Whatever the attitude towards members c other parties—always referred to as brothe parties—for the Polish CP there was a specia place. It was also partly a question of ideology because the Poles thought themselves as goo Marxists as the Russians, and they often con sidered themselves as old Bolsheviks, for ex ample Dzerzhinsky, who was a member of th Russian Political Bureau and was as influentia as any Russian. I knew numbers of them Radek was also a member—and nobod thought at that time about stressing the differ ences. But then came a time when the part leadership, especially Stalin, were trying t establish a special position for the Bolshevi party proper.

W. Do you mean that in the early period th Polish communists did not have the same kin of 'inferiority complex' as the members of othe foreign CPs about the 'revolutionary achieve ments' of the Russians?

P. Precisely; in a sense they even considere themselves more Marxist than the Russian They considered themselves as a bridge to Wes ern Marxism, in a certain measure also as repr sentatives of certain Western trends in Russi

d this was always a positive feature for them. ey were more sophisticated.

You stress the Western character of Polish arxism. What were its roots?

There was all the influence, the heritage of sa Luxemburg, particularly on those points which she dissented from Lenin. For a long ie it was not fashionable or admissible to talk out the differences of opinion between Rosa xemburg and Lenin. That was in the early nties. I don't remember a single article or a tence in an article after Rosa Luxemburg's rder in which Lenin himself underlined his lier differences with her. Lenin didn't like to ert to old disputes except for specific political sons. He really made an effort not to men- n anything of the past. Whenever there was discussion—for instance there was a debate out trade unions with Trotsky—he could have ntioned something to link it with past diver- ces, but he didn't. When such past doctrinal urrels began to be stressed it was really aimed the Polish group, particularly when it was ied that Bolshevism derives from many pre- olutionary trends; there were many discus- ns in order to reinforce this point, which was ected against the Polish communists.

So it was not legitimate for them to consider mselves part of the Russian revolutionary dition?

That was not only illegitimate, but they had declare that the other roots were wrong, and y were always recanting 'mistakes' derived n them; they even had to take an active part he struggle against those 'mistakes'. It was at this time that the awful hypocrisy began. en people in private said that all this was absurdity and in public were saying, as rybody else did, that every word of Stalin gospel truth, and condemning principles vhich they had been faithful for many years.

Do you recollect any private conversations n about that period which reflected such udes among the Polish communists in sia?

never entered upon specific discussions be- se people were reluctant to talk and I was as ctant to ask such questions. I only remem- what I knew about these people: partly the e people who wrote articles explaining the principles and the new line, and who were at the same time privately very sentimental about the old time and unhappy about the changes. As to ideological questions, the Poles were quite cautious. They tried not to enter into the Russian controversies. After the experience of Kostrzewa, who defended Trotsky and put herself into a bad position in the early 20's, and after the experiment of trying to make specific requests, they had all to be very cautious. They tried not to get involved in the struggle inside the Russian party although they could not help being drawn into it.

W. Do you remember any specific links, for instance between the Bukharinites and the 'rightists' in the Polish CP?

P. There were practically none. The Poles could not support Bukharin, particularly on the peasant question. They were all by tradition more on the left. There were only those Polish communists who were in the Krestintern. They had some sympathy for Bukharin but in general they tried to keep clear of it. They had enough trouble with their own 'mistakes'. They did not want to participate in other ideological schisms. Yet they were more involved in the internal Russian party struggle than any other national group—that is the first point.

Now I come to the second point. The Poles were so numerous at all levels of the Soviet apparatus, more numerous than all the other communist emigrants taken together. They also had a greater qualitative weight. For instance in the GPU they were the first, of course after the Russians. In proportion, they were five to six times more numerous than the Russians. If for every 100 GPU officials there should have been, say, one Pole, and 99 Russians and others, there were in reality perhaps 15 Poles. I was once shown a diagram of a pyramid by one of the GPU officials: at the bottom it was full of Russians, simple rank and file. But higher up there were more and more Poles and Latvians. In the commanding positions, among the chiefs of the departments, there were quite a big number, out of any proportion. This was the state of affairs in the twenties and early thirties.

W. And yet you mentioned before that there was this growth of suspicion in the GPU and in Narkomindel of the Polish communists.

P. It did not all come at once. The specific

anti-Polish theory came to its peak in 1938, but it developed much earlier. The Polish state was considered to be the vanguard of foreign intervention, sabotage, and spying against the Soviet Union. The Poles were thought to want revenge for the lost war of 1920, and they were depicted as wanting to march into the Ukraine again and as organising further intervention, preparing for it by infiltration into the Polish party, or even into the Soviet army, the GPU, and so on. The fact that they were so largely represented in the GPU began to serve as a proof of this and they became more and more suspect. The Polish party was gradually being put into a special position. Previously it was privileged, now it was suspect. Poles were kept in the background; they became outsiders with less and less chance of active participation in Party work. Those who participated, like Walecki, who was in the Comintern apparatus, had nothing to do with the Polish party, and were busy with their other tasks. Kostrzewa kept silent. It was an open secret that she had not repented, that she still considered herself to be in the right. She was leading a quiet life. I think she was working at the Marx-Engels Institute, that is to say, doing research work.

W. Do you remember any other people: Warski, Sochacki, etc.?

P. Well, Sochacki was at some time in the Comintern. Then there was Slawudzki. There was a time when I was in touch with another representative in the Comintern, Bronkowski, who once held a high post in the Red Army. In the early years he was deputy chief of the Red Army Intelligence Service. He played a big part in organising Soviet external security, and then he went back to the Polish party and became representative of the Polish party in the Comintern. There was Krolikowski and also Henrykowski who was representative in the Profintern, the trade union International. There was Lampe, very intelligent and very unhappy because he understood things much better than his colleagues. He was obliged to explain all those things which were going on in the Soviet Union, and it was quite clear that he did not believe what he said: he was one of those who escaped the annihilation of the Polish communist leaders.

W. How did he manage that?

P. He was arrested in Poland and put in Polish prison. Most of those in the Polish part who survived were those who were not in Russi during the Great Purge. Lampe fled only i 1939, when his prison was opened during th Polish-German war.

W. Was there a longing among the Polish com munists to get away from Russia?

P. Some of them were so disillusioned that the were even ready to get into Polish prisons. The didn't yet know what was in store for them, bu they felt that the dark road was coming to a end, that they were being strangled, and the wanted to get back. They wanted to be i Poland; there they worked enthusiastically a communists and of course many of them wer arrested. Especially, I should say, the peopl who were afterwards in the forefront; Bieru was in Pilsudski's prison, Gomulka was i prison.

W. How do you know that Bierut was i prison?

P. He is reported to have said when he hear about the dissolution of the party, that he wa in a Polish prison at the time. He said that h went for a walk in the prison yard, and the they found some clandestine way to get the new Gomulka was also in prison, the members o the party who were later secretaries after th foundation of the new party, the Polish Worker Party as it was now called, were in Polis prisons before. There was not a single one wh was in Russia who was set free. I was ofte asked about it in Poland, and I could only sa that as far as I knew none of the central com mittee members or well-known leaders had su vived. This is my impression. But I know o exception: that is the wife and son of Dze zhinsky. They were in Moscow all the tim and even remained untouched after the liquid tion of the party. They were in the apparatu near Stalin.

W. What was their personal role in this liqu dation? In what way did they assist in t liquidation of the Polish CP?

P. This is only gossip: the son was probably t young still, but the widow of Dzerzhinsky, Sof there were bad rumours circulating about her.

W. Is that the general opinion now in Pola among the Communist party leaders?

P. I was told she was compelled to participa

give evidence. But as for the Polish communs in Russia, they were eliminated during the ars when they were accused of treason, and re considered agents of Pilsudski, of the lish intelligence service. But when this point ne up attempts were always made to shift the estion from the political plane to the plane subversion and spying. The conception began emerge and it was fully developed in the s. In 1932 or 1933 the course was made ar, and was particularly illuminated by the e of Sochacki. That was the first case which ubled the whole body of communist emi-nts in the USSR.

What were the stories circulated at the time out Sochacki?

There were official declarations, inside party ormation, that he was a special agent who d connections, it was said, with Pilsudski nself. That was 1932 or 1933. In order to ke it easier for people to believe this, the U linked his case with the case of Skarbek, o was in the Ukraine, member of the Central mmittee of the Ukrainian CP. It was said that hacki's first crime was to have covered rbek. And Skarbek, so everybody said, had n connected with the Ukrainian nationalist itary organisation, which at that time was y active, and that it had been proved that had done such work, because at the very ment when his arrest became known to Pilski, Pilsudski had personally proposed by gram to exchange 10 communist prisoners Skarbek. He was alleged to have sent a tele-m to Molotov about it. This was the proof. body has ever seen this telegram. The story ne from the GPU.

How was it spread? By word of mouth, or circular letters?

Such things were only made known by per-al information, given orally; it was not sup-ed to be given on paper. It was always said t it was based on top secret material which ld not be disclosed, but nobody dared to bt it. If such particulars were given, like telegram from Pilsudski, this was considered icient proof. The idea was to make an ression upon people. It was part of the hod to say that all those people, Skarbek, hacki and others, were all unmasked one r another and that they had all confessed. In this way they hoped to make everybody afraid. Yesterday it was so and so, and tomorrow it may be you. And this was also how the GPU could refuse to enter into details. It was not said, but hinted, that not everything could be told, because the enemy was everywhere. People began to mistrust their best friends, even to lose confidence in themselves.

W. What was the reaction of the remaining party leaders?

P. Their reaction was quite natural. It would have been the reaction of any group of people in such a situation. You were told that there was a traitor among you. The first reaction was that they wanted to dissociate themselves from those accused as much as possible. Every one of them was preoccupied with the question of his own alibi. Even one of the cleverest of them, Pruchniak, a clever worker and at the same time a simple man who was not inclined to believe in trumped-up charges, even he simply lost his head, his composure. Then there were, of course, those who were already, in the political sense, suspect, about whom such rumours could easily be believed. Even those in high positions, Henrykowski for instance, who was considered to be always on the party line, could not protest, but was compelled to believe. All those men were as Poles a priori suspect, and so they all tried to get clear; some tried to get some mission abroad, there were quite a number of active Polish communists who were sent abroad as Comintern instructors, as delegates to other parties. When the Spanish war broke out, there was a rush among the Polish communists to get there. It was a question of getting out of Russia.

W. Who was next in line, after Sochacki, to get into trouble?

P. The next big wave of persecution began in 1935. There was a case of suicide of a very old party member which immediately provoked all kinds of speculation. After the Sochacki affair, he shot himself. It upset the whole Polish communist emigration, and immediately after his death rumours circulated that he had not shot himself for personal reasons, but because he was involved in the Sochacki case.

W. Your general impression, then, was that they were trying hard to show that they were loyal,

but at the same time they had internal inhibitions, etc.?

P. Not only inhibitions. Not only was the internal party regime full of lies, there was also the famine following collectivisation and its results, the increasing hypocrisy, bureaucracy, and corruption; all that had a great influence on the morale of the Polish communist organisation.

W. We mentioned earlier the case of Lenski. He was a special case, because he became the leader of the party and was considered a bit of a die-hard.

P. I don't think he was a die-hard. I had practically no personal contact with him, but persons in the Polish party told me that he was a die-hard *ex officio*, he had to enforce the line. He was in Germany and a sort of adviser to Thaelmann. All the time many German communists were trying to convince Stalin that a change of tactics was necessary. I met Thaelmann in Moscow and had a conversation with him. He was very depressed (after his discussion with Stalin) because his point of view had not found any support. He told me this personally. Afterwards, on the question of the united front, perhaps the only thing which might have saved the German proletariat from Hitler, it wasn't possible to interest Stalin in the need to save German democracy, and he hated the social-democrats. Lenski also thought that it would have been good if some sort of united front had been made. In 1932 there was the strike of the Berlin transport workers, when the Communists and Nazis collaborated, which no doubt played its part in bringing Hitler nearer to power.

W. Just as in the case of the social-democratic government in Prussia.

P. Lenski was present when Thaelmann was arrested. The Nazis were so intent on capturing Thaelmann that they overlooked Lenski. Thaelmann's secretary, Werner Hirsch, was also arrested; he was afterwards freed, escaped into the Soviet Union, and there was arrested, tortured, and probably died in prison. That is another story. Lenski, before the arrest, was present when Thaelmann got his last instructions, which came five weeks after Hitler assumed power. 'Now they want a united front', he said sadly, 'now when it is too late'. When the party line was changed in 1935 at the VIIth Comintern Congress, and Dimitrov was made general secretary, Lenski was still in favour.

W. Yes, he was editing the Polish communist paper in Paris in 1936.

P. During the whole period of the popular front Dimitrov gathered around himself all the people who were in favour of it. In 1936 Polish party fortunes were again improving because of the popular front. There was a wave of strikes and it was taken for granted that now the Polish party was on the road to success.

But although there was nothing against the Polish party from the ideological point of view Stalin's hostility to it was increasing from month to month. It was stabbed from behind because of the GPU apparatus, Stalin's suspicion, and his wish to have a monolithic unity centred solely on himself.

W. Can we now come to those culminating two years?

P. By 1937-38 ideological factors were no longer decisive. The NKVD and Stalin's personal entourage wanted to liquidate all those people who seemed not wholly reliable after what had already happened to Polish leaders. (That's a point which one must always keep in mind that a large number of people were eliminated only because other leaders had already been eliminated, after which those who remained could not be trusted. It was Stalin's idea that a man whose brother had been killed could not be relied upon.) The second question was the preparation for war which by then had entered its final stage.

W. Do you have any corroborative evidence from your own experience which can point in this direction?

P. I personally heard the declaration, made as far back as 1933, a few months after Hitler came to power, that the only possibility for Russia to survive as a power was to make sure that the conflagration in the West should break out before the fire in the East. I had authoritative information to rely upon, that in 1937 the question of making a possible compromise with Hitler at the expense of Poland was already becoming more concrete and Stalin wanted no internal opposition in case of a compromise with the Germans; not only was bourgeois Poland to cease to exist, but also the Polish Communist Party. I can only say one thing—

I have many arguments and facts confirm- this. This point was prepared beforehand, the dissolution of the Polish Party was a paration for the pact. I was told this plan been made by a member of the Polish Cen- Committee, who was not shot in 1937-38, only condemned to 15 or 20 years, and who with me in the prison camp and died there. ore he died we had many conversations, le he was with me in the camp hospital. He been Polish representative in the Commun- Youth International. He died in December 9.

By the time the Polish party was dissolved were in prison. Did you meet many of the sh communists who were arrested and sent ne camps?

Very few, because most of them were arrested shot during the Great Purge. The proce- was quite short. It was complete exter- ation. That was at the time of the Bukharin . The wave of terrorism reached its height . Thousands and thousands were shot, only ry few survived. I was told by a man who ived, who was arrested only in the 40's and was until then an employee of the NKVD, in Moscow alone there were no less than *thousand* Poles shot before 1939.

Ten thousand in Moscow. How many alto- er?

n all, he thought, about 50,000. Many of emigré Poles; the rest were Russian Poles. n in 1956 I again went into the question to over what had happened, it turned out that in people, of the rank and file, but not the ers, had survived in the camps. Also some were arrested before the Great Purge. For nce I met a man in Moscow who was sted in the Sochacki case in the early days. he was not considered important enough e shot, and he got only a short term and n the big storm broke he was in a camp, far away. He was working and survived he is now in Warsaw. He returned in 1946 n Stalin permitted a search in the Soviet n-camps for the survivors among the Polish munists.

The lists apparently included 800 names.

But I was told that those lists were of no tical significance, because Beria included em people who had already been shot. I should say that the Polish survivors in the camps in this period of 1946-47 had big hopes. Some of them had connections; they knew that something was going on, and tried to get in touch with the Polish party, which was now in power. Both Bierut and Gomulka did their best to rescue the Polish communists from the Soviet camps and prisons. And when they came back they were accepted in Poland as equals, and even before they were rehabilitated they got high posts in the party and government.

W. When you came back to Poland, what sort of questions were put to you?

P. Everybody, from the lowest to the highest party level, asked just these questions: 'Are there any survivors; who has survived and what was the fate of the leaders'? And from 1955 onwards there were efforts (and as far as I know they still continue) from the Polish side to find out what was the fate of the Polish communists in Russia. The Polish communist leaders were really interested to learn the truth even before and of course still more after the rehabilitation of the Polish party. But it is practically impossible to find out a big part of the truth, because the NKVD kept only such records as were in its favour and allowed no access even to these. I was told that certain documents were handed over after 1956. But only on condition of non-publication.

W. But do you think they will release any of these documents to the Poles?

P. That is possible. But I am not sure. I was told that they released documents which were concerned with the personal life, perhaps even with the end of certain people. But I don't think that these were fundamental documents. I know that in certain cases even when family members were trying to ask for some information about their relatives, no promises were made.

W. There was a special commission set up in the Polish party after the rehabilitation of the Polish CP. What sort of a commission was it?

P. It is surrounded by secrecy.

Mr. Theodore Draper writes from New York: The 'Comintern Reminiscences' in your issue of April-June 1960 contained many observations that should be of absorbing interest to future historians of the Comintern. Nevertheless, your

informant's memory has betrayed him at least with respect to the American aspect of Gusev's career.

Gusev (or Drabkin) did not live 'for a time as an emigré in America and had some knowledge of English and of the American labour movement'. There is no evidence at all that he ever worked with the IWW.

Gusev came to the United States for the first time in 1925 as the Comintern representative to the American Communist Party's Fourth Convention. He made the trip to the United States via Mexico where he stopped for several weeks and applied himself to studying English. The story of Gusev's activity in the United States is told in my book, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, which is being published here on 16 May and it is too long to tell in this note; suffice it to say that he did not try 'to smooth things over'. For the first time in the American party's history, he, as Comintern representative, overthrew the elected majority and installed in power the minority faction.

Gusev died in 1933, not in 1936 or 193 and his obituary may be found in *The Co munist International*, 22 June 1933.

I trust that these corrections of details m cause no offence to your informant; they mere reinforce the old historical lesson that memori are fallible and need to be checked by all mea

Our author replies: The story of Gusev work in America was told me by members the Comintern Anglo-American secretari when I asked why he had been appointed that post. I had no means of checking the sto which may have been spread precisely to co ceal his visit to Mexico and his unfamiliar with English (similar cases of misinformati are known to me). I was referring to G.'s at tude in private conversation—his actions we no doubt determined beforehand by the instru tions which he, like all other Comintern rep sentatives, received. I am grateful for M Draper's corrections and look forward to rea ing his book.

"THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA"

is the new Summer 1960 issue of

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TEWS AND REVIEWS

NTI-NIETZSCHE

Eugene Kamenka

'HE class making a revolution', wrote Marx and Engels in the *German Ideology*, 'ap-rs from the very start, merely because it is posed to a *class*, not as a class but as the resentative of the whole society; it appears he whole mass of society confronting the one ng class. It can do this because, to start h, its interest really is more connected with common interest of all other non-ruling ses, because under the pressure of condi-is its interest has not yet been able to elop as the particular interest of a particular ss'. At the same time, 'each new class which s itself in the place of the one ruling before is compelled, merely in order to carry ugh its aim, to represent its interest as the mon interest of all the members of the iety, put in an ideal form; it will give its is the form of universality, and represent n as the only rational, universally valid, s'.[1]

Though Mr. Oduev does not cite this passage, s this Marxian conception of the initially olutionary and progressive ideology of a class ggling for leadership gradually degenerating a repressive and conservative expression of ticular interests, supplemented by the Lenin-theory of imperialism, which underlies his raisal of Nietzsche's place in the history of osophy.[2] It was while the bourgeoisie was evolutionary class struggling against the old er, says Mr. Oduev, that it produced the osophers of the French Enlightenment usseau, Diderot, etc.) with their emphasis freedom, equality, and progress. As capi-m moved into the confident period of the market, some lip-service was still paid to e ideals, especially as applied to economics, philosophy now turned to serving the prac-l need of the bourgeoisie for industrial and scientific knowledge, finding its expression in the positivism of Auguste Comte and its off-shoot, the empiricism of John Stuart Mill. But by the middle of the nineteenth century the instability of capitalism was already becoming apparent: recurrent crises sapped the optimistic confidence of the bourgeoisie and produced the pessimistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Then came the inexorable movement of capi-talism towards imperialism—the concentration of industrial and bank capital in increasingly fewer hands, the external aggressiveness made necessary by the internal crises of capitalist countries, the internal aggressiveness produced by the fear of the rising revolutionary move-ment of the working class, all leading inevitably towards fascism.

It is this final period of aggressive imperial-ism, says Mr. Oduev, which finds its theoretical expression in the work of Nietzsche. His hatred of socialism and the people, his exaltation of leadership and the superior class, his insistence on the revaluation of all values (i.e., on reject-ing the former bourgeois ideals of freedom, equality, and progress), his emphasis on the will to power, mark the cynical emergence of the real values of the bourgeoisie desperately engaged in a naked struggle for survival. Nietzsche's philosophy was thus an expression of the emergence of new tendencies in the capi-talist process in general, but his instinctive per-ception of these tendencies and his complete identification with the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie were made possible by his class background and the special conditions of the German bourgeoisie. The latter, says Mr. Oduev, following a well-known Marxist line, had never been a genuinely revolutionary class. It had achieved its material aims not by pro-claiming a revolt in the name of freedom, but by a compromise with the Prussian *Junkertum* and aristocracy designed to protect them both from the threat of popular revolt. Thus it was that notions of leadership, order, and militarism had become deeply ingrained in the German bourgeoisie from the start.

Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Abt. I, Band 5, S.37.

S. F. Oduev, *Reaktsionnaya Sushchnost Nitsshe-va*. Published by the Higher Party School and lemy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central mittee, Moscow, 1959.

Nietzsche, then, is the prophet of imperialism. 'Nietzsche's attempt to transform Schopenhauer's passive voluntarism into a heroic realism was dictated primarily by the need for bourgeois ideology to defend itself against Marxism and its growing influence' (p. 92). Faced with the task of converting Schopenhauer's pessimism into an activist, dynamic philosophy of life, Nietzsche found a simple solution: since the world was ruled by will, this will had to be given an active, concrete dynamic aim: the will to power (p. 84).

Like many prophets, Nietzsche had his vision a little too early. His cynical rejection of conscience and morality, his stinging attacks on Christianity repelled many bourgeois thinkers who welcomed his onslaught on socialism and his spirited defence of the superior class.[3] But by 1900 Nietzsche was beginning to arouse interest and qualified approval. From then on, 'the further we move from the date of Nietzsche's death, the fewer reservations surround the acceptance of his views. . . . The deeper and sharper the crisis of the world capitalist system, the more necessary the philosophical armour of Nietzsche in the theoretical arsenal of the imperialist bourgeoisie' (pp. 9-10). Admittedly, the universal horror engendered by the excesses of fascism has since the war made it increasingly necessary to attempt to dissociate Nietzsche from fascism, to claim that fascism perverted his doctrine and glorified its inessentials. But Nietzsche can no more be divorced from fascism than fascism can be divorced from the essential nature of capitalism in its imperialist stage; the very influence of Nietzsche among bourgeois philosophers, historians, and sociologists, points to the constant and inescapable tendency of imperialist capitalism to develop into fascism.

THIS, I think, puts rather more cogently and concisely than Mr. Oduev is able to put it, the argument of his work; it is all that he has to say of significance in a smallish book of 260 pages. In Russia, as in the West, there has grown up a species of professional academics and thesis-writers with a tremendous armour of quotations and references. Mr. Oduev cite from literature on Nietzsche in French, Ge man, and English, paying special attention his revival among German existentialists; gives a passing glance at such sociologists L. Baudin, G. Mosca, E. Lederer, M. Ginsbe (who is attacked viciously but unskilfully f 'not believing' in progress), the economi Schumpeter, and such philosophers as Sant yana, Bertrand Russell, and the personalist Hocking; he valiantly attacks both racism a cosmopolitanism and ends by denouncing t cult of war. But, taken as a whole, *The Rea tionary Essence of Nietzscheanism* suggests fairly shoddy doctoral thesis, the sort that su ceeds because labour, however uninspired, mu be rewarded. The historical material outline above is at once the best and the least origin feature of the work; but even here Mr. Odue is obviously unable to relate his main pictu of philosophical development to his subsidia view that the main struggle in bourgeois philo ophy is between idealism and materialism, a that Nietzsche is the culmination of the phil sophical progression Berkeley-Hume-Schellin Schopenhauer. His exposition of Nietzsche views is on the whole sound, but unilluminatin in his criticism Mr. Oduev is content to rely the easily aroused emotive antagonism that fo lows from a mere statement of Nietzsche views. There is no attempt to consider serious Nietzsche's conception of the conditions culture or his reasons for rejecting the beli in progress; indeed, it is precisely at such cruci phases that Mr. Oduev indulges in bald counte assertion. Similarly, his citations from conte porary Western philosophy and sociology su gest the persistent twitter of a sparrow and n the discerning eye of a hawk; subjectivis scepticism (especially regarding progress democracy), pragmatism, and a belief in t importance of power in the history of huma relations all count as examples of Nietzsche influence and therefore as expressions of bou geois imperialism.

What impelled Mr. Oduev to write this boo he indicates in his preface, is the new flood literature praising Nietzsche emerging fro Western Germany and certain other capital countries. For the Old Bolsheviks this wou have been an occasion for some brilliant pa phleteering or for an exciting, if inaccura excursus into the history of ideas or the inte action of social phenomena. For the new gen ation of Russian specialists it is all too often

[3] On the other hand, Mr. Oduev notes, his radicalism and vicious attack on mercantile values have attracted 'such great progressive writers' as Stefan Zweig, Thomas Mann, and George Bernard Shaw, and even such Marxist critics as A. V. Lunacharsky, M. B. Leiteisen and Henri Lefèbvre. But, of course, this radicalism is only a cloak—it is radicalism in the service of reaction.

asion for padding out the statement of an rly unexciting, unoriginal, but safe view h a great deal of pedestrian quotation and stration. The new spirit in Russian philoso- is not likely to manifest itself by a critical ppraisal of the validity of Marxist concepts; the growth of philosophical interest and npetence must not be measured by the will- ness of even mediocre Soviet philosophers to scour professional Western journals in order to find grist for their mill. It can rather be felt in those philosophers who (like A. S. Bogomolov of Moscow University) choose for their doctoral theses and philosophical work subjects where Marxist criticism does require genuine philosophic work in *understanding* the man to be criticised. At the level at which Mr. Oduev discusses him, Nietzsche requires no such work.

HREE EVENTFUL YEARS

Pierre Bonuzzi

HE historiography of Russian communism has recently been enriched by a new book,[1] which it is not too much to say that it deserves east as much attention as did Khrushchev's ort over four years ago. For this is indeed markable work, without precedent in West- communist literature: never before has -criticism' been carried to such lengths, er has discussion so free from dogmatic nulas and stereotypes been devoted to the stions which continue to trouble a great ny rank and file communists and fellow- ellers; it is manifestly intended for certain llectuals who need to be taken in hand again; by that token it announces, without any bt, a re-casting of the propaganda themes se in the West.

Vith real mastery and much subtlety, the nor strives to defend a thesis to which one not deny the merits of novelty and an un- l clarity. The thesis is simple, and is skil- developed throughout the work: the past eviewed; blunders and mistakes admitted; e were sometimes necessary evils; com- ists will no doubt commit further mistakes; rtheless, the USSR is henceforth the second d-power, and the Soviets have decided to n 'in fifteen years at most . . . the highest dard of life in the world' (p. 225).

he past and its blunders? That was the k which Mr. Giuseppe Boffa (Moscow cor- ondent of the Italian communist daily à from 1953 to 1958) had to encounter n his arrival, as did so many others. The 50 pages of this book present a pathetic probably sincere account of the 'dismay'— the word appears with emphasis on p. 14—that comes over the militant communist from the West at his first contact with the reality so 'profoundly unlike' what he had imagined. His impressions are 'chaotic and contradictory; a good many of them frankly inexplicable' (p. 12). Soon 'I began to be aware that we ourselves, who were its friends, had made this country into a myth, an immaterial monstrosity not indeed floating in space but situated in a sort of limbo where terrestrial laws were no longer valid' (p. 14). Mr. Boffa has seen *all*, known *everything*—all the aberrations seen and reported by visitors to the Soviet paradise, as well as by many refugees from it; all the tragedies lived by those who have escaped from Siberian prisons and camps. His book is a journalist's report, a manual of history, and a course of economics; and he conveys all this in a vivid style that is a far from negligible aid to a narrative whose tangled course conceals numerous and intentional omissions. Yet the very easiness of the style creates, in the end, an uneasy feeling: for the most abominable things are recounted in a tone so laconic, so simple and detached, as to verge on the improbable. One cannot help wondering what the history of Nazi Germany would look like, viewed with the same 'objectivity'.

ONE of the essential motives of Mr. Boffa's thesis is to 'explain' the process which led to the 'violation of democracy' and the 'cult of personality'. Neither 'capitalist encirclement' nor the need for strict discipline and rigid centralisation, nor the struggle against the oppositions was the decisive cause, though each played its part. The true causes became manifest with the introduction of the first five-year plan and

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Giuseppe Boffa, *La Grande svolta* (The great ng-point), Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1959.

the adoption of the principle of one-man management and responsibility in each sector of activity, and when, in spite of Lenin's warnings, the Soviets' powers of control ceased to be effective. Stalin, who 'a few years before was certainly not the most striking [figure] in the party' (p. 54), then became prominent, because he succeeded in convincing the majority that it was possible 'to build socialism in one country'. His domination only became really baneful after 1934, after the XVIIth Congress, where he put forward his famous formula: 'Once the political line has been correctly fixed, organisation decides everything'. Here he was drawing attention to an urgent need of the moment. 'But this thesis may become dangerous as soon as it is set up as a rigid principle' (p. 60). And so it did, the writer tells us, not only because of Stalin's will but because 'instead and in place of the old class contradictions which were fading away, new contradictions appeared in the forefront of Soviet society' (p. 57).

These 'contradictions' revealed themselves first in the course of the first phase of industrialisation and in the collectivisation of the countryside—'a necessary struggle against an enemy class' (p. 53)—which provoked an inflow of unskilled man-power to the new enterprises and necessitated the hasty formation of new cadres. These two phenomena, so massive and so intense, may well have been among the chief causes of conflict. 'In their ardour to attain objectives whose greatness all can see, a good many people thought that administrative and authoritarian measures were the simplest and the most decisive' (p. 66).

A wave of authoritarianism thus swept over the country and, following a well-known pattern, back again towards the central power from which it derived renewed vigour, consolidating and reinforcing authority at the same time. 'The evolution was slow. Hardly perceptible at first. . . . Centralisation begins to take on the aspect of personal power; a power which gradually becomes limitless for want of any control. Stalin grows less and less accessible to any criticism. At the same time energy and firmness tend, in him, to be transformed into despotic will. The restrictions on freedom, which ought to have been temporary, were not only pushed too far, but were erected into a system of government, leading finally to the excessive power of the organs of repression. The myth of "personality" supplanted the idea of the masses as the motive-power of history. . . . Gradually, all successes were ascribed directly to Stalin. . . . Later came the adulation, th hymns, and the monuments. That is what co stitutes the "cult", the deviation from Leninis the negative side of Stalin's political work' (65).

The consequences are known, and Mr. Bof recalls enough of them, taking care, howeve to insist upon the part played by Beria, whi ignoring that of Yagoda, as he also ignor nearly everything that happened before th trials of 1936 to 1938. On the other hand, h demonstration brings out clearly, though i voluntarily, the way in which this last aspe of Stalin's deviation was both the pretext ar the justification for the psychosis of 'encircl ment', that favourite theme of Soviet prop ganda. Mr. Boffa more or less explicitly rejec this, as an excessive and rigid generalisatio but reserves the right to use it again for h own purpose when, for instance, he refers 'American atomic blackmail' (p. 207) which, we shall see presently, has in its turn justifi the orientation of the USSR's foreign policy.

The psychosis of encirclement is not the lea of the causes of the major 'contradiction' which he vaguely alludes at the end of th volume, when he is speaking of the resourc that the Soviets devote 'regardless of econom to the 'creation of instruments of modern wa Having stated that, in principle, the sums th the Russians spend upon armaments wou come to much the same, in round figures, those spent by the Americans (thus contradic ing Mr. Khrushchev's statement that the Sovi figure would be 25 milliards against the USA 40), our author deduces that the USSR mu have borne greater sacrifices than the Unit States, whose productivity was four times great (in 1948), and that 'to achieve disarm ment would liberate immense reserves of ener and open the way to a prodigious "leap fo ward" in the standard of living' (p. 218). B he does not explain that the burden of Russi armaments, like the earlier effort of industri isation, has been borne by the agricultural pr ducers. Whereas a steep rise in retail pric was imposed by the currency reform of 194 the prices paid to the kolkhozes for their pr duce remained at pre-war levels. 'Enormo taxes bore down upon the small plots and liv stock that the members of the kolkhozes po sessed individually; the peasants slaughter their cattle and uprooted their fruit-trees rath than pay the taxes. . . . What could the peas gain from labour so little remunerative? T youngest and the hardiest abandoned the fie

l went to work in the towns. In five years, pite the obstacles that were put in their way, exodus was registered of nine million persons o had left their villages' (p. 190).
Armament policy or agricultural policy? ose are the real terms of the 'contradiction'. September 1953, the Central Committee had n informed of the situation in agriculture. the July 1955 session of the Central Com- tee Bulganin reported on the difficulties of ustry. This revealed, says Mr. Boffa, that the iet economy was mobilised from top to toe a new armament drive, and the Soviet lership was confronted with a growing dis- ilibrium between the different sectors of pro- tion. The real problem was how to reverse tendency in foreign policy which had made pitalist encirclement' into a reality from rch all the internal difficulties proceeded.

" is to be hoped that Mr. Boffa's book will be translated, if only for the sake of the few es that deal with the proceedings and the im- diate repercussions of the XXth Congress. se pages are among the best; the same can- be said, for obvious reasons, of the two agraphs devoted to the 'events in Hungary'. should find it difficult to agree that the ed intervention was legitimised by its having n decided upon after consultation with the r socialist countries (p. 126).
o less second-rate is nearly all the second of the book, which examines the reforms ounced by the XXth Congress. The analysis uperficial and incomplete, but there is one vation in the themes for propaganda that orth noting: that is, the tentative way in ch the possible developments of certain insti- ons are envisaged. With regard to the 'per- ent councils of production', set up by ee in each enterprise, for instance, Mr. a, after recalling the old debate about kers control and affirming that the principle single command' cannot now be called in stion, leaves us to infer that, since nothing et defined, many possibilities remain open 250).
he 'agrarian reform' is presented similarly. author recalls Stalin's opposition to the idea the collectives should own the equipment he Machine and Tractor Stations—'instru- ts of production that belong to the State, therefore to the collectivity'. But this is ow that the question no longer really arises, use group property (kolkhoz) and State property (sovkhoz) are in course of evolution and tending to converge, giving rise to a new form of property, of which one knows only that it will be 'collective' (p. 199). But all the examples cited—the disappearance of small individual property; the substitution of money-wages for remuneration in kind; the subordination of the kolkhozy to the authority of the local Soviet—these are all signs of a strengthening of the grasp of the State, which would end in suppressing every vestige of individual enterprise.

THE profound transformation of the Soviet economy is an indisputable reality; and one of its consequences has been a no less radical modification of social relations, bringing about in its turn 'the demand for a wider democracy'—that is the essential factor in a long process which led up to the XXth Congress (p. 79). To this question Mr. Boffa devotes one of the most curious chapters in his book (p. 240 ff.). Here we find a tentative explanation of the formula of 'democratic centralism'. The implied contradiction is explained (in substance) on the one hand by the necessity for a single directorate over production and, on the other, by the fact that, where property is collective, the masses make necessary sacrifices voluntarily; and this, according to Mr. Boffa, is what gives the regime its democratic aspect. It is true that he also gives us to understand that the Soviets have, after all, sacrificed only 'that which they never possessed' (p. 216). 'The mistake was to present the political system of the USSR as something perfect' (p. 242). The system is evolving, and tending to assure a greater participation of the masses in decisions about economic matters; however, the contradiction between democracy and centralism 'will disappear only with the disappearance of the State' (p. 243), which is the most ideal objective of all, since, as he affirms elsewhere, 'To speak of the extinction of the State today would be premature, and even demagogic' (p. 137).

Need we ask what becomes of socialism in this perspective? Its 'indisputable historic victory' is that it knew how to valorise the immense riches of the country (pp. 147-148); and 'its great advantage . . . is that it is a more rational system of work and of production' (p. 177); while the reason for its existence is 'the satisfaction of the growing demands, material and spiritual, of the popular masses' (p. 219).

Apart from this, Mr. Boffa leaves us with no illusions. Soviet society tends obviously to equalitarianism. But it 'cannot and never will be equalitarian in the plain sense of the word. All levelling, contrary to the law of socialism which stipulates that each should receive in proportion to his work, would deprive the individual of the incentives necessary to progress' (p. 224).

Though the aim of such a work as this is obvious, several questions remain to be asked about it. Why was the task of writing it entrusted to an Italian? and, after publication in Rome with the aid of the official Communist Party publishers, why has its circulation, even in Italy, aroused no special publicity and attracted so little attention?

A plausible answer would, we think, adduce several explanatory circumstances: Mr. Boffa is certainly one of those Western communist journalists who enjoy most confidence in influential Soviet circles. We may recall, among other things, that it was from his dispatches from Moscow that the Western press derived its earliest information about the XXth Co gress, and the first signs of those dissensions the heart of the 'collective leadership' whi were to end in the expulsion of the anti-pa group. This seems to confirm the hypothe that the Italian CP plays a leading part amo the communist effectives in Western Euro and in the Mediterranean sector. For though was precisely among the Italian communi that the events of 1956—the XXth Congr and the Hungarian revolt—aroused the p foundest misgivings, it is still in Italy that co munism disposes of the most solid and reliab support it has in the West.

Mr. Boffa's work is thus a halfway attem for use inside the communist movement, explain and demolish myths at a time when t Italian CP is getting ready to enter a new pha of 'democratisation' announced at its ninth co gress in January. It is a trial balloon, cautious launched, and it is rather unlikely that it w be tried out elsewhere, at least before the su mit conference reveals what chances there a for an international détente.

A NOTE ON INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY

K. R. Tidmars

FOR many years general psychological study in the Soviet Union was faced with serious difficulties. These are well known and have been described in a growing body of monographs in English (and in articles in recent issues of *Soviet Survey*). Freud was attacked for seeing man as a biological rather than a social being. He concentrated on the individual and ignored the environment. The importance attached to instinct and the subconscious was furthermore regarded as unscientific. Only last year, a meeting was held in Moscow on the Ideological Struggle against Freudianism. Freudians are still attacked for 'denying objective economic laws of the development of society, the class struggle under conditions of capitalism, advocating extreme subjectivism, the importance of chance in history, and declaring as the primary basis of social life the individual consciousness and even an irrational concept called the subconscious . . . Freudianism in psychology denies the leading role of the masses in history, reducing them to the position of a passive group controlled by great personaliti There is no doubt that Freudians, by the means, fulfil the social orders of the bourge classes'.[1]

Labour psychology was understood in t USSR primarily in terms of productivity stu This conception differs very little from the t ditional definition of labour psychology as it w understood in the West until about 1935, t study of man *vis-à-vis* a production proce discounting factors such as job satisfaction a social influence at work, which are less imme ately concerned with the production proc itself.[2] In general this is still the case. Ho ever, work study, time and motion analysis, a

[1] *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1959, II, p. 170.

[2] 'Labour psychology is a science which conce the psychological mechanism and psychological l of the most important field of man's activity aim at the transformation of nature and the production material and cultural wealth. It is, of course, possible to explain this activity in a total way wi out taking account of the characteristic personal

Continued on p.

r methods of raising productivity were, l recently, condemned as designed primarily ntensify labour. Paradoxically, however, as been suggested by Bauer, the reason for lukewarm attitude even towards the behavi- sts such as Pavlov and Bekhterev during ng period was, in fact, that they saw man as a productive shaper of his own environ- t but as a passive product of this environ- t. 'With the inauguration of the five year s, the Soviet leaders became much more pied with controlling behaviour and stimu- g motivation than with explaining it. In context, it made little sense to hold to a le deterministic notion of man. What pur- does it serve to let a man explain criminal counter-revolutionary behaviour on the nds that he has a bad environment, or have eaders to consider a worker's level of pro- ivity as predetermined? The task of leader- was not to explain such behaviour but to ge it'.[3]

uman relations' work in capitalist coun- has always been condemned for the obvi- reason that any work aimed at improving ar-management relations in a private enter- was seen as a mark of reformism, calcu- to distract the worker from the class gle. The subject is rarely examined in the ext of a communist society. While 'non- gonistic' contradictions are theoretically ble in Soviet society, the subject of the lance of these is treated as part of 'ideo- al work.[4] A Soviet author recently wrote t 'human relations' work in the West that geois labour psychologists seek to examine,

inued from p. 112

e worker and the whole complex of social con- s in which the given activity is accomplished.... social context of working activity cannot be d—as labour psychologists try to do—to the y and plant technical milieu, artificially ted from society and the basic motive forces development. However, while taking account e social surroundings which condition labour ies, the labour psychologist must not replace ychological analysis of the work process itself the study of these relations. Otherwise, his e will lose all its specific character and will be d in an endless number of ethical and social ms.' (D. A. Oshanin, *Voprosy Psikhologii,* 1956, p. 158.)

A. Bauer, *Harvard Business Review,* Vol. /I, No. 3, p. 128.

and then remove in the interests of the capitalists, difficulties arising in the sphere of these relations. It is therefore not strange that progressive labour psychologists refuse to follow this course. The best of them are coming to the conclusion that these difficulties are insoluble in a capitalist plant, since the contradictions lying at the base of these difficulties are antagonistic contradictions'.[5]

DURING the Stalin period, industrial aptitude testing had been condemned as a 'bourgeois instrument for preserving the class structure'. It was forbidden by decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1936. The same applied to intelligence tests in schools which, it appears, were found to produce results embarrassing to Soviet policy. The reason was probably that children from bourgeois families and likewise from metropolitan parts of the Union consistently scored higher points in such tests,[6] while in the industrial tests peasants with ex-kulak background were shown to be more talented.[7]

There has of late been a change in the official Soviet line on psychology. Ten or even five years ago the very problems raised at the recent conference on Freudianism would have been ignored as utterly irrelevant. Now, however,

[4] An interesting comparison has been made between 'human relations' activities in the West and 'propaganda' and 'ideological' work in the USSR. 'Neither is content with the introduction of new technical processes or organisation in order to attain a certain purpose in industry. Both seek to influence the individual, the man, the small group in such a way as to obtain from them a voluntary co-operation in production, their goodwill and an extra effort by placing more store on the effort of the individual and the collective. On one side and on the other, the purpose is to obtain the highest labour productivity. Technical improvement alone will not suffice. Action directed to the individual—psychological action—tends, both here and there, towards a better integration of the individual in the enterprise. Both wish him to take to heart the purposes of the community, its plans and its future' (A. Vixlaird, 'Les Relations humaines dans l'entreprise soviétique', *Hommes et Techniques,* Oct. 1959, p. 935).

[5] D. A. Oshanin, *loc. cit.,* p. 159.

[6] It was stated that they 'pervert the class policy of the regime'. See R. A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology,* Cambridge, 1952, p. 113.

[7] Spilrein, 'Psychotechnics in the Reconstruction Period', *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii,* 1930. vol. XXXIX, p. 117.

even though the question is discussed in a one-sided fashion, a special conference is at least called which recognises their existence.

If one looks at the subject of industrial psychology, however, a very interesting and much more decisive development has taken place during the last three years. The author of an article in *Voprosy Psikhologii*, in analysing the forms and the methods of labour psychology used in the West, ended his study with the words, 'we must proceed decisively along the road to the creation of our own Soviet school of the psychology of labour'.[8] This statement followed closely on an article in *Kommunist* (1956, 4), the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which called for a resurrection of labour psychology.

It is stated in this article that 'the basic insufficiency [of Soviet psychology] is its divorce from practical affairs, the examination of such vital questions as child psychology and labour psychology'. Another article is more explicit still:

'In the study of questions of the psychology of labour, complete stagnation has reigned over a number of years. And yet it is quite clear that it is to man as the decisive element in the production process, that the closest attention must be given. In the working conditions of man, psychological questions find their expression which to a great extent determine the productivity of his labour. In labour are brought out and formed the individual psychological peculiarities of personality. Psychology must study those methods of tuition and those conditions of activity which can help the worker to attain the best results.'[9]

In the first instance the blame for the sad state of affairs is placed on the psychologists themselves:

On them depends the linking of their science with the wider practice of social construction. A lot depends likewise on the organisation and planning of psychological work in general. For this reason the headquarters of our academic world—the Academy of Sciences of the USSR —must be brought in to the question and in such a way that psychology is integrated within its system. No small role in the divorce o psychology from practice was played by th incorrect attitude to psychological science o the part of certain senior officials. It was be lieved by these officials that psychology wa some kind of an abstract science, having n relation to progress and unable to be of an direct use in this respect.'[10]

In the definition given by *Kommunist* to th subject of psychology, the emphasis placed o labour psychology is patent. It embraces

'The study and development of the scientifi bases of the development of the psyche of man his capabilities and powers, analysis of th means of forming the valuable aspects of hi personality, and the study of the psychologica conditions for the effective organisation o human activity and, in the first instance, o human labour.'

The emphasis on the practical means in fac that psychological methods are henceforth t be used intensively for the promotion of highe productivity.

'A most important task confronts Soviet societ —by every means to increase the productivit of labour. . . . Up till now, while a number o branches of natural science have been succes fully tackling this task, psychology has stoo apart from it.'[11]

and again,

'Interest in and attention to industrial ps chology is explained by the exceptional impor ance of that basic problem which it, togeth with certain other sciences, is aimed at resolvin —the problem of labour productivity. In th final analysis, it is precisely to this problem th the whole group of different questions in th sphere of labour psychology can be reduced.

The directive in *Kommunist* expanded on th as follows:

'Very considerable problems face scientists the work of a wide examination of questio of labour psychology—of the psychologic factors concerned in increasing labour produ tivity, the development of advanced techniqu and complex methods of production. It is, f instance, necessary to study the most ration forms of training method best adapted to t conditions of modern production techniq (high-speed mechanisms, complex signallin etc.), work planning habits by the worker

[8] D. A. Oshanin, *loc. cit.*, p. 159.

[9] V. V. Chebysheva, *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1955, No. 4, p. 29.

[10] *Kommunist, loc. cit.*, p. 90.

[11] V. V. Chebysheva *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

[12] D. A. Oshanin, *loc. cit.*, p. 159.

nual operations. Likewise of great import-
e is the psychological determination of the
t conditions for a given labour process such
organisation of place of work, timetable of
our processes, development and placing of
alling instruments, etc. Of real import-
e in a number of professions is the need to
e account of the psychological peculiarities
a worker from the point of view of his best
ptation to the demands of a particular
cess.

However, over the last few years scientific
earch work in the field of labour psychology
l dwindled almost to nothing. While a num-
of medical and physiological institutions
e been concerned with labour hygiene, occu-
ional diseases and labour physiology, the
ition is completely different in the field of
our psychology: studies on these questions
particularly rare, and as for the training of
sonnel for this field, it is non-existent. On
whole, the present state of psychological
dy of the working activity of man, while
resented by valuable but literally unique
dies, cannot be considered as satisfactory.

Looking at the experience of the past, it is
productivity work of the so-called 'psycho-
nics' which is singled out with disapproval:
the field of labour psychology one cannot
note the negative experience of so-called
chotechnics which had a particularly wide
lication in our country in the 1920s and '30s.
chotechnics was conducted at that time with-
any extensive understanding of conditions
uliar to socialist production and was pursued
manner divorced from general psychology,
ch itself was going through a period of re-
ptation on new Marxist theoretical founda-
s. . . . This, however, does not mean that
work on labour psychology had been carried
on incorrect lines. Alongside scientifically
ounded psychotechnical studies some inten-
studies of labour processes had been carried
, aimed, in the first instance, at the applica-
in practice of methods designed for the
st effective execution of working opera-
s.'[13]

he author then refers to several experiments
ied out during that period. One of these
cerned a production process at a ball-bear-
plant,

which particular importance was attached
he capability of the worker to assess particu-
larly short intervals of time, so-called micro-intervals, in relation to the peculiarities of a particular operation. It was determined that an insufficient development of "consciousness of micro-intervals" limited the productivity of the worker and effective means of developing these qualities were found.'

ANOTHER experiment mentioned in this article concerns the best means of conveying instructions to workers in a chemical plant in such a way as to secure immediate reactions to these instructions.

What was done in the past is now practised in the present. Two examples may be quoted. The first, described by Chebysheva, concerns a study carried out at the Kapranov shoe plant by the Institute of Psychology of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. The experiments were made to determine the reasons for difficulties in the tempo of work, and whether the work of slow workers could be speeded up to the level of leading workers and, if so, by what means.

Experiments by time and motion methods were carried out on a group of female workers to ascertain the effects of speeding up the conveyor system. It was found that one worker, by adapting a peculiar technique developed by herself rather than the one taught at the vocational training school, was able to attain a higher productivity than her colleagues. It was found possible to raise the tempo of work although this demanded higher powers of concentration. Speaking of the acceleration of tempo the author writes:

'It is usually thought that work at high speeds always demands a greater strain and is therefore more exhausting than work at slow speeds. But an experiment with the acceleration of the tempo of the simplest operation shows that the degree of strain depends upon the particular motions employed. A forced acceleration produces an alteration in motions. Following exercises, the new tempo of activity becomes easily attainable.'[14]

It emerges from this experiment that high-tempo work, far from lowering the quality of the goods produced, in fact lowered the number of faulty pieces.

Kommunist, loc. cit., p. 88-9.

[14] U. U. Chebysheva, *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1955, 4, p. 38.

'Results of this experiment show that defects occur most often on days when the worker is employed at slow or reduced tempo. On days of high pressure, the quality of goods produced rises. High-tempo labour mobilises the personal capacities of the worker, forcing him better to exploit the existing conditions of work and to seek to apply his own development of more rational motions. On the other hand, work at slow tempo is poor in its content and does not mobilise and consequently does not develop the capacity of the worker.[15]

In case it should be thought that these methods increase the burden on the worker's shoulders, it is pointed out that,

'Under Soviet conditions the increase in tempo is not a simple mechanical acceleration in the motions of the worker. It is a complicated, creative process based on the growth and enrichment of the worker's personality, since the increase in the tempo is usually the result of a manifestation of the creative initiative of the Soviet worker seeking all means for increasing his productivity for the fulfilment of his social obligations.'[16]

Another experiment described in an article by S. Y. Rubinstein concerned methods of selecting operators for electronic computers. Female clerks in this operation are required to transcribe data from manuscript on to cards by using electrical punching machines. Absolute accuracy is required in this operation, since the slightest digital error on the keyboard throw out the total calculation. After many experi ments it was found that success in operatin these machines did not depend upon any innat aptitude of the typist but rather upon the di position of keys on the board, correct writing- the way the letters were formed—and the traini ing given to the worker.[17]

This ties in with the Soviet attitude toward aptitude testing referred to above. Bauer write that: 'The Soviet version draws a clearcut lin between the "progressive" attitude of Sovie psychology and the imputed reactionary doc trine that the *I.Q. is immutable*'.[18]

Oshanin writes of Western psychologists, wit apparent disregard of their real interest i training methods:

'Their basic methodological difficulty consis in the technique of determining the degree o correlation between data derived from psycho logical study, on the basis of which a prognos is offered and a selection of personnel mad and actual success in professional activity. Th is first of all because the very concept of pr fessional success in bourgeois psychology is u scientific. *The understanding of aptitude a primary and unalterable qualities of personali leads to an abandonment of questions of pr duction training which is typical of labour ps chology.* For a pedagogue working within system of vocational training, decisive impor ance is attached not to the static measureme of professional aptitudes but to the question o possibilities for their further training. Labo psychology in the West does not seek or giv an answer to this question, although the simpl fying, metaphysical view prevailing there severely criticised by progressive psychol gists.'[19]

However, one Western writer suggeste recently that aptitude testing may see a reviv in the USSR.[20]

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 42. It is not irrelevant to note that the Soviet attitude to Taylorism is also changing. On different occasions Lenin had written both in favour of and against Taylor's views. In a review of a book by O. Ermansky about Taylorism, Lenin had written that, 'At all costs take everything valuable from European and American science—that is our first and most important task'. Several years earlier, however, he had written about Taylorism, 'What does this scientific theory consist of? To squeeze from the worker three times more labour in the course of the same working day'. For many years this latter view prevailed in the USSR. This is now changing and the positive aspects of Taylorism are now singled out. The author of an interesting new book on technology and social progress writes, 'Making a general assessment of the teaching of Taylor, one can draw the conclusion that it contains many positive aspects, particularly in the struggle against superfluous and awkward movements as well as the development of the best methods of accounting and control'. (G. V. Osipov, *Tekhnika i Obshchestvenny Progress*, 1958, pp. 46-47.)

[17] S. Y. Rubinstein, *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 195 No. 4, p. 46.

[18] Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, 195 p. 152.

[19] D. A. Oshanin, *loc. cit.*, p. 156.

[20] A. Mintz, 'Recent Developments in Psycholo in the USSR', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 195 p. 478.

INOLOGY

Hugh Lunghi

N his classic survey of the world cinema, *The Film Till Now*, Paul Rotha once declared: e significance of the Soviet film has been gely over-rated by enthusiastic *cinéastes*. ause they were often forbidden, all Soviet is are hailed as the supreme example of dern cinema, all Soviet directors as film iuses; with the result that the cult for Soviet is has become slightly hysterical and more n a little tedious in its parrot-like cry'. The ation is not quite so bad now. Most serious lents of the cinema have long realised that progressive little film societies and clubs quently did more harm to Soviet films by r extravagant adulation than most of those is deserved. But the mystique of the Soviet still lingers on. Mr. Leyda's history of the ssian and Soviet film does something to bedy that,[1] but it fails to dispel the confusion ch still exists and which is fostered by the n anomalous products of the Soviet film ustry that are exported abroad.

Mr. Leyda's book is unashamedly political. himself admits as much in his introductory rences to the 'less than happy episodes in iet film history'. Mr. Leyda need not apolo- for his *engagement*, because the history of iet films is meaningless without the back- und of their political environment. Films in iet Russia are as much politics as art—and applies just as much to those films sent side the USSR. Curiously, however, Mr. da 'justifies' his 'open discussion' of the tical background not on grounds of histori- or even of artistic truth (though he does say 'idyllic' versions of these events do little ce to issues or individuals); his chief con- , it appears, is that the 'thousands of film- ers in China and Eastern Europe' should make the same 'mistakes' as the Soviet ma made in the past.

evertheless, his account of the truly fas- ting history of the Soviet cinema is neither enetrating nor as critical as some studies that have appeared in the Soviet Union itself in the last few years. Although he is by no means blind to the shortcomings of many Soviet films and can hardly avoid mentioning the 'less than happy episodes', Mr. Leyda does his best to minimise them, and in doing so produces a subtly, but quite markedly, distorted picture both of Soviet reality and of Soviet film-making. It is questionable, for example, whether even Mr. Khrushchev would recognise his toned down portrait of Stalin. Mr. Leyda seems to put the blame on the film-makers for 'idolising' Stalin in the notorious post-war Stalin-worship films. He makes a brief reference to 'signs of megalomania', and while it is doubtful whether Mr. Leyda's description of Stalin as 'one of the few in positions of authority who paid the cinema more than lip service' would stand up to critical examination, it is his excursions into political analysis and comment that most clearly define his attitude. For example, he anticipates criticism of the withdrawal of anti-Nazi films by the Soviet authorities while the Nazi-Soviet Pact lasted, by describing how much more 'anti-fascist' the pre-Pact Soviet films were than British or American films, which pulled their punches, according to Mr. Leyda, in order not to lose the German market. What is much more misleading to the uninformed reader is Mr. Leyda's subtle distortion and suppression of the facts of Soviet history, which impinged in the most direct fashion upon the development of the Soviet film.

Mr. Leyda's *History* is an advance on the apologias of his predecessors, because he uses what might be called the 'mistakes' technique, which explains away the 'less than happy episodes' of past Soviet history as unfortunate 'mistakes'. Alternatively, he softens their real nature by totally misleading descriptions. The blood baths that followed Kirov's assassination in 1934 are referred to as 'some disturbingly unpublicised arrests and . . . even more disturbingly publicised trials'. He admits that 'these trials had repercussions among film-making personnel' and adds that 'there were disappearances that have never publicly been

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[1] Jan Leyda, *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1959.

explained'. Even Mr. Khrushchev has employed less sophistry in explaining these events. The impact of the terror on the development of the Soviet cinema can hardly be dismissed so nonchalantly without giving a very false impression of the forces which made Soviet films after 1930 what they were.

Occasionally one wonders whether Mr. Leyda's view of Soviet history is not due to a naiveté which seems incredible in someone who studied film making in Soviet Russia for three years at first hand and who has made such a painstaking study of his subject. 'Trotsky's ego made him lose sight of the greater political aims of the Party, and the fat was in the fire'. One might suspect him of indulging a grisly sense of humour when he writes about the film 'A Great Citizen' that it was 'so intimately' connected with 'the Moscow trials, that actors were understandably reluctant to play the enemies' roles' if he did not go on to say that the actors finally accepted the parts because they thought it was their 'social duty' to do so. The Soviet invasion of Poland in partnership with the Nazis is described as the creation of a 'buffer zone, comprised of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia'. The prohibition on dealings with foreigners is dismissed as 'a certain xenophobia', and his criticism of the way film careers were cut short by purely political events is reduced to this kind of formula: 'no attempt has been made to explain the silence of Dziga Vertov's last years'.

This attitude is reflected throughout the whole book, and colours Mr. Leyda's approach to his main subject, the development of the Soviet film. The story of the Soviet cinema, which possessed the elements of a tragedy of almost epic proportions, is reduced to little more than a struggle between the demands of an 'industry', with its insistence on efficiency and profits, and those of 'art'. The sacrifice of Soviet film workers on the altar of politics is depicted as nothing worse than a 'purgatory of administration'—the same sort of situation, in fact, as in the non-communist world. Mr. Leyda himself is fond of drawing the parallel—'anything Soviet Russia has done, the West has done worse', seems to be his motto. 'The sad blank chapters of Seroheim and Flaherty have some motifs in common with the silences of Eisenstein and Dovzhenko', laments Mr. Leyda. Such comparisons do the greatest disservice to the great Soviet film directors.

However, while the overall picture of the growth of the Soviet cinema may be misleading there is a wealth of interesting material not only about the Soviet cinema but also about the young pre-revolutionary Russian film industry. As far as I am aware, no previous work in English has ever presented so much material on the film in Russia from its earliest days. This is one of the fullest and best documented accounts of the pre-revolution cinema. In both the pre-revolution and Soviet sections there are fascinating items of information: for instance that the first publication devoted entirely to film appeared in Russia, and that the idea of the 'feature documentaries' which became the vehicles for the 'cult of personality films' originated with Pudovkin. There are glimpses of the earliest filming done in Russia; the first Russian producer, filming a sequence for the Jubilee of the Romanov Dynasty in a village and the villagers presenting to the actors their grievances against the local government. Tolstoy appears as a most reluctant film star, and we get a delightful vignette of Trotsky as a film extra in America in 1916, registered by the studio as Brown.

On the more technical side there is a vivid picture of the Kuleshov studios which laid the foundations of the Soviet cinema, and some penetrating analyses of Soviet film classics. Unfortunately this rich material has little coherent shape; the arrangement is almost haphazard and there is much irrelevant matter, so that one often gets the impression that Mr. Leyda operated on the principle 'if film or cinema is mentioned in a story, shove it in'. The chapter on his own stay in Russia, although it has one or two interesting impressions of famous Soviet film figures, is particularly disappointing. There are sudden and often disconcerting switches from one subject or one film to another, rather as though he were trying to apply the 'shock cutting' montage technique of the film to the printed page.

More serious than these faults in a book that claims to be a complete history is the failure to do justice to the period since 1956, which has seen the beginnings of a new revolution in the

viet cinema. This is not a question of being ertaken by events, since Mr. Leyda has refer- es to works where these changes are des- ped and where the previous period comes in strictures more severe than any Mr. Leyda kes. Mr. Leyda ignores the new films which e moved away from depicting the collec- towards trying to portray the individual. also fails to mention such young Soviet ectors as Khutsiev and Miriner of the Odessa dios and the Georgians Chkheidze and uladze. The omission is the more serious because these new trends have roots in the 'old masters' of the Soviet cinema. It is significant that two-thirds of Mr. Leyda's book are devoted to the film up till 1930; the later 30 years merit only one third; and of the 61 plate illustrations only three relate to films later than 1930. Mr. Leyda does not explain why Soviet films after that date do not 'make the grade', just as he fails to recognise the new trends that may recover some of the artistic standards of those earlier Soviet films, which won international recognition.

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ur Contributors

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We regret that in our last issue Professor Ernst Bloch was given as the author of Sein und Zeit; *Professor Bloch is the author of* Erbschaft der Zeit.

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